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Abstract 
Contemporary liberal democratic societies currently enact immigration policies that are 
morally indefensible from a liberal autonomy and social justice perspective. In a world 
characterized by stark inequalities in individual opportunities to lead autonomous lives, 
and in which many individuals lack the basic conditions for autonomous functioning, 1 
argue that contemporary immigration regimes that distinguish between desirable 
immigrants - who are typicallY from similarly wealthy countries - and undesirable ones -
who are typically members of the global poor - conflict with liberal commitments to 
individu al autonomy and equality of opportunity. 1 advocate that su ch commitments 
should lead wealthy countries to change their criteria for immigration, so that they admit 
proportionally many more of the global poor than they currently do. Such redistributive 
immigration policies are a way for rich countries t() fulfill their global distributive justice 
duties. The thesis examines two major objections to formulating immigration policies on 
grounds of global distributive justice. First, sorne theorists posit a moral distinction 
between compatriots and non-compatriots, and argue that duties of redistribution should 
be restricted to compatriots. Second, sorne theorists fear that redistributive immigration 
schemes will have negative consequences on the conditions of social justice in host 
communities. This fear derives from the assumptions that social solidarity and social trust 
will be eroded by the greater ethno-cultural heterogeneity that is likely to result from the 
implementation of redistributive immigration policies. In response 1 show, first, that 
social solidarity is not circumscribed by national boundaries; the empirical evidence does 
not support daims that solidaristic acts rely on a predefined idea of community. Second, 
drawing on the Canadian case study, 1 find that institutional trust rather than interpersonal 
trust is key to motivating compliance with social welfare policies, and that this kind of 
trust can be sustained under conditions of ethno-cultural heterogeneity. 
Résumé 
Les sociétés démocratiques libérales contemporaines préconisent à présent des 
politiques d'immigration qui sont injustifiables à partir d'une perspective qui privilégie 
l'autonomie libérale et la justice sociale. Au sein d'un monde caractérisé par des 
inégalités extrêmes en termes de la possibilité individuelle de mener une vie autonome, 
nous soutenons que les régimes actuelles d'immigration, distinguant entre les immigrants 
désirés (qui parviennent des pays d'une richesse comparable à celle des sociétés 
d'accueil) et non-désirés (qui viennent le plus souvent de pays nécessiteux), reposent sur 
une opposition discutable entre les attitudes libérales dominantes, d'une part, et 
l'autonomie individuelle et l'égalité des chances, d'autre part. Par contraste, nous 
proposons que le libéralisme exigent que les pays riches changent leurs critères 
d'admissibilité à l'immigration, de sorte qu'ils admettent davantage d'immigrants de pays 
nécessiteux qu'ils ne le font aujourd'hui. Une telle politique d'immigration redistributive 
serait une façon pour les pays riches de s'acquitter de leur devoirs globales de justice 
redistributive. Par conséquent, notre thèse porte sur deux objections majeures contre les 
politiques d'immigration basées sur la justice distributive globale: en premier lieu, l'idée 
courante selon laquelle il existe une distinction morale entre le concitoyen et le non-
concitoyen; ensuite, l'idée selon laquelle toutes politiques d'immigration redistributives 
pourraient mener à des conséquences négatives sur les conditions de la justice sociale 
dans la société d'accueil. Or ces craintes naissent de la supposition que la solidarité et la 
confiance sociales sont minées par l'hétérogénéité ethnoculturelle qui est produite par 
l'imposition des telles politiques d'immigration. Par opposition à ces soucis, nous 
soutenons d'abord que la solidarité sociale n'est nullement définie par les frontières 
nationales. En d'autres termes, l'hypothèse selon laquelle la solidarité sociale repose sur 
une idée fixe de la communauté n'est pas étayée par l'évidence empirique. Ensuite, par 
rapport au contexte canadien, nous montrons que la confiance institutionnelle, non 
interpersonnelle, est l'élément clef pour motiver le soutien des politiques de l'État-
providence. Enfin, nous montrons que la confiance institutionnelle peut être maintenue 
dans des conditions d'hétérogénéité ethnoculturelle. 
Introduction 
1 Immigration Regimes, Individual Autonomy and Social Justice 
Public debates about immigration reach us through the news almost every day. 
Mostly, these news stories are about people from poor countries trying to make their way 
to the borders and shores of ri cher countries. Spain' s immigration procedures, for 
example, have been subjected to careful scrutiny by the international media in recent 
months since increasing numbers of migrants from West and sub-Saharan Africa have 
tried to enter European soil by climbing the fences surrounding the two Spanish enclaves 
in North Africa, Ceuta and Melilla. The US grapples with Central Americans trying to 
cross into US territory, while European countries have to face man y Africans who risk 
their lives attempting to cross the Mediterranean, or who try to enter European territory 
by hiding in ships and trucks heading that way. The answer to most of these harrowing 
attempts from the governments of the EU and the US has come in the form of higher 
fences, stricter border patrols, and increased pressures on the governments of those 
countries through which hopeful immigrants move on their way from the South to the 
North. The EU, for example, has signed agreements with formerly shunned Libya, 
obliging the Libyan government to do its best ta deter individu ais from moving through 
its territory on the way ta the Spanish enclaves - a way for Spain ta forestall, as it were, 
having ta deal with people on their borders. 1 Similarly, the government of Morocco was 
1 1 should note, however, that despite its attempts to deter more immigrants, the socialist Spanish 
government has nevertheless granted an amnesty in 2005 to 700,000 illegal immigrants already in Spain 
(Die Zeit, 30th March, 2006, and The New York Times, lst August, 2006). Similar amnesties are now 
debated for many illegal workers in the US under the Kennedy-McCain law proposed to the US Senate in 
March 2006. Such amnestÎes attempt to strike a balance between upholding immigration regimes on the 
1 
encouraged to shut down traveling routes through the Western Saharan territory. Most 
recently, Spain has started to patrol the sea with both police and hospital ships on the 
lookout for rickety boats carrying would-be immigrants - a measure that is not only 
intended to pre vent more people from landing on its shore, but also to pre vent rising 
numbers of deaths by drowning that occur regularly on the dangerous sea routes from 
Africa to Europe? These and other similar developments such as the establishment of 
"detention camps" for shipwrecked migrants off the ltalian coast and the ltalian practice 
of relocating those kept in these centres to Libya where they are imprisoned before being 
sent back home3 have suggested the metaphor of "Fortress Europe," which European 
governments are keen to defend.4 
There are, of course, many different reasons why individuals want to leave their 
country of origin and immigrate to another one. Most of those desperate enough to board 
unseaworthy boats, or trek through the desert, hope to immigrate to countries that will 
afford them a better life. Many are young men who set out in order to be able to send 
money back- money that will make aIl the difference to those left at home.5 Others may 
move to another country to study there, but find themselves wanting to stay on for 
one hand, and catering to the interests of those who have already employed illegal immigrants (and who 
claim that they rely on such workers) on the other. 
2 The Guardian, 23rd March, 2006. 
3 Amnesty International (2005); see also The Guardian, 8th October, 2005. 
4 Many European governments are in this together, of course: since the Schengen Agreement came into 
force in 1993 abolishing border contrais among the signatory states - these include as of today Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden - once one has entered any of the Schengen countries (even illegally, 
i.e. without necessary visas and a valid passport), one is relatively free to travel across the territory of ail 
the Schengen countries. Rence, if one enters Spanish territory, it is easy enough to work one's way to 
another country in the Schengen group. 
S In the words of one man trying to get to the Canary Islands, and who had already been forced to turn 
around twice after encountering security forces: "It's a shame for my family, who are waiting for me to 
send money from Europe. That's why 1 would rather die on the seas than return to Mali." (The Guardian, 
23rd March, 2006). 
2 
personal reasons. Again others may originally have been recruited to work in a host 
country for a specified number of years, and then find themselves settling in and staying 
longer. This was the case of many Gastarbeiter, or guestworkers, in Germany. What aIl 
of them share, however, is their intent to leave their country of origin and take up life 
somewhere else. 1 conceive of immigration, then, in the most general sense, as "the 
movement of pers on or persons from one state into another for the purpose of temporary 
or permanent settlement" (Ku kath as 2003: 570). 
ln our contemporary world, the conditions of su ch movement are officially 
legislated by sovereign states. Every state has an immigration policy that regulates the 
movements of people onto its territory, as well as their initial settlement. A state's 
immigration policy typically deals with two kinds of cases. First, international 
recognition of a dut y to aid refugees fleeing natural disasters, political chaos, religious 
persecution, war and the like, leads many states to admit small numbers of migrants as 
refugees. Second, states encourage and accept much larger numbers of migrants in order 
to fulfill a variety of economic and social needs of their communities. For example, 
admitting immigrants may help to fiIllabor force needs, contribute to demographic 
stability or enhance the cultural or religious make-up of the country. GeneraIly, it is 
illegal to enter a country's territory without going through its immigration procedures.6 1 
will refer to the underlying premise of the second set of policies - namely, that states 
should be free to regulate people's movement into their territory according to the ho st 
6 It is not illegal, however, to arrive at a country's borders and seek asylum as a refugee or ask for 
admittance as an immigrant. But while it is not illegal to come to the borders of a country in an attempt to 
immigrate, it is illegal to immigrate disregarding immigration regulations. Primafacie, therefore, those 
getting on their boats on their way to the Spanish, Italian or US shores are not yet in violation of 
immigration policies. But neither, at least from the perspective of European officiaIs, have they made 
sufficient efforts to comply with the set immigration policies. Instead, many would-be immigrants pay 
human traffickers exorbitant sums for the services they are expected to provide (The Guardian, 23rd March, 
2006). 
3 
community's needs - as the conventional assumption regarding national sovereignty in 
matters of immigration. It is this underlying premise of the second set of policies that 1 
want to discuss in the context of this thesis. 
1 argue that in a world characterized by stark inequalities, the implementation by 
rich countries of immigration policies built on the conventional assumption produces 
results that pose an ethical dilemma for liberal egalitarians. Contemporary immigration 
regimes challenge liberal commitments to individual autonomy and social justice in two 
different ways. First, in a world characterized by stark inequalities in individual 
opportunities to lead autonomous lives, and in which many individu ais lack the basic 
conditions for autonomous functioning, an unfair share of opportunities are available to 
those living in rich countries compared to those living in poor ones. Second, and 
compounding such inequities, the distinction made in contemporary immigration regimes 
between desirable immigrants - who are typically from rich countries - and undesirable 
ones - who are typically members of the global poor7 - contradict liberal principles of 
individu al autonomy and equality of opportunity. Such inequities, 1 argue, cannot be 
defended from a liberal position, which is a position concerned with social justice for aIl 
human beings. Especially in those cases in which immigration into another country can 
make the difference between life and death, current immigration regimes that distinguish 
between desirable and undesirable immigrants cannot be defended. Instead, 1 aim to 
show that if we are concerned with individual autonomy, liberals ought to think about 
changes in immigration regimes as a means of remedial justice to enable conditions of 
7 1 will refer to the global poor and the globally worst-off - both of which 1 use interchangeably - as those 
2,6 billion people who live on less th an US$ 2 per day. This figure incIudes the 1 billion people who live 
on Jess th an US$ 1 per day. According to the most recent World Bank report, poverty rates have changed 
favorably in many countries with the stark exception of Sub-Saharan Africa, where 44% of the population 
lives on less than US$ 1 per day (World Bank 2006). 
4 
I~ 
autonomous living for aIl human beings. 1 will refer to such a concept of a new ethics in 
immigration as redistributive immigration po/icies. To implement redistributive 
immigration policies would change the picture of immigration. First, while potentially 
existing alongside immigration regimes that allow for family-related immigration, for 
example, redistributive immigration regimes would most likely lead to an increase of 
immigration from countries with whom rich countries serving as ho st communities do 
not share a history, language or culture. And it wou Id change the ratio between those 
who immigrate coming from rich countries, compared to those from poor countries.8 
The first aim of my thesis is to propose and promote su ch revised immigration schemes. 
My proposaIs for a change in the ethics of immigration might be challenged from 
various different positions. 1 will attend to the most significant of these. Sorne liberal 
authors argue that immigration policies need to reflect a balance between the justice 
concerns we have for members of what might serve as ho st communities to immigrants, 
and the justice concerns we have for the globally worst-off (Miller 2005; Walzer 1988; 
Whelan 1988) and they might argue that redistributive immigration policies will 
undermine social justice in host communities. One of the achievements of liberal 
egalitarian societies is the establishment of functioning welfare states. Suppose that a 
society has established a functioning welfare state, which includes equal access to 
education and medical care, for example. Clearly, such a society has made positive steps 
8 To illustrate, the biggest portion of temporary immigration into Canada in 2004 came from the US, 
followed by citizens of Mexico, the UK and Australia (ail figures from Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada 2004: 66). The top ten source countries for temporary workers between 1998-2004 were 
continuously the US, Mexico, the UK, with Australia, France, Jamaica, Philippines, Japan and Germany in 
the second half. In 2004, citizens of the G8 countries represented 48.8% of temporary workers in Canada, 
compared to 47.2% in 2003, and 49.5% in 2002, with the pattern persisting for the period between 1996-
2004. In Chapter One, 1 will explain that temporary work permits wou Id be a measure consistent with 
redistributive immigration schemes, which is why this category is the most relevant to examine when 
making a case for a change in immigration ethics. According to my proposai, more individuals from very 
poor countries should be able to work and reside temporarily in rich countries like Canada. 
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towards realizing the goal of providing its members with conditions of autonomous 
living and fair equality of opportunity. To achieve and sustain such a welfare state - i.e. 
the one built on the idea that society' s better-off contribute to the welfare of those less 
well off - some believe that societies rely on certain characteristics of the community 
that may be challenged by redistributive immigration schemes. The welfare state, they 
insist, particularly in its redistributive form may be challenged, if not jeopardized, by 
immigrants from different ethno-cultural backgrounds. The changing nature of society 
brought about by ethno-culturally diverse immigration might go hand in hand with a 
change in the trust that members put into the working of the welfare state. In other words, 
with new and different members to the national community, the rationale for reasons to 
have bought into and supported a scheme of redistribution - e.g. that we were all part of 
the same nation - may change to the point of alienation. Similarly, with a change in 
national identity and culture, sorne authors fear, we will witness a decline in social 
solidarity. However, only by being able to instill feelings of social solidarity and social 
trust can we obtain the necessary ingredients for establishing and maintaining 
achievements of liberal egalitarianism such as the welfare state. In this sense, then, 
restrictions to immigration may be called for from a pragmatic perspective, in order to 
protect the welfare state. 1 call this the social solidarity caveat. The second aim of my 
thesis is to investigate the fears that derive from it in order to assess whether su ch fears 
can serve as an argument against redistributive immigration policies. 
My proposaI for such policies should be read as an invitation to think about 
immigration differently from how we have conceived it in contemporary theoretical 
debates up until now. Liberal principles on immigration regulations have not received the 
same theoretical scrutiny as other topics that address liberal conceptions of the polit y 
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(Blake 2003). Debates about social justice, citizenship and minority rights abound in 
political the ory today, of course, but most of those contributing to these debates accept 
the regulations determining the make-up of the community in which princip les of social 
justice ought to be conceived, or in which fair citizenship and minority rights should 
apply.9 Another set of liberal authors has theorized the consequences of immigration on 
host communities and has discussed liberal ways of integrating immigrants within host 
communities. However, these authors have eschewed the question of whether or not the 
mIes that regulate who can become an immigrant are fair and equitable. Such theoretical 
neglect stands in contrast to the attention that issues of immigration - its regulation and 
failures to implement the mIes of a particular country - have received in public debate. 
As 1 raised at the outset, immigration has become a central topic in both European and 
American public political discourse. To be sure, what raises public concern is very often 
the effects of immigration, su ch as a perceived lack of integration of immigrants into the 
social fabric of host communities, or the numbers of immigrants that hope to immigrate, 
which sorne fear might challenge the social fabric of a host community. These concerns 
need to be taken seriously; indeed, as Kukathas has observed, 
immigration is an issue that is fraught with ethical difficulties, in part because the 
questions it raises are numerous and complex, but also because the stakes are 
high. Political stability, economic progress, human freedom, and economic 
survival all hang in the balance. (Kukathas 2003: 586) 
ln this vein, those authors who discuss the questions of integration and citizenship 
seem to address the most vital problems arising from immigration. Debates about the 
effects of immigration have to be contextualized, however, with what one might callfirst 
order Liberal princip/es. And in order to determine the implications of first order 
9 There are notable exceptions, of course, which will be discussed in the course of this thesis. 
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principles for immigration policy, liberals need to address the question whether it is 
defensible to support immigration regimes that violate the implementation of the liberal 
principle of individu al autonomy and equality of opportunity. 
2 Thesis Layout 
ln Chapter One, 1 explore how immigration policies compound international 
inequities. 1 posit that there is a tension between the liberal princip le of individual 
autonomy and the inequalities that arise from the arbitrary fact of being born into a rich 
country, rather than into a poor one. Therefore, 1 argue for a cosmopolitan 
conceptualization of immigration that accounts for our liberal duties to pro vide 
individu ais with conditions of autonomous living on a global scale, and 1 sketch a 
different kind of immigration policy. This policy is based on the idea that rich countries 
should accept immigrants from poor countries as one way of fulfilling their dut Y to 
redistribute wealth on a global basis. 1 elaborate the liberal princip le on which such a 
redistributive immigration policy might be based, namely what Rawls caUs fair equality 
of opportunity, and 1 promote such policies as a means of remedial justice for the non-
ideal world we live in. 
ln Chapter Two, 1 explain the motivation and rationale of possible objections to 
my proposaIs from Iiberal nationalists. A first objection might be that we accept duties of 
redistribution in a domestic context, but that we do not incur su ch duties in an 
international context. Liberal nationalist authors motivate their stance with what 1 caU the 
socially contingent model for principles of social justice and individu al autonomy. This 
model postulates a link between social justice and a shared national community and 
identity. 1 criticize this model and argue instead that principles of social justice must be 
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defined universally in order to serve as reference points by which we evaluate what is 
just or unjust in a global context. Moreover, 1 show that the empirical evidence we have 
from the world today indicates that individuals compare their conditions of life with 
those of others on an internationallevel. To advocate an account of social justice that 
does not allow us to compare the conditions of life in one country or society to another or 
several others misunderstands how justice considerations are actually carried out. 1 then 
move on to investigate the second objection that might be raised. Liberal nationalists 
hold that individu aIs have a different set of duties towards fellow nationals compared to 
non-compatriots. 1 explain that this claim is founded on an ethical particularist account of 
our moral duties, an account 1 show to be unconvincing. 1 follow this with a critique of 
the argument that the relationship we have with our compatriots compared to the ones we 
have with non-compatriots warrants redistributive duties towards the former, but not 
towards the latter. Employing what Samuel Scheffler refers to as the "distributive 
objection" to special relationships, 1 main tain that even if we accepted that there are 
special relationships between compatriots, these would nevertheless not permit us to 
negate our global redistributive duties. 
ln Chapter Three, 1 address the first part of the social solidarity caveat. This 
caveat seems to me to have most critical merit when rethinking national immigration 
schemes. 1 take as its basis the fear that redistributive immigration might challenge and 
potentially undermine two social conditions for the development and maintenance of 
institutions of social justice at the nationallevel, i.e. social solidarity and social trust. 
Both social solidarity and social trust are taken to be necessary to motivate individuals to 
contribute to a social welfare state and are hence considered to be foundational 
conditions for a functioning welfare state. These are both assumptions that warrant 
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clarification and analysis. 1 start out exploring the social solidarity caveat and speculate 
that accepting redistributive immigration policies might challenge our conception of 
community and that this change might induce us to feelless solidarity with compatriots 
and to have Jess social trust. To make sense of this assumption, social solidarity has to be 
understood in a specific way, namely as a moral ideal that is tied to our concept of social 
justice. 1 explain the moral ideal and set it within the context of my argument in Chapter 
Two, where 1 discussed what kind of duties we incur towards our fellow nationals 
compared to those we have towards non-compatriots. The first lesson 1 draw is that social 
solidarity is not plausibly circumscribed by national boundaries. 1 then explore what 1 
calI the instrumental definition of social solidarity, which ties social solidarity to the 
functioning of the social welfare state. 1 show that liberal nationalist authors hold that a 
social welfare state depends on feelings and acts of solidarity towards other members of 
the community and that such feelings are fostered and promoted by a cornrnon national 
identity. 1 challenge this argument with other accounts of the basis of welfare state 
contributions and question the argument that only sharing a national identity can bring 
about solidaristic behavior su ch as tax cornpliance. My own definition of what is 
necessary for the support of a social welfare state is what 1 caU a sense of civic 
mindedness. Civic mindedness does not prescribe the type of community belonging we 
need for a successful social welfare state. Actions of solidarity do not depend, as liberal 
nationalists claim, on feelings of shared national identity. Renee, the social solidarity 
caveat does not convince as an argument against redistributive immigration policies. 
Chapter Four, finally, evaluates a similar set of fears for social trust as a social 
condition for social justice. Sorne liberal nationalist authors believe that the only way to 
achieve the kind of trust we need to buttress policies of social justiee is to have strong 
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national identities, which, incidentally, discourage multicultural diversity. 1 explain that 
this fear is about the trade-off that modern societies may encounter between the 
accommodation of ethno-cultural minorities at the expense of measures of social justice 
aimed to help members from its lower socio-economic rungs. If su ch fears were 
substantiated, it would be plausible to say that the social welfare state may be 
jeopardized by a change in immigration policies. Redistributive immigration schemes, if 
they brought about ethnically diverse immigration that would undermine social trust 
could face a legitimate objection on grounds of liberal justice. However, 1 challenge the 
assumption that the social trust needed for the support of policies of social welfare 
depends on ethnie homogeneity. Evaluating data from the Canadian case study, 1 deduct 
that ethnie pluralism does not pose an insurmountable obstacle to raising support for the 
welfare state. Judging from the Canadian case 1 argue instead that a functioning social 
welfare state depends on institutional trust in the workings of those state institutions that 
are meant to preserve and promote the social welfare state. 1 show that it is not 
convincing to argue against redistributive immigration policies based on the fear that 
such polieies lead to increased ethnic pluralism and thus undermine social trust. 
Immigration, 1 conclude, is a topic that needs to be addressed from a principled 
position. LiberaIs cannot endorse immigration policies that are based solely on host 
communities' needs and concerns. Instead, a liberal principle of immigration has to 
account for the stark differences in living conditions that make it impossible for the 
poorest of the world to live autonomous lives. The need to rethink the principles of 
immigration in rich countries is heightened by the fact that concerns for social justice 
provisions in host communities do not provide plausible arguments against redistributive 
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immigration polices, since their implementation will not jeopardize the social welfare 
state in host communities. 
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1 The Case for Redistributive Immigration Poli des 
1 Introduction 
Why ought the subject of immigration policy raise troubling issues for liberal 
minds today? In this first chapter, 1 will provide a sketch of contemporary immigration 
practices that pose serious dilemmas to liberal theorists. Based on illustrative examples, 1 
will argue that conventional immigration regimes challenge liberal beliefs about 
individu al autonomy and equality of opportunity in two fundamental ways: first, an 
unfair share of opportunities to determine the shape of their lives - which is, within 
reasonable limits, how 1 summarize what it means to lead an autonomous live - is 
available to those living in rich countries compared to those living in poor ones; and 
second, and compounding su ch inequities, citizens of rich countries are admitted more 
easily to other wealthy countries than those coming from po or countries. 1 will follow 
this by an in-depth discussion of the liberal tenets that contemporary immigration 
regimes potentially defy and explain how liberal authors have dealt with the challenges 
that these immigration regimes represent. In this vein, 1 explore arguments dealing with 
the tension between the liberal principle of fair equality of opportunity and the 
inequalities in conditions of autonomy that arise from the arbitrary fact of being born into 
a rich country, compared to being born into a poor one. The tension between these two 
issues is highlighted by arguments for "open borders" to which 1 revert to as a reference 
point when assessing immigration regimes. Open border arguments help us understand 
what the world might look like if the movement of people was not govemed by 
immigration policies. 1 investigate how open borders would affect the lives of people, 
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and ask if they would help us approach the ideal of global justice. 1 thus employ the 
concept of open borders as a way of highlighting what remedies we should choose in 
order to come closer to providing individuals with equal opportunity and apply the 
rationale for open borders to support my argument for a revision of immigration regimes. 
1 hope to sketch a different kind of immigration policy than the one we now know. 
My aim is to defend an immigration policy based on the idea that rich countries should 
accept immigrants from poor countries as one way of fulfilling their dut y to redistribute 
wealth on an international basis. 1 will call such a change in the ethics of immigration -
for lack of a better term - redistributive immigration schemes. 1 will then sketch the 
liberal principle on which such a new ethic might be based, namely what Rawls callsfair 
equality of opportunity. Underlying my proposaI is the belief that, from a liberal 
perspective, it is difficult - if not impossible - to defend two conventional distinctions 
made in contemporary immigration regimes. First, such regimes make distinctions 
between "deserving" immigrants who should be allowed into a country because they face 
discrimination and/or persecution in their home countries - those immigrants, in other 
words, who are allowed entry into ho st communities based on their status as refugees 
(see UNHCR 1952) - and those who simply want to immigrate into a 'land of 
opportunity' to get a fair share of opportunities in life. To my mind, the clear-cut 
distinctions between Convention refugees and economic immigrants made on paper 
rare1y translate into reallife (see UNHCR 2000: 281). Two ex amples may help to clarify 
my point. Is a farmer whose fields have been destroyed for the third time in sequence in 
the course of ethnie conflict, and who flees to a neighbouring country to work in the 
fields there, an economic immigrant or a refugee? Or is a member of a persecuted 
minority who decides to seek asylum in a country that will afford her better economic 
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chances a refugee from persecution, or an economic immigrant?1O Rather than trying to 
fine-tune the distinctions made in nationallaws regulating the movement of people - that 
is, distinguishing between those who are deserving and those who are not deserving of 
immigration and work visas - it seems to me that a better way of dealing with the 
disparities in the conditions of life to which individuals are subjected is to assess whether 
such disparate conditions can be justified from a principled perspective, and if not, how 
to remedy the situation. Since 1 do not believe that there are such justifications, 1 propose 
redistributive immigration policies as a remedy, as a way to provide individu aIs from 
poor countries with access to adequate conditions of autonomy. In this instance, the 
second conventional distinction 1 want to challenge is that between desirable immigrants 
- who are typically from similarly wealthy countries - and undesirable ones - who are 
typically members of the global pOOL 
My proposaI for redistributive immigration policies is grounded in my second 
belief that liberals should work towards pro vi ding aU human beings here and now with 
conditions of autonomy and with lives which people "have reason to enjoy" (Sen 1999: 
19). My concept of autonomy foUows that of Joseph Raz who argues that for individuals 
to be autonomous implies that they "are agents who can [ ... ] adopt personal projects, 
develop relationships, and accept commitments to causes, through which their personal 
integrity and sense of dignity and self-respect are made concrete" (Raz 1986: 154). Or, to 
put this differently, to be autonomous implies that we are 
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part authors of our own lives, [that we have] a commitment to projects, 
relationships, and causes which affect the kind of live that is for us worth living, 
[ ... and that we can] control, to sorne degree, our own destiny, fashioning it 
through successive decisions throughout our lives. (Raz 1986: 369) 
Both these examples are taken from UNHCR (2000: 280). 
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A fundamental condition of individu al autonomy is it to have a range of options 
that may inform an individual's choices in life (Raz 1986: 372ff). We can first hold, then, 
that to have opportunities and options is a condition of individu al autonomy. For options 
to serve the ideal of individual autonomy in a meaningful way, furthermore, they need to 
be adequate. ll In other words, the options available need to represent a choice between 
one option in favor of another one, which is equally viable, exciting or fulfilling (Raz 
1986: 297). Both long-term options that carry pervasive consequences as to the direction 
my life will take and short-term options that apply mostly to trivial decisions in my life 
have to be available and open in order for us to be authors of our own life (Raz 1986: 
374). Finally, the options available need to be viable ones. 12 Only if the options available 
can also be realized and become concrete can they serve the ideal of individual 
autonomy. I3 
Now, the most important part of Raz' concept of autonomy for the purposes of 
this project is his stipulation that individuals can only be autonomous if not coerced, and 
if they have viable and adequate options and opportunities available to them. Both of 
these conditions of autonomy are threatened, 1 posit, by severe poverty.14 The individual 
autonomy of those existing in life-threatening conditions, or those living below a certain 
threshold of basic needs, is in jeopardy or violated. 15 1 therefore hold that those 2.6 
billion people who constitute the global poor do not have access to adequate conditions 
Il The options available cannot "be dominated by the need to protect the life one has" which is the case if 
"ail options except one will make the continuation of the life one has rather unlikely" (Raz 1986: 375). 
12 Michael Blake, who also follows Raz' definition of autonomy, argues that the viability clause should not 
be misunderstood to imply "the maximization of the number of options open to us" (Blake 2001: 269). He 
therefore argues for a concept of a "certain baseline of adequacy" of options and conditions of life that 
need to be provided in order to allow for "autonomous functioning" (ibid.). 
13 ln this instance, Blake's characterization of the limits on his autonomy by speculating about his chances 
to become a "superhero" might clarify what it means to have viable options available. 
14 See Jeremy Waldron (1989: 1116) and similarly Blake (2001: 267). 
15 ln this instance, 1 agree with Blake's concept of conditions of autonomous functioning. 
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of autonomy and that liberals ought to think about ways to pro vide them with access to 
the means of autonomy. 
To evaluate the scope and nature of my argument, consider the following 
comparison. Imagine we lived in a world in which aIl people had access to social goods 
and resources to enable them to lead a life they value and with which they were content. 
We might caB this World A (as in autonomy). In su ch a world no person is forced by 
desperate circumstances to move and migrate to another country. Instead, people might 
want to move for idiosyncratic reasons, because they fancy the idea of living in one place 
more than living in their country of origin. If we think about the ethical implications that 
immigration regulations would have in this world, 1 would venture that there might be 
few ethical restrictions to immigration policies besides the liberal clause that they cannot 
discriminate against people based on their religion, race, sex and the like. Individuals 
would not be disadvantaged or deprived of a certain quality of life by living in one 
country rather than another and therefore liberal democratic states, we might say, should 
be free ta decide who immigrates and settles into their territory. Barring one from 
immigrating to a country will not have any moral significance or will not inhibit her 
chances of enjoying a live worth living or stand in the way of her realizing the goals in 
her life since her country of origin provides her with just such opportunities. In other 
words, if we lived in such an ideal world, my critique of contemporary immigration 
regimes tailored to the domestic needs of the host community wou Id not be very 
convincing, and my proposaI would not have much moral clout. 
Compare this to a world where about half the people live in countries that do not 
provide them with the resources necessary for autonomous living or an acceptable quality 
of life. This is much like the world we live in today, marked by extreme inequalities 
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between the top 15% and bottom 15% of the world's population. 1 will call this World R 
(for real). These real unequal conditions in the world do pose ethical dilemmas to liberal 
democratic states in the richest percentile. To phrase this differently, in this non-ideal 
world we live in, countries are not as free to reject immigrants from the poorer half as 
they would be in ideal W orld A because the consequences of rejection in World R have 
much greater moral significance - indeed, for sorne it is an issue of living a valuable life 
compared to merely eking out an existence or even death. 1 believe it fair to conclude that 
in this World R, there is something morally wrong if the wealthy 15% are able to 
immigrate to each other's countries with great ease, while the bottom 15% and the 
bottom half in general are given a much harder time. Citizens of the rich countries form 
what we could caU a "mutual benefits club" built on principles of mutuai advantage and 
their reciprocation (see Scheffler 2003: Ch. 6). Such reciprocity, 1 posit, cannot be at the 
basis of a just and fair system of immigration regulations since it exclu des members of 
those countries, which have nothing to offer in exchange for relaxed immigration rules. 
ln other words, 1 argue that a morality of self-interest is not defensible because it leads to 
the exclusion of the moral claims of those with whom we do not share mutually 
advantageous relationships. 
1 will first provide an overview of what 1 call the state of immigration today 
(section 2), followed by an exploration of the liberal principle deriving from the belief in 
moral equality of aU human beings (section 3). Equal moral worth, 1 argue, is the 
foundation for the liberal concern with social justice, and more specifically, with 
providing equai opportunities for individu aIs to lead autonomous lives. 1 then 
contextualize concerns for equality of opportunity with arguments for open borders and 
cosmopolitan justice (section 4). In distinction to open border advocates, 1 argue that it is 
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access to the means of autonomous functioning that needs to be redistributed and made 
accessible to the global poor, rather than an encompassing cosmopolitan redistribution of 
wealth among all humans beings. One way of achieving this goal is to implement 
redistributive immigration policies, the essence of which 1 described in the following 
section (section 5). 1 conclude by drawing out sorne social consequences of such policies 
(section 6). 
2 The State of Immigration 
To substantiate my claim that current immigration regimes are contributing to 
unfair inequality, a look at the state of immigration and the policies regulating it seems 
warranted. To be sure, popular debates about immigration in the tabloid press most often 
revert to employing metaphors of insurmountable amounts of water and the dangers and 
challenges that come with them: governments have to "stem the tide" of the "flood" of 
immigrants that are threatening national communities even though "the boat is full". This 
is, of course, a misrepresentation of immigrants as a threatening and overpowering 
natural force that is coming over us. Instead, national governments regulate immigration 
and the number of people who are allowed in. Of course, sorne governments impose 
quotas based on assumptions about how many people their societies can successfully 
integrate, or according to their estimates of how many would benefit the host community. 
To suggest that immigrant numbers overstepping these limits are in sorne way 
threatening, however, is a deceiving construct of national rhetoric. In fact, domestic 
needs determine how societies think of immigrants. In post-war Germany of the 1950s, 
for example, the arrivaI of immigrants from Southern Europe was hailed as proof of the 
German Wirtschaftswunder, since they were meant to work in the re-established German 
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industrial sector that needed more manpower than Germany cou Id mobilize on its own. 
The fact that immigrants are today considered a threat - which is what is represented in 
the metaphors of "tides," "waves" and "boats" that are too full- cannot be explained 
with "natural" or "organic" numbers of people societies should encompass. Societies do 
not have organicaIly prescribed numbers that determine their viability. 
The scenario of Spain trying to "stem the tide" of immigrants coming from Africa 
has sensational news value, of course. And stories about the Spanish coast guard rescuing 
shipwrecked migrants catch our attention because of the inherent horror of imagining 
people dying simply in order to get to Europe's shores - ajourney many can make with 
ease. Rather than stepping up border controls and security in response to increasing 
numbers of those attempting to reach Europe - which seems the logic of the tabloid press 
- the plight of those fished out of the Mediterranean, or those held in Italian detention 
camps should raise questions to liberal minds. Should people desperate enough to risk 
their lives be taken in and given a chance to enjoy the opportunities those individuals 
who have been born in these places enjoy and take for granted? Or should the former be 
automatically returned to their points of departure simply because they are in violation of 
immigration regulations, or because potential ho st communities fear a flood of 
immigrants? How should we balance the fact that sorne consider their conditions of life 
in their home countries as so inadequate as to warrant the uncertain and dangerous trek 
north, with considerations of national interest that potential host communities might 
have? Must we balance them at aIl? 
Thinking about the treatment hopeful destitute immigrants receive also raises a 
second set of questions. How do these scenarios compare to sorne other immigration 
scenarios around the world? The ease with which a would-be immigrant may move 
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freely from one country to another depends on particular immigration policies. Most 
states restrict the free movement of people into their territory to sorne extent. Questions 
about immigration are thus tied to the make-up of the world as we know it, namely the 
global territory being divided up into the jurisdictions of different states. Indeed, as 
Kukathas writes, "what stance one takes [on immigration] will often depend upon - or 
shape - one's general views about the nature of the state" (Kukathas 2003: 571). What 
one thinks about immigration and the laws and policies regulating it will be influenced 
by wh ether one imagines the state as an administrative unit, or as a self-determining 
political community that is engaged in a common project, or as something el se again. 
ln answer to these sets of questions, 1 propose to evaluate contemporary 
immigration regimes of liberal democracies using the criterion of faimess. Most 
immigration regimes as they are applied today are markedly unfair. A comparative look 
at two scenarios helps to clarify my point. On the one hand, there are those living in the 
poor parts of the world trying to immigrate into its richest parts. However, they often 
lack the funds necessary to process their applications, or they lack the professional and 
educational skills that their desired country of destination is looking for to make them 
"desirable" immigrants. If, despite these impediments, they nevertheless choose to 
venture on the trek, and arrive at the borders of the country to which they hope to 
immigrate, most are tumed away. On the other hand, there are the citizens of rich 
countries who have enjoyed higher standards of training and education to be equipped 
with educational and professional skills a host country might be looking for. Or they 
might be employed by multinational corporations that will provide them with proof of 
employment and make their case to immigration officiaIs to facilitate immigration 
procedures. In comparison, then, sorne people travel and settle relatively easily in 
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between countries (members of the EU, North-Americans, Oceanians) while many others 
do not (Africans, many Asians). Citizens of wealthy countries, in effect, form an 
exclusive club, as it were, which immigration policies enable and perpetuate. 
Membership in this club entails the benefit of easy immigration, while denying the very 
same benefits to the world's poor citizens. There is, 1 would argue, a double standard 
when it cornes to entry and immigration regulations to wealthy states, with members of 
other wealthy states seemingly more welcome than members of not so wealthy ones. 
To be sure, personal wealth itself may not be an explicit criterion for a successful 
immigration application. 16 Instead, the favorable treatment of those coming from rich 
countries may be the result of other requirements, such as higher levels of education, or 
better professional skills. The exclusion of applicants from destitute countries, in other 
words, may be a secondary effect of immigration policies, rather than its underlying 
rationale. In this sense, sorne might argue that there is no problem with fairness. 
Moreover, they could argue that to prefer immigrants with good professional skills or 
high levels of education is not unfair, but instead will assure the successful integration of 
hopeful imllÙgrants into the social fabric of the host community. Such selection criteria 
are therefore geared to assure the interests ofboth individu al immigrants and the host 
community. 
Consider, though, the new regulations the government of the Netherlands has 
established for those willing to immigrate there, a country hitherto notable for its open 
immigration policies by European standards. As of March lSth , 2006, aIl hopeful 
immigrants have to take a "ci vic integration examination" in their respective country of 
16 However, Canada, for example, requires at least for one cIass of immigrants, namely those who do not 
apply with either the help of a Canadian sponsor or based on their professional skills, to prove that they are 
in possession of sufficient funds to survive for a period of time in Canada. 
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origin before being in a position to apply for a visa. This exam includes a Dutch language 
test, which poses the biggest hurdle for many hopeful immigrants since it has to be 
passed before entrance to the Netherlands, i.e. before man y would have a chance to 
acquire the necessary language skills. Furthermore, applicants are quizzed about their 
attitudes towards gay marri age and other examples of what Dutch officiaIs consider to be 
part of Dutch values, culture and lifestyle. Hopeful immigrants can order a test 
preparation kit for 80 Euro, and are invited to take the test at any Dutch consulate or 
embassy for the fee of 350 Euro per applicant. 17 These tests, or plans for them, are high 
currency in European immigration debates at the time of writing, with both Denmark and 
Germany contemplating similar measures (see The Guardian 24th March, 2006). 
Motivating their implementation is a deep concern for the successful integration of 
immigrants, something that many European governments feel they have not achieved. 
1 agree that successful integration is an important criterion for immigration 
regimes. 18 Especially if immigration is intended to help improve one's opportunities, 
which is my concern in this project, it is vital that immigrants can successfully integrate 
into their host community. Only if immigrants are able to take up the opportunities 
provided by their host community will they actually have a chance to realize their goal of 
17 See www.ind.nl/en/inbedrijf/actueel/basisexamenvervolg.asp. 
18 Integration and how best to further and achieve it has been a topic for theorists for sorne time now. See, 
for example, Rubio-Marin (2000) who argues that speedy integration of immigrants into the ho st 
community will best be achieved by conferring citizenship rights that en able participation in the 
democratic process. Rubio-Marin calls for a disentangJement of political participation rights, which ail 
immigrants would have an interest in and which in tum wou Id tie them to their host community and its 
welfare, and enforcing adoption of the nationality of the host community, which is a requirement many 
might shy away from. See also Baubock (1998) for similar points, and Barbieri (1998) for a verification of 
the ties between citizenship rights and integration based on a case study of Turkish immigrants to 
Germany. See also Kymlicka (1995) for a concept of citizenship rights aimed at integrating immigrant 
newcomers to a liberal community, and ibid (1998) for his account of the Canadian case. Kymlicka argues 
convincingly that the liberal state has a vital interest in integrating immigrants, and proposes, for example, 
language training as an important part of such a regime. 
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achieving an adequate quality of life. One of the goals of the proposed Dutch test is to 
stimulate immigrants to learn the language of the ho st community, and mastery of 
language is, of course, an important part of being in a position to participate in the social 
and economic life of the host community. Many critics have debated and questioned the 
helpfulness of such tests, however, and, indeed, there may be an important discussion to 
be had about their design. One could debate, for example, whether language training 
could not be provided more successfully in the host country, rather than in the country of 
origin, or whether it might be more fair to the very poor to expect them to learn the 
language of the host community once there, rather than to require them to obtain 
language proficiency in their country of origin. In the latter case, it might be difficult and 
expensive to learn a language and taking the actual test might involve traveling to a big 
city or the capital, for example, or acquiring expensive language instruction materials. 
Once in the host country, on the other hand, language training might be offered at little 
expense by ethnic communities, or by the government itself. In principle, however, to 
require immigrants to learn the language of their ho st community is not problematic from 
a liberal point of view: such a requirement is not discriminatory since language 
acquisition is, theoretically at least, open to all (see Carens 2003).19 
As soon as immigration schemes leave the realm of plausible principles behind, 
however, they start smacking of something other th an simple concern for integration. In 
this respect, it is worthwhile examining what else the Dutch government has written into 
its test guidelines. 
19 Carens provides a good overview of the difference between discriminatory immigration criteria, such as 
ethnie ties or background, and those that are non-discriminatory, like language and professional skills (see 
Carens 2003). Why this is important to liberal minds will be explained in more detail in the next section. 
24 
Persons of Surinamese nationality who have completed a minimum of primary 
education in the Dutch language in Surinam or the Netherlands, and can show 
this by means of written proof (certificate, testimonial) issued and authorised by 
the Surinamese Ministry of Education and Public Development [are exempt]. 
( www.ind.nl/enlinbedrijf/actueel/basisexamenvervolg.asp ) 
This is an exemption consistent with one aim of the test, i.e. to establish Dutch language 
proficiency. If such proficiency is already guaranteed because applicants have received 
Dutch language education, this part of the test becomes superfluous. However, why 
should aspiring immigrants of 
American, Australian, Austrian, Belgian, British, Canadian, Cypriot, Czech, 
Danish, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Icelandic, Irish, 
Italian, Japanese, Latvian, Liechtenstein, Lithuanian, Luxemburg, Maltese, 
Monegasque, New Zealand, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, Slovakian, 
Slovenian, Spanish, Swedish, Swiss, or Vatican nationality 
( www.ind.nllen/inbedrijf/actueel/basisexamen vervolg.asp) 
also be exempt? To be sure, most of these nationalities are part of the European Union, 
and it is part of the European Union agreements that EU citizens can seUle and take up 
employment freely in any member state. To impose a test on them, in other words, would 
be a breach of the Union's terms. But what distinguishes Canadians, Americans, 
Japanese, and Swiss nationals from, say, Turkish or Lebanese hopeful immigrants? If it 
is a concern that potential immigrants should accept Dutch "cultural values" like gay 
marri age and topless women sunbathing - representations of both of which are shown on 
the DVD accompanying the test preparation kit and are proposed as instances of the 
Dutch people's emphasis on tolerance - what should we make of the fact that those with 
Vatican nationality, whom one would not immediately expect to easily accept such 
values, be exempt from taking the test? The Swiss may have it easier in accepting certain 
Dutch cultural values, but should we assume that a Suisse romand, or French-speaking 
Swiss, would find it easier to learn Dutch than, say, a Chilean? 
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In order to make this li st compliant with the liberal stipulations that immigration 
criteria have to be accessible to aH hopeful immigrants and should not discriminate 
because of religion, race or ethnicity (see Carens 2003; Kukathas 2003), and, we could 
add socio-economic background, the Dutch government would have to show that these 
rules are not based on su ch reasons. In other words, it would have to explain what else 
those non-EU nationalities who are exempt share that justifies their exemption from what 
are otherwise rather stringent criteria. 
The Dutch government could make several arguments to justify its exemptions. 
For instance, it could invoke its national history as a colonial power. Many countries, 
including the UK and France, have had a tradition of conferring citizenship rights to 
those coming from former colonies, a practice that has only changed recently (see Carens 
1989). In this vein, the Dutch exemption of Surinamese not only from language tests but 
also the cultural value part of the exam may seem plausible. The assumption, or so it 
seems, is that the colonial heritage ensures speedy integration. Similarly, Germany has 
for the longest time recognized and conferred citizenship to "ethnie Germans," i.e. 
citizens of German descent, such as the descendants of Hessian émigrés to Russia who 
had moved East, lured by the promises of free agriculturalland made by Catherine the 
Great. These "Russian Germans" have not had to undergo the otherwise arduous process 
of naturalization in Germany, as they were expected to integrate relatively easily 
(Barbieri 1998). This assumption, however, has often proven wrong. Germany has 
started to acknowledge that these exemptions from the otherwise difficult naturalization 
process is based on fundamentally illiberal ide as about the German "Volk" - they were 
incorporated into German Basic Law from the 1871 Reichseinwanderungsgesetz, after 
aH, i.e. taken from a legal document that was framed at the time of the second German 
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Reich and which was built on the idea of a German nation. And in fact, these regulations 
will be phased out over the next decade (Joppke 2000). 
Secondly, and regarding Canadians and Americans, for instance, the Dutch 
authorities could argue that residents of G8 countries will not have much difficulty 
integrating nor will they cause any headaches for the host society. People leaving 
countries with a comparable socio-economic standard, so the argument could go, will 
only leave these countries if they have either found a job in their ho st country, or are very 
likely to find one - otherwise they would not leave their country of origin. Hence, they 
should be exempt from immigration regulations that are aimed at assuring the integration 
of immigrants. These kinds of justifications for admitting immigrants - based on the 
match between the characteristics of the applicant on the one hand, and the culture, social 
fabric or economy of the ho st community on the other - is most obviously challenged by 
those immigrants who come from poor countries, since their chances of finding 
employment that would allow them to access aIl the opportunities provided to them, and 
help them to integrate into the socio-economic fabric of the host society, are slim, or so 
the fear goes, since they williack the necessary qualifications. 
FinaIly, exemptions could be explained by bilateral or multilateral agreements 
between states, along the lines of the treaty of union signed by aIl EU member states. 
Governments enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements about travel restrictions and 
immigration guidelines in order to free the movement of their citizens and in order to 
ease immigration regulations pertaining to their respective citizenry. Besides being based 
on the common historical background as discussed above, such agreements are most 
often based on mutual interests. The broad catalogue of opportunities Europeans enjoy 
today, like that of freely moving or settling anywhere in the EU, for example, had its 
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origin in the interests of the French and German coal and steel industries in post-war 
Europe to coordinate their efforts for reconstruction (what is known as the treaties of the 
M ontanunion). 
Regardless of what one makes of these possible justifications, what the Dutch 
example illustrates, it seems to me, is my daim that immigration regimes should be the 
topic of a liberal debate that is concemed with principles of faimess and equality of 
opportunity between individuals. If mu tuai and reciprocal interests motivate govemments 
of wealthy countries to ease immigration restrictions for their citizens, then citizens of 
the least developed countries (LDCs) may immediately be treated unfairly simply 
because their countries have little or nothing to bring to the bargaining table where 
mutual benefit is determined. There is, in other words, an unfair bias in an immigration 
system that is built upon assumptions of reciprocity and mutual benefit. Concomitantly, 
immigration regimes based on national interests reinforce the discrepancies in 
opportunities between persons living in sorne countries, compared to those living in 
others. Because sorne countries do not have much to offer in way of exchange for relaxed 
immigration regulations, members of these countries will not be able to immigrate into 
countries where they might have a better chance of living meaningful and valuable lives. 
A Swiss national for instance, will be exempt from taking the Dutch immigration test 
(even though she might be in a better position to pay for language training, the course 
preparation pack and the actual test and even though her chances of leading a valuable 
life in her country of origin are as high as in the Netherlands) while a Somali (who might 
have a harder time to comply with an the requirements and whose opportunities would 
be greatly increased by a move) will not be exempt. 
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This is problematic. LiberaIs cannot think of justice as merely mutual advantage 
and reciprocal behavior.20 When reciprocity is defined as the ultimate exchange value, it 
willlead to the exclusion of the moral claims of those with whom we do not have a 
mutually advantageous relationship. And, of course, liberalism does not construe our 
moral obligations as based on principles of mu tu al benefit and reciprocal advantage21 
when it cornes to justice considerations in the realm of domestic society. If we did, why 
would we care for the handicapped, the very young, the very old, i.e. aIl those "with 
whom we have no need of co-operating, or those whom we are strong enough to 
dominate" (Hampton 1993: 386)? We do not think of people merely in the sense of their 
contribution to our own benefit. Instead, liberals subscribe to the view that individuals 
are ends in themselves. If this applies to the realm of domestic societies, why should we 
not observe the consequences of this premise in the international sphere? 
Now, sorne might object that differences in bargaining power are simply the 
inevitable result of being a citizen of one country rather than another and that those living 
in rich countries cannot be called upon to compensate for the bad ruling practices of 
sorne governments, for example of those countries who are resource rich, but whose 
populations live in poverty (e.g. Miller 2004). These are important arguments that go to 
the core of our thinking about the nature of the state and about national sovereignty. As 1 
suggested earlier, how we think about immigration regimes and their legitimacy is 
determined by our beliefs about the nature and the purpose of the state. 1 will discuss and 
20 Different theories of justice support this daim. Most obviously, my approach is informed by John 
Rawls' work and his concept of "Justice as Fairness" (1999c). It would also find support in Brian Barry's 
proposaI to construe "Justice as Impartiality" (1995). 
21 This is distinct from Rawls' idea of moral reciprocity which he explicitly distinguishes from mutual 
advantage, and instead defines as "a relation between citizens expressed by princip les of justice that 
regulate a social world in which everyone's benefits are judged with respect to an appropriate benchmark 
of equality defined with respect to that world" (Rawls 1996: 17) 
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question these arguments in more detaillater on. What 1 hope to have illustrated so far is 
simply that immigration policies and regimes are vital topics for liberal political theory to 
address because they have consequences of moral significance for individuals, and 
therefore require justification. These properties of immigration policies and their effects 
are the motivation for this project. Immigration policies determine how individuals can 
conceive their life and give it shape by enabling or restricting an individu al' s choice 
about where to live. Especially in a world fraught with stark disparities in conditions of 
individu al autonomy, su ch restrictions influence individu al opportunities to live lives 
they have reason to value. 
ln the following section, 1 will explain in more detail why 1 take the consequences 
of contemporary immigration practices to be problematic from a liberal perspective. 
Second, 1 shall develop my daim further that current immigration policies need to be 
investigated and ultimately questioned under the liberal postulate of fair equality of 
opportunity. 
3 Liberal Tenets: Moral Equality and Equality of Opportunity 
ln order to make sense of the liberal perspective, a look at the background of 
liberal thinking about immigration is warranted to substantiate my argument that CUITent 
immigration regimes pose a dilemma to liberal theory. 1 will first set out the liberal 
dilemma, which 1 believe arises from the liberal postulate of equal moral worth of aIl 
human beings, on the one hand, and the unfair distribution of opportunities, on the other. 
The dilemma is accentuated, 1 continue, if we accept that the principle of equal moral 
worth calls for fair equality of opportunity - a principle that is challenged by CUITent 
immigration regimes. 
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3.1. The Liberal Dilemma: Moral Equality and Unfair Inequality of Conditions of 
Living 
ln sorne fashion or another, liberals believe in the moral equality of human beings 
(Frankfurt 1987; Nagel 1991; Raz 1986; Williams 1967). It is from this principle that 
liberal authors derive a moral daim or obligation to treat aIl humans with equal respect: 
because all humans are equally worthy, aIl human life is equaIly worth y of protection. 
Rence liberals have opposed slavery, rape, genocide, and torture (at least until recently) 
everywhere in the world. This set of beliefs, furthermore, is at the foundation for laws 
and rules that prohibit discrimination based on morally arbitrary characteristics, such as 
one's ethnicity, race, or gender. 
LiberaIs, however, confront a world that is divided into national territories, and in 
which national governments responsible for these jurisdictions enjoy a sovereign right to 
regulate who can come to live within their borders. Liberal democratic states aIl enact 
immigration policies and restrictions that do make distinctions among people. 
Governments typically construct immigration policy based on socio-economic, cultural 
or political interests, as weIl as the general welfare of their communities. Sorne 
restrictions on immigration may not be problematic for liberal minds, as 1 intimated 
above. For example, 1 have explained in reference to one of the goals of the Dutch 
immigration test - the assurance that immigrants have Dutch language proficiency - that 
language requirements are in principle not problematic. Requiring immigrants to learn 
the language of the host community is non-discriminatory because it does not rely on any 
ascriptive or moraIly arbitrary features that individuals cannot influence. 
31 
However, there are also distinctions made by liberal democratic states that are 
based on fortuitous or morally arbitrary contingencies, such as where 1 was born, or who 
my parents are. These are individu al characteristics over which individu ais have no 
influence, but which may determine the course of one's life. For example, those born on 
a national territory often acquire the rights of citizenship - because birth on a territory 
automatically confers citizenship rights in the context of jus solis. If, say, a child is born 
in the US or France, he or she obtains French or US citizenship, that entail a vast range 
of social, economic or educational opportunities along which to make decisions about 
what life to lead. Similarly, many countries, such as Germany and Switzerland, confer 
citizenship to children born to citizens even if the latter do not reside in the country - a 
practice known as jus sanguinis. Children of German parents, for example, who have 
been born and reside outside of Germany, have access to German citizenship regardless 
of their language proficiency, their education, or professional skills. 22 In response to the 
distinctions between citizens and non-citizens, liberal authors have argued that the best 
the liberal state can do to overcome such arbitrary distinctions is to facilitate access to 
citizenship rights, like the right to vote and take public office, for those immigrants who 
subscribe to the principles of the liberal state (Habermas 1999; J oppke 1999; J oppke & 
Morawska 2003; Kymlicka 1995; Rubio-Marin 2000). Liberal political theory has thus 
22 Other concepts of citizenship, for ex ample the German one under the Nazi regime, stripped many 
citizens including aIl Jewish citizens of their citizenship status. Learning from this wrong, the German 
Basic Law today stipulates that "German citizenship cannot be taken away. The loss of German citizenship 
can only be based on the rule of law, and can only occur against the will of the person concerned if that 
person will not be rendered stateless by this act" (Artikel 16 (1) German Grundgesetz, my translation). This 
stipulation was inserted into the German 1949 constitution to prevent any re-occurrence of statelessness. 
To be stateless was, of course, one of the aggravating factors in the plight of German Jews (and for Jews of 
annexed Austria and the Sudetenland) since no government felt responsible for their fate (for the Canadian 
Policy during this time see Abella and Troper 2000). Similar to the German Basic Law, the UN 
Declaration for Human Rights in 1948 acknowledged the need for citizenship and has declared that "every 
one has the right to a nationality" (United Nations 1948; Article 15 (1». Concomitantly, those rendered 
stateless by tyrannical regimes are considered to have refugee status according to the definition by the 
UNHCR (see UNHCR 1951:16, Article lA(2». 
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accepted that the distinctions between citizens of rich countries and those of poor 
countries are cause for concern, and has attempted to find ways to overcome this 
distinction by disentangling citizenship and the rights that come with it, from either jus 
sanguinis or jus salis. 
1 have illustrated the second set of distinctions liberal states make in their 
immigration policies with reference to the Dutch example, namely those between one 
group of non-citizens (i.e. those who are exempt from immigration tests) and another 
group of non-citizens (those who are not). It is precisely these distinctions between 
potential immigrants that are based on morally arbitrary contingencies for which, 1 posit, 
liberal theorists have yet to articulate coherent justifications or effective tools that 
counter-balance the adverse effects such distinctions have on the principle of moral 
equality. 1 have accepted earlier that if we lived in World A where aIl individu ais are able 
to lead autonomous lives, immigration restrictions would not pose a direct challenge to 
the liberal postulate of equal moral worth. The situation becomes problematic, however, 
in our world where someone born in one country has very different life chances that 
prevent leading an autonomous life compared to someone born in another. To make 
distinctions between individuals simply because one's parents happen to be citizens of 
Switzerland - hence making one a Swiss citizen who will be exempt from strict 
immigration procedures - compared to the parents of the other being citizens of Mali -
making the other Malian and leading to being subjected to a different set of immigration 
legislation - causes a dilemma in a world where these distinctions have fundamental 
influence on the kind of life one can lead. The dilemma, as 1 construe it, derives from the 
fact that both would have very different conditions in life, sorne of which allow for 
autonomous living, while others do not. 
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3.2. Moral Equality and Equality of Opportunity 
The last step in my discussion bears exploration. If we accept the liberal postulate 
of the equal moral worth of aIl human beings, the question posing itself is that about 
possible ways of implementing such a principle - even though sorne commentators have 
voiced scepticism regarding the feasibility of translating moral equality into concrete 
policy23. How can we realize moral equality, or, to put this differently, how can we 
translate the moral postulate into actual principles? What has to be provided in order to 
respect individu aIs equally? What kind offactual equality signifies or represents moral 
equality - or, to put it more pithily, "equality of what" (Sen 1980) accounts for moral 
equality? 
The political expression of moral equality, sorne argue, is reflected in the kind of 
anti-discrimination laws mentioned above, and in the catalogue of civil rights to which 
we have become accustomed. These rights apply equaIly to aIl in liberal democracies at 
the domestic level (see Williams 1967). Beyond basic civil rights, including anti-
discrimination laws, however, opinions diverge about how we should conceive of 
equality. Sorne, for example, advocate equality of resources (Dworkin 1981 b) while 
others believe that what counts is equality ofwelfare (Arneson 1989; Dworkin 1981a) or 
equality of circumstances (Van Parijs 1995a). What aIl these arguments about equality 
share is the underlying assumption that liberals should promote equality of opportunity to 
enable individuals to determine the course of their life.24 The moral principle of equality 
of opportunity is meant to counteract inequalities in the distribution of social benefits and 
23 See Williams (1967) for a very critical take on the discourse of equality. 
24 See Kymlicka (2002: Ch. 3). This debate is also weil surveyed by Arneson (1993) and the collection of 
essays in Darwall (1995). 
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burdens that stem from morally arbitrary factors, su ch as being born black, po or, 
disabled, and the like, and to assure instead that the lives people le ad are, as much as 
possible, the results of their own choices (Kymlicka 2002: 58f). 25 The extent to which 
individuals enjoy equality of opportunity, one could say, serves as a tool to evaluate the 
extent of moral equality individu ais enjoy. 
The next question, then, is how to construe equality of opportunity. Endorsing the 
ideal of equality of opportunity as an ideal requires us to give an account of how to 
construe its basic conditions. What obligations arise from the postulate of equality of 
opportunity? Most liberal egalitarians agree that equality of opportunity entails, very 
minimaIly, a certain equality of condition, including comparable access to healthcare, 
schooling, clean water, proper housing and shelter and the like. 26 ln other words, basic 
subsistence is a prerequisite for equality of opportunity and individu al autonomy - a 
point already made in my definition of autonomy.27 If we accept the liberal postulate of 
individual autonomy, however, it seems to me that a concept of liberal equality of 
opportunity calls for more than equal access to means of basic subsistence. In this vein, 1 
25 Kymlicka concludes his discussion of equality by conceding that there will be limits to the 
compensation we can provide for certain morally arbitrary factors that determine one's life. So, for 
example, there can only be limited compensation for somebody who is clinically depressed even if 
provided with encompassing medical assistance. (Kymlicka 2002: Ch. 3). That person's life will 
conceivably not have the extent of opportunity as somebody's who is not clinically depressed. 
26 Such minimalist arguments can also be based on rationales other than that of equality, of course. Charles 
Beitz has provided an intriguing argument to support arguments for international redistribution without 
reference to the principle of equality. Assuming that we reject the goal of global equality, Beitz writes, 
liberals would still have good reasons - what he calls derivative reasons (i.e. deriving from the effects of 
inequality) - to object to global inequality (see Beitz 2001). Put differently, Beitz argues, and 1 concur, that 
even if we do not accept equality as a trump, we nevertheless have good reasons to promo te it since so 
much depends on it. This approach is intriguing in so far as Beitz tackles concerns by those who propose, 
for instance, arguments for the "bounded nature" of justice, i.e. that notions of justice are tied to a bounded 
state, or are relative to a national community's standards, both of which 1 will try to tackle in turn in 
chapter 2. Instead, Beitz argues, that even if we were able to dismiss ideas of global standards of equality 
we would still have to address the consequences arising from inequality. 
27 See for example O'Neill: "It is not controversial that human beings need adequate food, shelter and 
clothing appropriate to their climate, c1ean water and sanitation, and sorne parental and health care. When 
these basic needs are not met, they become often ill and die prematurely." (O'Neill 1991: 279). 
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subscribe to the argument that equality of opportunity in its liberal egalitarian 
understanding must inc1ude the condition that a person has enough "to be content with" 
or "to meet his expectations" of a reasonably fulfilled and content life (Frankfurt 1987: 
38/39). A concept of liberal equality that is driven by concerns of individual autonomy 
should account for the fact that individu ais need to have the means at their disposaI to 
lead a life that realizes their goals and ambitions, with which they can be genuinely 
satisfied. A liberal concern for equality of opportunity thus translates into a concern that 
goes beyand mere subsistence. It is precisely this conception of equality of opportunity 
that 1 refer to as fair. It delineates the kinds of social goods that individuals would aspire 
to obtain if they had a chance ta do sa, if aIl things were equal and the y had the time, 
lei sure and food supply that would aIlow them to deliberate about what kind of life was 
worth leading.28 In this vein, Rawls defines the principle offair equality of opportunity 
as implying that 
those with similar ability and skill should have similar life chances ... those who 
are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use 
them, should have the same prospect of success regardless of their initial place in 
the social system. (Rawls 1971: 73) 
28 To be sure, sorne authors propose good arguments against what may be rejected as too comparativist an 
approach to evaluating equality of opportunity provisions. Nussbaum and Sen's proposais for a 
"capabilities approach", for ex ample, evaluates an individual's capability to lead an autonomous life. It 
does so by delineating individu al needs that ought to be fulfilled in order for her to be able to exploit and 
explore her capabilities fully in a given society, rather than assessing individual needs based on a 
comparative, seemingly objective standard of social goods (see Nussbaum 1997; Sen 1980; 1992, and 
Nussbaum and Sen 1993). To illustrate, we can imagine that income disparities may primafacie be used to 
assess whether or not the principle of fair equality of opportunity is fulfilled or violated. Such an 
"economic concentration" (Sen 1999: 19) on assessing opportunities, however, neglects "the characteristics 
ofhuman lives and substantive freedoms [ ... ] that people have reason to enjoy" (Sen 1999: 19) and which 
help determine what kind of opportunities an individual in her society has access to. This is not to imply 
that poverty can be neglected as a defining feature of individual autonomy and agency, but rather, that it 
has to be contextualized (see Sen 1999: Ch. 4). 1 believe that my very specific goal- to provide for 
conditions of autonomy for the globally worst-off - wou Id be uncontested by Sen and Nussbaum. In other 
words, and if! understand their proposai correctly, to be able to explore and fulfill one's capabilities 
presupposes conditions of individual autonomy. 
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1 interpret this definition to stipulate that the principle of fair equality of opportunity 
addresses questions regarding the distribution of social advantages and social burdens. It 
posits that social burdens and advantages should be distributed and shared fairly and non-
arbitrarily among those to whom the principle applies. 
To translate this postulate, we could say that 1 should not only be able to eat 
enough on a regular basis, but further, that 1 should be able to become a teacher or a 
doctor if 1 had the inclination and the talent to do so, rather than to be forced to stay at 
home and leave the professional sphere to my male counterparts. Similarly, a single 
woman in Mali should be able to aspire to become a teacher, if her skills and talents 
render it a feasible goal, rather than having to toil the fields in order to provide for her 
most basic needs. In my understanding, then, the principle of fair equality of opportunity 
implies that equal opportunity does not only require that 1 have basic means of 
subsistence, but that 1 should furthermore be able to engage in autonomous deliberation 
and action about what course, within the constraints of my abilities, 1 want my life to 
take. To put this differently, the liberal principle of equal moral worth entails the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity as a supporting condition. If 1 find myself 
arbitrarily barred from opportunities that others with the same capacity, talents, and skills 
enjoy, then 1 posit that the liberal principle of equal moral worth is challenged. 
3.3. Fair Equality of Opportunity and Immigration Regimes 
How ought an endorsement of the principle of fair equality of opportunity inform 
the immigration policies of liberal democratic states? In sorne cases, it may not have 
much or any moral relevance. Germany and Canada, for instance, are countries of 
comparable standards of welfare, chances, and opportunities available to me when 
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thinking about how 1 want to shape my life. Both countries have healthy economies and 
good systems of healthcare in place, decent housing and dean water are readily 
available, as are public schools and universities. For an able-bodied, white woman, it 
would be fair to say that the principle of fair equality of opportunity would not pro vide a 
moral argument to buttress my immigration application to either country: it would be 
difficult for me to daim that a fair equality of opportunity argument requires Canada to 
approve my immigration application since 1 can enjoy comparable life chances and 
opportunities in my CUITent country of citizenship, Germany. 
The more pressing questions about immigration policies, within the context of 
fair equality of opportunity, arise from the radically different position 1 find myself in 
when choosing what life to lead as a citizen of Germany, on the one hand, and the more 
restricted sc ope of my opportunities if 1 had been born in Niger, for example. In this 
latter scenario, those who believe in equal human worth and advocate fair equality of 
opportunity need to address ethical questions that arise from two sources. First, fair 
equality of opportunity concerns arise from the fact that being German, 1 will have 
benefited from the German health care and education systems over the years, which have 
kept me healthy and provided me with valuable skills, and which now endow me with an 
advantage in my immigration prospects over someone from Niger who has grown up in a 
society that does not have a comparable health and education system. Niger has had the 
second lowest enrolment of primary school children in the world - 40% of the relevant 
age group - and has had a literacy rate of only 19.9% for its adult population between 
2000 and 2004 (all figures from The Economist 2006). Its health system provided one 
doctor for 31,088 people from 1998 to 2002, while the German system counted one 
doctor for every 277 people in the same period. As a citizen of Germany wanting to 
38 
immigrate to Canada, 1 might have to submit a lot of paperwork, undergo a language test, 
and take a medical exam, but 1 am weIl prepared for succeeding at aIl these tasks. Under 
current immigration regimes involving a two-class system - between desirable and less 
desirable immigrants - 1 stand to benefit from such immigration regulations at the 
f . N' 29 expense 0 my counterpart ln Iger. 
Second, and leaving immigration regimes aside for the moment, the mere fact of 
having been bom in Germany rather than Niger provides me with many more 
opportunities based on the vast discrepancies in the standard of living between these two 
countries. Niger has the second lowest human development index (HDI)30 in the world 
(29.2), only followed by Sierra Leone; it is in the group of the 15 countries with the 
lowest GDP per capita (230); and - very importantly for a woman - Niger has the 
highest birth rate for women aged between 15 and 19 with 233 births per 1000 teenagers. 
29 ln this instance, 1 disagree with Blake's argument. Blake argues that to accept international 
redistributive duties would neglect the fact that redistributive policies are part and parcel of a liberal state 
which, on the one hand, en forces contributions to national welfare schemes, while simultaneously 
buffering the effect of such coercion with the promise of redistribution. In other words, we have a different 
relationship towards compatriots because "we share liability to the coercive network of state governance" 
(Blake 2001: 258) which we do not have with those who do not share in the institutions of the same 
coercive state. On the internationallevel we do not have any comparable coercive institutions - we do not 
have international welfare institutions that can function as the equivalent for the kind of redistribution that 
occurs within the institutional realm of domestic justice. Blake does not address the fair equality of 
opportunity argument in his defense of domestic redistributive duties, compared to the internationalliberal 
dut Y to promote "conditions of autonomous functioning." ln fact, Blake states that he will have to leave for 
another occasion a discussion of what the principle of individual autonomy would mandate in the 
international arena (Blake 2001: 266). 1 speculate that he might find the distinction he draws harder to 
defend when applying what one might cali an "international principle" of fair equality of opportunity. It 
certainly seems so to me: Blake argues that the coercion exerted over a would-be immigrant at the border, 
barring her from entry into a land of better opportunities while potentially constituting the kind of coercion 
prohibited under the principle of autonomy, nevertheless does not cali for the same redistributive promises 
as those given by the state to its citizens since "the mere fact that exclusion is coercive does not erase the 
distinction between prospective and CUITent membership" (Blake 2001: 280n). What Blake neglects, 
however, is that sorne are baITed and hence coerced, while others are not. To argue, then, that "[e]ach 
distinct form of coercion requires a distinct form of justification" (ibid.) does not address the problem 
raised when evaluating immigration regimes under the heading of fair equality of opportunity. 
30 The UNDP determines the Ruman Development Index (RDI) according to GDP per capita, combined 
with levels of adult literacy, average years of schooling and life expectancy. The sc ale ranges from 0 to 
100; "countries scoring over 80 are considered to have high human development, those scoring from 50 -
70 medium, and those under 50 low" (See The Economist 2006: 30n). 
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Finally, Niger does not even show up on the gender-related development index31 and its 
life expectancy prognosis for the years between 2005 and 2010 are at about 45.4 for both 
men and women. These numbers offer a rather bleak picture about what a middle-aged 
woman living in Niger will be able to do. In comparison, Canada has a RDI of 94.3 
(number 4 behind Norway, Sweden and Australia), a GDP per capita of 27,190, had a 
teenage birth rate of 24 per 1000 teenagers between 15 and 19 in 1997 (with numbers 
dec1ining),32 a gender-related development index of 94.1 and a life expectancy of 80.7 
years. Two people born in or immigrating to these two different countries will enjoy 
drastically different sets of opportunities to lead lives they would have reason to value 
and be content with. 
J oe Carens has argued that distinctions based on one' s place of birth are as 
illiberal as sorne of the status differences that characterized feudal times.33 Liberalism, as 
an ideology of emancipation aiming to free individuals from su ch constraints and enable 
individual autonomy, cannot comfortably accept any distributive scheme that makes 
distinctions between persons based on the arbitrary fact of where they happen to be born 
or live. Once we acknowledge the stark differences in equality of opportunity that 
individuals are able to enjoy, merely by virtue of being a citizen of one country rather 
than another, we can see the tensions that arise between liberal democratic principles of 
individu al autonomy and moral equality, and contemporary immigration regimes. 
31 This index combines similar data to the RDI "to give an indicator of the disparities in human 
development between men and woman in individual courttries. The lower the index, the greater the 
disparity" (The Economist, 2006: 31 n). 
32 Statistics Canada (2000) Health Reports Vol 12 (1), available at 
www.statcan.caJenglish/kits/preg/preg3.htm. 
33 "[Citizenship] is assigned at birth; for the most part it is not subject to change by the individual's will 
and efforts; and it has a major impact on that person's life chances. To be born a citizen of an affluent 
country like Canada is like being born into nobility (even though many belong to the lesser nobility). To be 
born a citizen of a poor country like Bangladesh is (for most) like being born into the peasantry in the 
Middle Ages" (Carens 1992: 26). 
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4 Equality of Opportunity, Open Borders and Cosmopolitan Justice 
For liberal authors such as Carens and Kukathas, the undeniable fact of stark 
inequalities among the world's population suggests that the liberal state should abandon 
restrictive immigration policies altogether and, instead, adopt a policy of open borders. 
According to this view, well-off states ought to offset the arbitrary differences in equality 
of opportunity prevailing among the world's citizens by liberally admitting immigrants-
in particular, those who come from less well-off countries (Carens 1987; Kukathas 
2005). Why should we accept su ch proposaIs? 
Very minimally, we could follow Joseph Raz' argument that liberal egalitarian 
concerns about individu al autonomy translate into "duties of Wellbeing," i.e. duties to 
help enable and realize the well-being of other human beings (Raz 1995). The argument 
for open borders thus builds on and carries further arguments that call for a general 
acceptance of cosmopolitan human rights and duties (see Jones 1999). Of course, duties 
and rights are interdependent (see Jones 1999: 50ff): duties on the part of sorne flow 
from accepting that others have rights that ought to be protected, such as, in Raz' terms, 
the right to well-being, or, according to my own proposaI, the right to conditions of 
autonomous living. If we do not simply want to propagate "manifesto rights" - i.e. rights 
that all are happy to subscribe t~, but which nobody is actually required to help realize-
then we need to accept that rights come with corresponding duties on the part of sorne. 
Without recognizing this fact, rights holders simply "cannot find where to lodge their 
daims" (O'Neill 1991: 287, see also Jones 1999: 66). Second, 1 endorse the 
cosmopolitan argument that rich nations have duties to help members of poor nations -
namely, by providing the means that contribute to conditions of individual autonomy-
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based on the premise that those in a position to provide for a good have a dut Y to pro vide 
it (see Nickel 1993). It is in this context that 1 believe there to be good reasons to accept 
Carens' and Kukathas' daim that wealthy liberal countries are called upon to contribute 
to alleviating global inequality, and that one way to do so is by opening their borders to 
the least advantaged, rather than the most advantaged, of the world's population. 
To be sure, combating global poverty and inequality requires that a ho st of other 
measures such as international aid, debt reduction, and development assistance be 
considered in concert with a change in immigration policy. Besides international efforts 
as we know them today, though, advocates of the open border strategy daim that opening 
the borders of wealthy countries will be more immediately effective at addressing 
international differences in equality of opportunity and the global injustices which ensue 
than other attempts at tipping the balance in favor of the least well-off (see Goodin 
1992). 
Furthermore, one could argue that other attempts to remedy global inequality, 
well-intentioned as they may be, may not live up to the principles of liberal egalitarian 
justice if we understand these principles to target systemic injustices like that inherent in 
contemporary immigration schemes of rich countries. If liberal egalitarians are concerned 
about providing conditions of autonomy, international aid may not be the most effective 
way of producing opportunities for autonomous living. The logic of humanitarian aid, for 
instance, implies that donors decide and the po or receive - which is why, if we are 
serious about global development, sorne believe that we "must stop thinking about world 
poverty in terms of helping the poor" (Pogge 2002: 23; see also 2005). Similarly, debt 
reduction is granted to poor countries according to qualifying criteria established by 
donor countries for debtor countries to fulfill. Both these exchanges are built on inherent 
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power-imbalances. These power-imbalances, as Thomas Pogge has argued, are built into 
and perpetuated by the international system of trade and tariffs, and the regulations for 
loans established by the World Bank, for instance. Decisions by the World Bank 
concerning funding promises and development aid are taken by a board of governors that 
"casts votes in proportion to each country' s ownership of capital stock in the Bank" 
(Beitz 2001: 108). Needless to say, those countries hoping to get funding for developing 
projects have only minimal voting power since they have only minimal capital stock in 
the Bank. 
A change in immigration policies, on the other hand, would empower individuals 
here and now to take their own fate in their hands, as it were, and "move to where the 
money is" (Goodin 1992: 8). Considering the immediate effect changes in immigration 
regimes would have on individuals' lives, one could criticize Rawls' conception of 
immigration in Law of Peoples. Rawls argues that a just international order wou Id 
require that just and decent societies help non-decent ones to establish the essential 
properties of decency, such as the rule of law and respect for human rights. More 
specifically, Rawls uses the term decency to "de scribe non-liberal societies whose basic 
institutions meet certain specified conditions of political right and justice"(Rawls 1999: 
3n). A decent society 
is not aggressive and engages in war only in self-defense. It has a common good 
idea of justice that assigns human rights to all its members; its basic structure 
includes a de cent consultation hierarchy that protects these and other rights and 
ensures that aIl groups in society are decently represented by elected bodies in the 
system of consultation. Finally, there must be a sincere and not unreasonable 
belief on the part of judges and officiaIs who administer the legal system that the 
law is indeed guided by a common good idea of justice. (ibid, 88) 
While to promote decency is worth pursuing, it nevertheless fails short of fulfilling the 
demands of a non-ideal theory like the one 1 advocate. Rawls' concept will not give 
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individuals hoping to significantly improve their conditions of life much immediate 
satisfaction in their pursuits, but only once standards of decency have been achieved in 
their country of origin. Changes in immigration regimes, on the other hand, would 
provide for conditions of autonomy here and now. 
Returning, then, to the original motivation of concerns for equality of 
opportunity, which 1 take to aim at enabling individu al agency and autonomy, a change 
in immigration polie y seems to be a plausible, immediate, solution to the problem of 
discrepancies in equality of opportunity. So far then, and irrespective of one's stance on 
what specifie changes immigration regimes would have to undergo, 1 support those 
advocating policy change insofar as the y have identified the crucial dilemma that arises 
for liberal theorists when considering immigration regimes. Particularly considering the 
divergences in individu al opportunities on an international scale, immigration regimes 
that stand in the way of fair equality of opportunity are difficult to defend from a liberal 
egalitarian perspective. 
To some critical minds, this last step in the argument begs the question, and their 
fundamental objection to the case for policy change still needs to be discussed. Some 
commentators argue that we can accept differences in opportunity since the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity can only be realistically applied within the context of our 
own liberal polity. Put differently, it do es not make sense to apply the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity on an international scale. This is the gist of Bernard Boxill' s 
argument against applying the principle of fair equality of opportunity to the international 
sphere. Boxill instead supports only an international application of what he calls "formaI 
equality of opportunity." The latter is defined in a libertarian vein as requiring that "legal 
restrictions on the taking of opportunities be lifted and such[sic] restrictions diminish 
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negative liberty" (Boxill 1987: 143)?4 1 do not pretend to provide a complete theory of 
international redistributive justice since others have do ne so (see Beitz 1979; Caney 
2005: Chapter 4; Jones 1999; Pogge 1989; 2002: Chapter 1; Tan 2004). In response to 
this criticism, therefore, 1 refer to the writings of those authors who have discussed and 
countered the daim that we do not live in a global state, and that it is therefore 
implausible to argue from the premise of a global principle of fair equality of 
opportunity. Particularly, 1 side with those authors who argue that the fact of global 
interdependence makes it less easy to reject the idea of global institutions akin to 
domestic social institutions in the context of the national state. Thomas Pogge, for 
example, has persuasively argued that the lack of democratic sanction for many features 
of the international economic system is indeed a problematic feature of the contemporary 
global state of affairs (2002). But it is not convincing to use this problem as the rationale 
not to remedy it. While it is true that we do not have a global government to implement 
the principle of fair equality of opportunity, we nevertheless have global institutions that 
work actively against it. Procedural and distributive inequalities are rampant in 
international institutions, and they ought to be addressed in concert with measures such 
as redistributive immigration schemes. For the purposes of this project, then, 1 assume 
that it is plausible to ex tend the realm of application of a principle of fair equality of 
opportunity to the globallevel even in the absence of a global state and global enforcing 
institutions. 
34 Even Boxill's principle of formaI equality of opportunity, then, would require that "ail states rescind, or 
al least significantly reduce, ail restrictions on eIIÙgration and immigration" (ibid, 145). Needless to say, 
open border advocates dismiss the assumption underlying Boxill's argument. Why, they ask, should we 
question the distribution of equality of opportunity at home - a principle Boxill subscribes to - yet 
wholeheartedly neglect any such considerations as soon as we leave the borders of our nation-state (see 
Carens 1992)? 
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The assumption that concerns for individual autonomy should be applied 
internationally identifies those advocating immigration policy change as advocates of 
"cosmopolitanism," i.e. that strand in political theory that theorizes domestic principles 
of justice on a universal, global scale (see Beitz 1979; 1983)?5 Very broadly speaking, 
defenders of cosmopolitanism regret the privileging of identities other than the simply 
human one in politicallife (see Nussbaum 2000). Instead, cosmopolitans subscribe to the 
idea that we should consider ourselves citizens of the world, rather than to be bounded by 
particular socio-political entities such as nation-states. To the cosmopolitan mind, we 
should be concerned with the well-being of aIl people, not only that of our compatriots, 
and hence promote the idea of individualliberty and welfare globally, not only in the 
boundaries of our nation-state (see Nussbaum 2002; Waldron 2000) even though the 
sphere in which we act on our cosmopolitan convictions may be that of our immediate 
surroundings rather than the world as a who le (see Lu 2000). These cosmopolitan 
convictions arise from the context in which cosmopolitan thoughts emerged, namely the 
Enlightenment as that period in the history of ideas which initiated the slow embrace of 
what we now consider to be core liberal ideas about how to decide on the shape of our 
lives: the freedom to reason and deliberate about what life we want to lead based on our 
own needs and experiences, not on traditional identities and fixed social roles. Instead of 
being locked into a religion, social class or other identificatory group by birth, 
individuals are now considered free from such constraints. Cosmopolitanism is thus 
intimately tied to liberal convictions about individual agency and autonomy and wants to 
35 1 will adopt this terminology even though to be precise, one should speak of "ethical cosmopolitanism" 
- as distinct, for ex ample, from those authors and that strand of literature theorizing the growing 
interdependencies in the international sphere and hence calling for cosmopolitan governmental bodies (see 
Held 1995; Kymlicka and Straehle 1999). 
46 
see them applied globally - it was, in fact, for the longest time considered the only 
plausible stance liberals could take (Kymlicka 200 l: Ch.l 0). 36 
5 Redistributive Immigration Schemes 
If our concern is justice, fairness, and equality of opportunity on a cosmopolitan 
scale, and if the achievement of these goals is at least partly thwarted by current 
immigration schemes, then these schemes clearly present an obstacle to realizing our 
goals, and would need to be changed in order to make any progress from an unjust and 
unequal world to a fairer one. If it is indeed a morally arbitrary fact to be born in one 
country rather than another, as Carens argues (1992: 26), and if liberal egalitarianism 
requires that the distribution of advantages and disadvantages to individuals should not 
be deterrnined by morally arbitrary characteristics, then immigration policies that rely on 
such arbitrary features to judge applicants are difficult to defend from a liberal egalitarian 
perspective. Instead of viewing the national interests of host communities as the only 
relevant ethical consideration by which to assess national immigration regimes, 1 propose 
a change in the ethics of immigration that is guided by the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity for the globally worst off. 
36 Cosmopolitanism is also the theoretical context in which we should conceptualize Pogge' s work. This 
is not to imply that Pogge's and, for example, Carens' work overlap widely. 1 extrapolate that Carens' 
blueprint of open borders is buiIt on ideas of positive duties rich countries have towards members of poor 
countries, which 1 will substantiate in Chapter Two. Pogge, as far as 1 understand his project, shies away 
from articulating positive duties rich countries have towards the poor beyond the negative dut Y not to 
inflict harm (Pogge 2002). In a later piece, he argues that it is a question of balance - we have to help, in 
order to avoid behaving in an unethical way (see Pogge 2005). Alan Patten has criticized Pogge's 
distinction between positive and negative dut Y as unconvincing, and argued that Pogge employs a very 
idiosyncratic definition ofharm and obligation (see Patten 2005). A second distinction between Pogge's 
and Carens' work is that Pogge's approach takes a statist stance to solving problems of differences in 
equality of opportunity. He theorizes dealings of states, while open border theorists anticipate assisting 
individuals. The motivation behind Pogge's argument, however, is cosmopolitan in that he advocates 
global egalitarianism through the abolishment of punitive international monetary and trade systems. 
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In this vein, 1 will refer to those advocating open borders as the necessary change 
in immigration regimes as advocating an ideal that should invite us to reflect on the 
legitimacy of immigration policies and their often detrimental effect on fair global 
equality of opportunity and individu al autonomy. Put otherwise, 1 subscribe to arguments 
for open borders insofar as they tackle unfair immigration schemes that prohibit 
individuals from improving their conditions of life?? 1 support the rationale underlying 
open border arguments as a means of remedial justice in an otherwise unjust world. What 
we can learn from arguments for open borders is that to open borders for sorne may make 
a difference to an individual's chances ofliving an autonomous life. 1 do not, however, 
subscribe to the idea that a world in which we had open borders would be the ideal 
world. Another way of putting this is that in my ideal World A, where everyone enjoys 
adequate means for living autonomous lives, and in which 1 do not take immigration 
restrictions to have important ethical implications, 1 might not disagree with those who 
argue that we should accept the conventional assumption of national decision-making 
when determining who should be allowed to immigrate and 1 might not see the need for 
3? Sorne authors supporting open borders seem furthermore to imply, however, that open borders are 
morally required from a general "freedom of movement" perspective. In this view, freedom of movement 
has intrinsic value and hence should be protected - and the best way to protect the negative right of 
freedom of movement is through policies of open borders (see Steiner 1992). While there may be sorne 
merit to such libertarian arguments it seems to me that we are restricted in our freedom of movement on an 
everyday basis. This may be deplorable from a libertarian perspective; from a liberal egalitarian 
perspective, however, problems with restrictions of the right to free movement occur only when sorne are 
unfairly restricted in their movement. Put otherwise, we do not always cry foui when we (or others) are 
prohibited from exercising our righl to free movement. Convicted criminals are the most obvious example 
of individuals whose movements are legitimately restricted, but restrictions can take many legitimate 
forms. For example, one can, and probably should, be restricted from entering a natural preservation area, 
or a radioactive zone. Sometimes, in other words, freedom of movement is restricted for very plausible 
reasons, namely to protect a common good, or to protect persons from harm. These restrictions do not pose 
problems to liberal convictions. We do, however, cry fouI if we consider restrictions on the right to 
freedom of movement to be unfair in comparison to the restrictions others are subjected to. To my mind, 
then, for the argument for freedom of movement to have moral clou t, it needs contextualizing from the 
perspective of justice, fairness, and equality; it then addresses and scrutinizes scenarios in which sorne 
enjoy freedom of movement while others are implausibly and unqualifiedly denied il. 1 therefore do not 
take freedom of movement to have any intrinsic value. 
48 
or the value of a change in the ethics ruling immigration policies in such a world. 
However, in the real and non-ide al world we live in, there are good reasons to find the 
conventional assumption untenable and unsupportable. The argument for immigration 
regime change from the principle of fair equality of opportunity, then, do es not aim to 
free aH of us from aIl border restrictions, but instead aims to enhance fair equality of 
opportunity for the globally worst off. To phrase this differently, the justification for 
opening borders to sorne is grounded in a specifie moral aim, which is to enhance fair 
equality of opportunity for the worst off. It is against this background that 1 want to 
propose my argument for revised immigration schemes - what 1 calI redistributive 
immigration policies. 
5.1. The Essence of Redistributive Immigration 
Redistributive immigration policies aim to make it easier for the worst off to enter 
and settle in countries that provide considerably more or better options and individual 
opportunities for autonomous living than their countries of origin. What form cou Id such 
policies take? Very minimally, 1 would hold that anyone of the 2.6 billion living on less 
than US $2 a day would be eligible for consideration under a redistributive immigration 
scheme, and that aH G7 countries (with the exclusion of Russia) would qualify as 
potential host communities. Those living in Niger or Mali, for example, and who are 
willing to immigrate, could be granted temporary work visas for Canada or Germany. 
This would enable them to seUle and work and, thus open up adequate set of 
opportunities to them. 
How many immigrants would actually be taken in would have to be debated, but 
the kind of redistributive schemes 1 have in mind could work along the lines of current 
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./"". schemes for accepting refugees employed by individual countries. It would be feasible, 
for instance, to implement a second category of immigrants besides refugees that cornes 
not from war-torn countries, but from destitute ones. In this vein, national governments 
would agree to change their ethics of immigration based on redistributive principles as a 
way of fulfilling their dut Y to redistribute on a global basis. In those cases 1 illustrated 
earlier, where it is difficult to determine whether an individual should be considered a 
refugee or an immigrant in the redistributive class, countries could employ their 
discretion, as long as she is enabled to immigrate and be provided with a chance to 
capitalize on the opportunities the ho st community offers. This, in fact, would help to 
overcome the distinction mentioned above, between deserving and undeserving 
immigrants. 
Of course, national governments may also retain the option to accept as many 
other immigrants as they think necessary. They could continue to have in place, for 
example, family sponsorship programs to reunite families, or programs promoting 
immigration for groups with religious or ethnie affinities, as in the case of Israel and its 
policy of "Aliyah", i.e. the right of aU Jews to immigrate to Israel. 
The second concern would be to determine who of the many destitute and po or 
willing to move should immigrate. This may prove difficult: when faced with the 
numbers of those who live in conditions that do not aUow for autonomous living, one 
might wonder if any discretion can be applied in determining who should be admitted. 1 
do not deny the weight of such questions but 1 believe that we should start thinking about 
possible answers, rather than eschewing the question altogether. One way to address the 
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question of selection might be that since it is impossible to avoid arbitrariness, a lottery 
system might be the best way of dealing with questions of selection?8 
ln proposing redistributive immigration policies, and when thinking about 
possible answers to questions about numbers and selection, 1 build on a set of 
assumptions. First, redistributive immigration policies aim to enable individuals to live 
valu able lives - but immigrants in the redistributive class are not necessarily meant to 
lead the entirety of their lives in countries other than their countries of origin. Instead, 
sorne, if not many, may want to immigrate but with the wish to return ultimately to their 
country of origin. 1 accept that "[m]ost people who move do not want to settle abroad, 
but to get cash and skills for a better life at home" (The Economist, Il th February, 2006: 
41). Except for the class of well-educated, multilingual elites who move effortlessly 
between countries (whose immigration status would not be affected or covered by my 
proposed scheme), 1 believe that most people would rather live and work in their home 
country if they had adequate opportunities at their disposaI there. 39 Hence, if we were 
able to establish conditions of autonomous living on a global scale, this first assumption 
concomitantly implies that redistributive immigration schemes might be of limited 
duration only. And even in a non-ideal world, we might expect that sorne of those who 
immigrate under redistributive schemes might only come for a set period of time. 
Imagine a woman in Mali who would like to be a teacher, but cannot go to teacher's 
college, either because there are no training facilities in her community, for example, or 
because she lacks the time and 1eisure to get trained, or both. If she were given the 
38 This is a suggestion made to me by Alan Patten in response to Carens' proposais for an "Ethics of 
Immigration" (see Carens 2003). 
39 This is an assumption similar to that made by Kymlicka about people's preference to conduct their lives 
and politics in their native language rather than another (see Kymlicka 2001: Ch. 10). 
51 
opportunity to get a teacher' s education in one of the rich countries, we may speculate 
that she might be keen to retum to her country of origin in order to help benefit others, by 
setting up a school in her community, say, thus broadening the opportunities available to 
those coming after her. Countries implementing redistributive immigration schemes 
would hence not be faced with more and more immigrants in the redistributive class. 
Instead, the numbers may settle down at an average level, with a group of people arriving 
each year, but another group retuming to their country of origin. It is worth noting, then, 
that to implement redistributive immigration policies is not tantamount to accepting 
"more and more" immigrants. The purpose of this project is to suggest a change in the 
selection criteria of immigration policy, not necessarily to suggest that rich societies 
should accept more immigrants overall. 
Instead, what they would need to accept are their obligations deriving from the 
implementation of redistributive immigration policies. So for example, those countries 
accepting immigrants would have to ensure their safe transportation to their host 
communities. Second, a society implementing redistributive immigration policies would 
have to pro vide for mechanisms of integration of immigrants into host communities that 
are conducive to achieving the goal of these policies, i.e. to provide immigrants in the 
redistributive class with access to opportunities. Immigrants will not be able to benefit 
from any kind of opportunity if they are entirely left to their own devices once in the 
country. Rather than finding what they are looking for, they might instead be 
unemployed, not able to learn the language, or be forced to living in poor conditions.40 
40 The unwanted kind of integration is often referred to as "downward assimilation." Thanks to Alan 
Patten for drawing my attention to this problem. 
52 
Put differently, redistributive immigration policies will only work if adequate housing, 
for example, and language and employment training are available to immigrants. 
This is consistent with my second assumption, which holds that redistributive 
immigration schemes should form a part of other efforts to redistribute wealth, and to 
stimulate development in LDCs, along the lines of systemic re-organization of the 
international system that liberal theorists have proposed (see the contributions in Barry 
and Goodin 1992; Doyle 2000; Pogge 2002). Changes in the make-up of international 
bodies responsible for administering funds and in international trade agreements should 
be pursued further, for example, in order to give the local populations of LDCs the 
chance to develop their economies and raise the national standard of living. The 
challenge is ultimately to provide individuals with a chance to enjoy opportunities at 
home, hence making them available to aIl members of poor countries, not only to those 
able and willing to migrate to richer shores.41 To put this explicitly, redistributive 
immigration schemes should be considered only as a means of remedial justice that ought 
to be put to work until a more just world order is in place - they are not to be considered 
as a goal or ideal in themselves. A more just world is the ideal, not to have redistributive 
immigration schemes. And in a just world, "there would be no systematic quality to 
... migration" (Barry 1992: 279); people would not have to move to pursue opportunities 
far from their families and their homes but they would move "for idiosyncratic reasons" 
such as "love across frontiers" (Barry 1992: 279). 
41 1 am aware of very divergent arguments in development theories concerning the best way to achieve 
development. How precisely to go about the necessary changes to the international system is not the 
question of my project - more capable minds have addressed these broad issues. What 1 want to do, 
instead, is to propose a policy liberal polities should adopt to further the cause for development, and to 
examine potential counter-arguments to such proposais. 
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Third, 1 take it for granted that commonly acceptable standards can be agreed 
upon when assessing the conditions of autonomous living. Isaiah Berlin once famously 
said that the liberty of an Oxford don is different from that of an Egyptian shoe-maker, 
highlighting that when assessing socio-politicalliberties one may enjoy, we need to take 
into consideration the specifie socio-politieal background in whieh one's liberties are 
placed (see Berlin 1969). One might speculate that comparisons of individu al 
opportunities might be put under the same contextual constraints. It is in this context, in 
fact, that attempts proposing less comparative approaches to assessing individual 
opportunities must be understood, which advocate instead an idea of equality of 
opportunities as "rather culture-dependent, especially in the weighing of different 
capabilities" (Sen 1980: 219). Admittedly, then, sorne rnight take a relativist or culturally 
dependent view of what equality of opportunity entails. Whi1e this approach may seem to 
contradict attempts to frame fair equality of opportunity as a globally applicable concept, 
the assumption employed here follows Beitz, when he argues that "sorne of these 
capabilities [such as being able to have self-respect] have relatively similar resource 
requirements across cultures" (Beitz 2001: 103). In this vein, 1 understand the principle 
of fair equality of opportunity to imply that sorne of its necessary preconditions apply 
globally. They include such basics as proper nourishment, of course, but also the 
possibility to achieve a level of being, as Frankfurt has it, that allows an individual 
anywhere to be "content with what he has" (Frankfurt 1987: 38).42 
42 This definition of the necessary requirements of an adequate level of individual autonomy, which 1 have 
defined earlier as giving an individual reason to have self-respect may be interpreted by sorne as too 
subjectivist an account of what autonomy implies. If it is a question of being "content" with what one has, 
could 1 not be charged with defending oppressive regimes that brainwash their citizens into contentment, or 
with absolving patriarchal and abusive husbands who brainwash their wives into enjoying their 
submission? It is important to recall my definition of autonomy in this instance, which rejected individual 
coercion and posited that we need to have viable options available in order to be autonomous. If the choice 
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So far, 1 have argued that a liberal immigration polie y should be framed in the 
eontext of global justice and equality. 1 have proposed that instead of eonceiving of 
immigration policies as tools to be used excIusively to promote national interests, we 
should theorize immigration sehemes as instruments for furthering goals of global 
justice. However, it is one thing to con vince ourselves that immigration regimes should 
be considered in the context of justice deliberations - and a very different matter entirely 
to accept what 1 have called redistributive immigration policies. So what should be our 
motivation to embrace the latter? 
5.2. The Theoretieal Foundation of Redistributive Immigration Regimes 
Redistributive immigration regimes, 1 believe, ean be motivated and premised on 
Rawls' argument in A Theory of Justice (1971). In this 1 follow Charles Beitz who has 
argued convincingly for an expansion of Rawls' principles of redistributive justice from 
the domestie to the international sphere (Beitz 1979).43 The correlation Beitz proposes is 
straightforward. Imagine representatives of states who find themselves behind the 
Rawlsian veil of ignorance. It is behind this veil that they must determine prineiples that 
should guide the distribution of and access to social goods. Beitz postulates that aecess to 
global resources will help soeieties to establish just politieal institutions and an eeonomy 
that ean meet members' needs (Beitz 1979: 137ff). Considering that resouree distribution 
among the territories of the earth varies widely, that any one representative is aware of 
is between incarceration and submission, or between being beaten and abused, or submission, individuals 
are coerced and do not have viable options to choose from. To clarify, then, 1 might say that 1 subscribe to 
conditions of "content autonomy." 
43 Methodologically, Rawls agrees with the idea of employing domestic principles of justice to assess the 
international sphere and to develop principles of international justice: "In developing the Law of People s, 
the first step is to work out the principles of justice for domestic society" (Rawls 1999: 26). 
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the possibility that she might be representing a resource-poor country, and that aU have 
an interest in just political institutions and thriving economies, it is highly plausible to 
assume that national representatives would subscribe to principles similar to the ones 
Rawls argues wou Id be agreed upon by members of a national community in the same 
setting of ignorance. Among these principles is that of fair equality of opportunity which 
1 summarized above, together with principles of redistribution from the better off to the 
least well off (see Rawls 1971: 302t). If we can agree on principles of redistribution in 
the national context, and all else being equal, we are also likely to embrace them in the 
international context. The analogy would entail that national representatives in Beitz's 
blueprint are the correlative to Rawls' heads of households who represent the 
beneficiaries or contributors to any redistributive scheme. To elaborate, national 
representatives would accept their national community' s dut Y to redistribute wealth to 
the least weIl-off, as Rawls assumes heads of households would accept the same 
obligation on their family's revenue if they were to find themselves to be among the 
weIl-off of a society. 
To be sure, Rawls has criticized Beitz for the assumption that international 
resource distribution would fall under the purview of a global principle of redistribution 
(see Rawls 1999: 115ft). Rather, he ho Ids that his ideal for an internationally just society 
- what he calls a Society of Peoples - is built onjust or, at minimum, decent societies 
(see above). Neither justice nor decency, however, depends on access to resources, but, 
instead, on a prevailing sense of the mIe of law and respect for human rights. In this 
sense, then, Rawls does not accept that a global distribution principle is necessary for a 
just world order (Rawls 1999: 117). Second, while Rawls admits the attraction of Beitz' 
global resource distribution principle in a non-ideal world, he nevertheless criticizes such 
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a redistribution principle as somehow counterproductive if it were meant to "apply 
continuously without end - without a target, as one might say" (Rawls 1999: 117). To 
paraphrase, a global redistributive principle could not plausibly be applied because it 
does not articulate clearly enough what it aims to achieve, or at what point justice would 
be achieved - claims for redistribution, in other words, could be endlessly made (Rawls 
1999: 116). 
1 agree with Rawls that measures of justice should have a target, a goal or 
reference point that determines when we can speak of a redistributive situation to be a 
just rather than an unjust one. My account of redistributive immigration policies is meant 
as a means of remedial justice - it has as its target the provision of conditions of 
autonomous living that should be provided for every individual. Once aU individuals can 
le ad lives they are reasonably content with, redistributive immigration policies will have 
served their purpose. 1 would therefore refute Rawls' first objection against applying 
principles of redistribution on a global sc ale. Redistributive principles when applied 
globally as 1 propose to do can be defined and limited and their target can be delineated 
as precisely as their domestic equivalents.44 
Second, if Rawls sees the appeal for global redistributive principles in the world 
we live in, as he admits he does in response to Beitz, 1 would conjecture that he wou Id 
see the appeal of redistributive immigration schemes. To reiterate, 1 situate my argument 
to apply redistributive principles on a globallevel squarely in the realm of non-ideal 
theory, not in that of ideal theory. Since 1 am concerned with changing the conditions of 
44 The very specifie scope of my proposai for redistributive immigration policies to provide for fair 
equality of opportunity, moreover, also means that my position on the extent of global redistribution is 
doser to Rawls' proposai for ajust world than to a cosmopolitan view promoted by Beitz, Pogge and Tan, 
for example, who aim to equalize conditions of living on a global scale. 1 do not advocate the equalization 
of conditions of living, but instead advocate adequate conditions to enable individual autonomy. 
57 
individuals here and now, Rawls' critique of Beitz does not apply to my use of 
redistributive principles on a global sca1e. 
If my argument about immigration being a contributing factor to global injustice 
and inequality is plausible, i.e. that whether or not governments of wealthy states permit 
an individual to immigrate will play an important role in the kinds of opportunities she 
may have, then immigration rights can be framed as an international analogy to what 
Rawls has described as access to "primary social goods." Rawls defines these goods as 
"liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect" (Rawls 1971: 
303) to which access should be equal "unless unequal distribution of any or all of these 
goods is to the advantage of the least well-off' (Rawls 1971: 303). According to Rawls, 
then, representatives behind the veil of ignorance would subscribe to the general 
principle that access should either be equal, or that inequalities have to benefit the least 
weIl-off. For individu ais behind the veil of ignorance -lacking the particular details of 
their lives - to agree on this principle wou Id be the only rational course of action. 1 have 
argued that contemporary immigration regimes do not allow for equal access, nor do they 
benefit the least well-off.45 In fact, 1 have construed immigration regimes as enhancing 
and perpetuating unequal conditions that determine individual access to the primary 
social goods. 1 therefore believe that under an "international" veil of ignorance, national 
representatives wou Id agree to consider immigration regimes as one area of policy-
making that just institutions have to address if they were to acknowledge the 
international discrepancies in access to social goods. 1 thus hold that immigration 
45 The immigration regimes 1 have in mind are obviously not those applying to refugees, for which we 
could make the case that they benefit the least weIl-off. 
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regimes can plausibly be construed as subject to the redistributive principles 
characteristic of Rawls' theory of justice. 
This somewhat inferential account of Rawls' principle is substantiated, 1 believe, 
by another principle of Rawls' conception of the Society of Peoples. As 1 have already 
explained, immigration is regulated by national governments that implement policies that 
further domestic interests. This is what is known as the conventional assumption 
regarding the extent of national sovereignty in immigration matters, which is to say that 
national governments have the right to determine who should and who should not be a 
member of the citizenry based on their rationale of who will benefit the national 
community. Of course, theorists of sovereign statehood may object to my proposaI on the 
grounds that it amounts to a fundamental challenge to national sovereignty. And to be 
fair, one of the consequences of redistributive immigration regimes would be that 
national governments would have to abandon sorne of their current motivations when 
making decisions about who should be allowed to immigrate into their territory. Rather 
than grounding their decisions on such matters solely on considerations of national 
interests, they would have to accept sorne obligations to accept a set number of 
immigrants from poor countries. In this instance, free-reigning ideas about national 
sovereignty would be curtailed. 
Rawls proposes similar restrictions on national sovereignty wh en he writes that a 
national government' s right to wage war or infringe on the human rights of its members 
wou Id have to be revised and potentially restricted in a Society of Peoples. Rawls 
believes that war should only be permissible as a means of self-defence, and that human 
rights have to be respected in an unqualified manner for a society to be decent (Rawls 
1999: 26-27~ 42). Put differently, "national interest" cannot be used as a ration ale to 
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infringe on the human rights at home or abroad. Similarly, my proposai contends that 
national interest should not be allowed to dominate over the moral daims of the world' s 
poor who are asking for access to adequate conditions to live autonomous lives. If one 
accepts this as weIl as my previous argument that redistributive immigration schemes 
should be adopted as a means to redistribute wealth, then we have arrived at a principle 
of redistributive immigration that trumps, as it were, the conventional account of national 
sovereignty with respect to immigration policy. 
5.3. The Merits of Redistributive Immigration Policies 
While some may accept the analogy just drawn, the y might wonder why it is 
preferable to advocate redistributive immigration schemes rather than open borders. 
Would it not be more plausible for national representatives - under the veil of ignorance, 
of course - to accept the latter rather than the former?46 Maybe. 1 believe, however, that 
the principle of fair equality of opportunity in our fallen world requires redistributive 
immigration schemes that benefit the world's worst-off - it does not require open borders 
for its realization. As 1 demonstrated in my earlier example comparing my opportunities 
as a citizen of Germany and as a potential citizen of Canada, the principle of fair equality 
of opportunity wou Id not be clearly violated if my case for admittance to Canada was 
rejected, because both countries provide adequate 1evels of opportunities.47 ln other 
words, immigration applicants from countries with similarly adequate levels of 
opportunities would fall outside of a redistributive immigration scheme because their 
46 This is of course Carens' argument (see Carens 1987). 
47 In this vein, see also Carens' interesting example of a Canadian who, after having lived in the US, 
wants to come back to Canada in order to be able to enjoy health care benefits in his old age, and his 
discussion of what principles should apply to a US citizen who wants to immigrate to Sweden (Carens 
1988). 
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daims for entry cannot convincingly appeal to the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity. To admit su ch applicants to the country of their choice would not enhance 
global justice in any meaningful way.48 
This is not to say, however, that aU citizens of the poorest countries could make a 
daim for immigration under a redistributive regime. Members of the ruling elite of a 
developing country cannot daim to be missing out on opportunities. To illustrate, 
consider the daim of, say, a high-Ievel government official in Nigeria. Nigeria's RDI of 
46.6 is very low, and the average life expectancy of 44.2 years is comparable to that of 
Niger. Rowever, its economy has had an annual real growth rate of 3.1 % between 1993 
and 2003, largely due to oil production, as Nigeria is one of the world's top 15 oil 
pro du cers (see The Economist 2006).49 Nigeria is also perceived as one of the world's 
most corrupt countries.50 For a member of the elite who benefits from such corruption, 
making a daim for immigration based on lack of opportunity is, quite simply, 
disingenuous, and is adding insult to injury to those man y whose plight is so as to 
warrant Nigeria's low RDI rating. There may, of course, be other reasons why a high-
ranking official may want to emigrate. These indude ethnie violence or religious or 
48 Remember also that national representatives behind an international veil of ignorance wou Id not only 
want to promote redistributive justice because it is the most rational course of action - they wou Id also 
want to minimize their risk of finding themselves to be representatives of rich countries who now have to 
accept immigrants in the redistributive c1ass. Put otherwise, to accept open borders wou Id not comply with 
Rawls' stipulations that members to the contract aim to "maximin," to maximize their gains by minimizing 
their risks (see Rawls 1971: 152f). Representatives do not know what the actual situation of their country is 
and hence they will want to maximize the position of the worst-off because this might mean maximizing 
their own and their constituents' gains while aiming to minimize the risk in the event they represent the 
richest countries. 
49 Oil production accounts for 20% of GDP, 95% of foreign exchange earnings, and about 65% of 
budgetary revenues. 
50 Official Corruption is defined as 
The abuse of public office for private gains. Public office is abused for private gain when an official 
accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. It is also abused when private agents actively offer bribes to 
circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit. Public office can 
also be abused for personal benefit even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the 
theft of state as sets or the diversion of state resources. (Agbu 2003) 
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r' .. political oppression - namely, the violation of fundamental human rights and civil 
liberties - which sorne groups in Nigeria experience. Individuals, suffering from such 
violations cou Id, of course, rightly daim refugee status, regardless of their socio-
economic or political status. However, in terms of fair equality of opportunity - a 
principle that 1 have taken to pertain to means of subsistence, time, 1eisure, and access to 
skills - it seems implausible to make a case for redistribution towards an individual who 
seems to fully enjoy the opportunities to shape the course of his life according to his own 
ideas of what constitutes a valu able life.51 If we accepted the case for the redistributive 
immigration of a high-ranking government official of a resource-rich, yet drastically 
corrupt and overall poor state - that is, for somebody whom we expect to benefit from a 
system of personal gains and systemic bribery52 - it seems to me that we wou Id pervert 
the goal of liberal egalitarian policies. 
This example supports the idea that redistributive immigration policies should be 
aimed at individuals, not at individuals as part of larger identity groups. If we accepted 
immigration daims from sorne people simply because they come from a poor country, 
but if they themselves are not poor, we would neglect the individu al component driving 
ideas of fair equality of opportunity, and we would violate the very princip les that liberal 
policies aim to uphold. Such an individual-centric approach, in my mind, is one of the 
51 1 acknowledge that this take on the principle of fair equality of opportunity implies that it is a principle 
primarily concerned with the distribution of social advantages and social burdens and that, concomitantly, 1 
assume that human rights and civilliberties to be provided as fundamental, rather than as falling under the 
principle. 
52 Admittedly, my cIaim assumes that aIl those who are high-ranking officiais are also corrupt which may 
be an unfair assumption. That there is sorne evidence for this in the case of Nigeria, however, may be 
gleaned from a recent statement by Nigeria's president Obasanjo made to iIlustrate his problems in getting 
a bill approved to set up an anti-corruption agency: "1 am told that members of the National Assembly said 
that if they passed the bill the way it was, they would ail be behind bars" (quoted on 
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/4441523.stm). Obasanjo and his family are equally suspected of 
widespread personal profiteering (see ibid). 
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strengths of redistributive immigration policies. As 1 summarized earlier, a change in 
immigration regimes would be more immediately successful at addressing a lack of 
opportunity than other efforts at international redistribution because it would enable 
individuals to take their lives into their own hands. In addition, redistributive 
immigration schemes would be more immediately effective at enabling individual 
autonomy because they wou Id target individu ais rather than channel efforts through 
cooperation among national governments, such as, for example, international trade 
agreements or schemes for debt reduction. These latter measures are necessarily geared 
towards governments, and the way in which governments earn and administer the funds 
and resources of their country. Not only are redistributive immigration schemes thus 
more directly targeted at those most in need, they also help to avoid one of the pitfalls of 
international aid, namely bureaucratie corruption at the level of national governments of 
aid-recei ving countries.53 
Furthermore, immigration is unique in that it is a mechanism that countries can 
implement unilaterally, without a host of complicated bargaining procedures that arise 
when attempting to come to multilateral or international trade agreements or 
development policies. Immigration policies are the sole responsibility of individual 
states; indeed, a country committed to meeting international obligations to redistribute 
wealth can immediately put this intention into effect by changing its immigration policies 
to include cases that gain access under the newly outlined categories of redistributive 
immigration. It is worth noting, then, that this aspect of the conventional assumption 
concerning the national administration of immigration policies is actually helpful to the 
53 Corruption is one of the biggest problerns in international aid efforts to help the world's worst-off. Sorne 
estirnates of how rnuch aid rnoney actually arrives at its destination is as low as barely 20% (Die Zeit, 12th 
April, 2006). 
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global redistribution principle as 1 advocate it - that is, if national immigration policies 
are premised in part on global redistributive principles and not only on principles of 
national interest. 
However, sorne critics might argue that such an individualistic approach is more 
part of the problem, rather than the solution. To be sure, the case of a high-ranking 
Nigerian official is easily dismissed from being considered for redistributive immigration 
visas. But what should we make of the case of a doctor from, say, Zimbabwe hoping to 
immigrate to the UK? With an HDI of 49.1, Zimbabwe is a country with an even lower 
life expectancy than Niger (36.3 years for women, and 38.2 for men), due largely to 
HIV / AIDS since one quarter of the population is affected by HIV / AIDS. For every 1000 
people, Zimbabwe has 0.1 doctors to attend to their needs, and hospitals are few and far 
between.54 It would take little to assume that life in the UK would pro vide many more 
opportunities to an individu al doctor or nurse. But if aIl doctors in Zimbabwe followed 
the spell of better socio-economic or professional opportunities abroad, it would be aIl 
but impossible to uphold a system of medical services in their home countries, as badly 
equipped as they may be. From a national perspective, then, one cou Id argue that if these 
well-educated individuals were able to leave their country of origin more freely in pursuit 
of better opportunities, their exodus would seriously compromise the already inadequate 
state of their home-country' s medical service. In fact, the addition al effect of this exodus 
might be a general improvement of the medical care situation in their adopted countries 
and thus the further accentuation and perpetuation of the inequality of opportunity 
between the citizens of the world's richest and poorest countries. 
54 In fact, there is no figure to account for the number of hospital beds available for every 1000 people 
(for ail other figures, see The Economist 2006: 240t). 
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This question touches on one of the most problematic issues in contemporary 
debates about immigration policies: the problem of "brain drain." Not only are doctors 
educated in sub-Saharan Africa eager to explore their chances elsewhere, but an 
increasing part of the educated classes from LDCs want to move away from their 
countries of origin to wealthier shores where they are often welcomed with open arms. 
Without doctors from Africa and Asia, for instance, health care provisions in the British 
NHS would come to a haIt (The Guardian 15th April, 2006). As a consequence of this 
"brain drain" from poor to wealthier countries, we are already receiving reports of the 
slow demi se of systems of higher education in Africa, for example, because "about 30% 
of Africa's university-trained professionals and up to 50,000 Africans with PhDs now 
live and work outside the continent" (The Guardian 1 i h March 2006), with the exodus of 
those in the medical profession posing the biggest threat. The problem with an individu al 
approach to immigration, sorne could then argue, is that those who are in the best 
position to help improve the conditions of their countries and, by extension, to pro vide 
more opportunities for the members of their country of origin, may opt to emigrate and 
look for better opportunities for themselves elsewhere. An individual-centric 
redistributive immigration policy may weIl deepen the gap between the haves and the 
have-nots, rather than close the opportunity gaps that exist between them. How could 1 
answer this challenge? 
On the one had, one could argue that the educated elite, when emigrating abroad, 
might actually help their country of origin economically, albeit by a circuitous route. For 
example, the remittance payments sent home by those abroad might help families back 
home to ensure that their most basic needs will be met, and potentially even more. 
Remittance payments could help get younger family members through school and 
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university (at home or abroad), and could thus allow families, or at least their younger 
members, to significantly improve their opportunities in life. In fact, as a recent World 
Bank report states, 
[r]emittances remain the second-large st financial flow to developing countries, 
after foreign direct investment, more than double the size of net official 
finance .... In 2002, remittances were larger than both official and private flows in 
36 developing countries. (World Bank 2004:169) 
In this sense, then, whether one is a highly educated emigrant, or someone who simply 
hopes to earn money through manuallabor, the beneficial effect of emigration for those 
staying behind may weIl be the same. Both highly skilled and unskilled emigrants are 
likely to contribute to the improvement of socio-economic conditions at home, which 
should ultimately lead to increased opportunities for those living in less developed 
countries. 
On the other hand, even if the socio-economic balance sheet of developing 
countries improves with the help of remittances from those working abroad, specifie 
sectors of society may nevertheless come to harm. If, for instance, institutions of higher 
education lose employees to wealthier countries, these institutions may fold altogether, 
barring educational opportunities in the long run for those who cannot afford to seek it 
abroad. Simply measuring a national GDP, in other words, does not necessarily pro vide 
us with an adequate picture of the kind of opportunities a country provides. 
These are serious concerns. When addressing such concerns, however, we should 
remember the seminal princip les that liberals espouse. One of the reasons why liberals 
promote equality of opportunity is to account for the equal moral worth of individuals. 
Because of this set of beliefs, the liberal state cannot restrict immigration arbitrarily. As I 
argued in the Dutch immigration legislation example, liberal tenets prescribe that we 
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either treat people equally, or that we have plausible and convincing reasons for treating 
people unequally. To apply these principles to immigration policy - if we were to ponder 
restricting the movement of educated people, su ch as academics, for example - it seems 
to me that we would have to put such restrictions into context: aH things being equal, 
does the implementation of liberal principles imply that aU academics should have 
limited access to immigration opportunities, or are there important reasons why sorne 
should enjoy greater immigration opportunities than others? 
1 assume for the point of this argument that individuals are entitled to use the 
opportunities available to them in an equal opportunities scheme to seek their own 
advantage - as long as everyone el se has equal opportunities available and an are at 
liberty to use them as they see fit. 55 This much 1 take to be uncontroversial. The problem 
in the "brain drain" cases arises, we could say, when sorne people exercising their right 
to maximize their opportunities restrict or diminish those of others, or perhaps jeopardize 
the overall welfare of the community. Of course, most of us have heard of sports stars 
who seUle in tax havens, such as Monaco, in order to avoid paying higher income tax 
rates in their country of origin. To be sure, this kind of behavior is not praised, but 
neither is it prohibited by law or even condemned, even though one could plausibly argue 
that the welfare of the home cornmunity is adversely affected by the high-income 
earners' tax evasion. Although emigration to a country with lower incorne taxes pre vents 
the sports star from contributing taxes to the state and its institutions that supported her 
early sports education and career, for example, we seern to accept that someone in the 
lucky position to have a talent for which she is highly remunerated also has the right to 
55 This is in contrast to, say, nationalist doctrines that asks us to have the welfare of our nation rather than 
our own welfare paramount on our minds. 
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make the most of her opportunities. In a more pedestrian vein, imagine the case of a 
Canadian academic who, unsuccessful in the Canadian academic job market, turns 
abroad for options. Would it be problematic if he took up employment in the UK, say, 
considering that sorne might think that there are enough good academics there, but fewer 
in his country of origin? Or would it be problematic for this individual to move to "where 
the money is", i.e. where he wou Id get better pay than in his country of origin? Most 
liberals would be uncomfortable arguing for immigration restrictions in such a case, or so 
it seems to me. Why should we think differently about the job-searching academic from 
Angola? Could we make a liberal case that the Angolan has an obligation to further the 
best long-term interests of her national community and that fulfilling this obligation 
requires her to stay in Angola where she might have to work in an underfunded 
university system that does not enable her to enjoy the same set of opportunities than if 
she were to move abroad? 
Sorne liberals have theorized the relationship between individuals and their 
identity group - be it ethno-cultural, or national, or linguistic - and have argued for 
accepting certain group rights in order to promote the well-being of the group (see 
Kymlicka 1995). Following Kymlicka's argument, we could imagine that the well-being 
of Angolans requires a properly functioning system of higher education, which implies 
having sufficient university teachers and researchers to keep the system running. A 
system of higher education, we could imagine, is constitutive of the well-being of the 
group because it contributes to the vibrancy of nationallife, for its cultural and scientific 
development. We could also say that it is vital to have medical services, and hence 
important to retain doctors in order to provide for the basic health needs of the 
population. How do these considerations pertain to an individual academic, doctor, or 
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engineer? Kymlicka has been explicit in arguing that group rights can only take the form 
of protections against detrimental external impact. For example, a group should have a 
right to external protection from intrusion in its collective cultural heritage, or in its 
language. However, the well-being of the group cannot be instrumentalized to serve as a 
rationale for imposing internal restrictions on individu al members of any group, such as 
restrictions of movement. Analogously, it seems to me, liberals would be hard pressed to 
attempt to prevent individuals from leaving their national cultures behind, if that is what 
they choose to do, even if such a rnove may bring about long-term problems such as a 
faltering higher education system. The dangers of "brain drain" do not legitimate placing 
immigration restrictions on those who have the education and skills to search for better 
. . 1 h 56 opportumttes e sew ere. 
This argument might not be convincing to those who fear for the overall welfare 
of many poor countries. One of the merits of redistributive immigration policies, 
however, and in stark contrast to CUITent immigration regirnes, is that those who are most 
needed in their countries of origin, like doctors and PhDs, would not fall under the 
purview of such policies. Recall that the motivation for my proposed change in the ethics 
of immigration is it to enable those lacking in fair opportunities to lead autonomous lives 
to lead just such lives. To my mind, if one has chosen and successfully completed an MD 
or PhD program, it would be fair to say that this person has been able to lead an 
56 Instead, Kymlicka's argument for external protection might support measures against external threats to 
a nation' s health care system. An example of such a threat wou Id be the policies of pharmaeeutical 
industries that attempt to artificially inflate priees for medication, such as anti-retroviral drugs direly 
needed to treat people affected with HIV/AIDS. By not allowing cheaper versions of such drugs to be 
circulated - which is prevented through the lobbying of national governments in international trade 
negotiations - pharmaeeuticallobbies are contributing to the slow bankruptcy of the national heaIth 
services of developing nations that have to allocate a large portion of their health care budget to pay 
exorbitant priees for drugs rather than for the salaries of their doc tors, or for medical equipment of public 
hospitals. 
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autonomously chosen life. 1 admit that working conditions for an Angolan doctor may be 
less ideal than for a Canadian one and the former may hope to attain better conditions of 
work or a higher salary by emigrating to a rich country. It is not part of my project, 
however, to provide access to either. Redistributive immigration policies, to reiterate, are 
not intended to equalize or maximize individual conditions but to pro vide the basic 
conditions of autonomous living to those who can not find them in their country of 
origin.57 
However, the "brain drain" argument does have implications for countries that 
benefit from the global search for opportunities. It would be incompatible with the goals 
of a redistributive immigration scheme if rich nations solely profited from the fact that 
they are able to provide more opportunities to those coming from poorer countries. More 
specifically, it wou Id be indefensible if rich nations used their advantage, for ex ample, to 
employ immigrants at lower rates than home-grown doctors or workers employed for the 
same tasks. 
This stipulation, in tum, addresses one of the concerns about increased 
immigration voiced by trade unions or those lobbying for socially disadvantaged groups 
within wealthy countries. These groups are concerned that immigrants will drive down 
workers' wages and employment benefits because they are often willing to work for 
minimum or for even lower, cut-throat wages with few employment benefits. For 
employers to have the option of avoiding the payment of higher wages because there is 
an "army of the willing" waiting at their door who will work for whatever an employer is 
willing to pay does indeed threaten the chances of local, unskilled workers to earn a 
57 To return to Blake, redistributive immigration policies do not aim to "maximize the number of options" 
(see above, FN 12). 
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living. The fear is that immigrant labor may push those low on the socio-economic ladder 
out of work, thus aggravating social inequalities (see The Guardian, Il th October, 2005). 
Again, these are important concerns regarding changes in immigration regimes - in this 
instance, concerns about the potential consequences of increased immigration of low-
skilled workers for host communities. They reflect the kind of situation that critical 
observers describe to reign in the liberalization of immigration regimes where national 
governments implement immigration schemes that are tailored to their domestic 
economic interests. An immigration scheme that is dedicated to the goals of 
redistribution, however, cannot condone a scenario in which some profit unduly, while 
the situation of those who are already disadvantaged continues to deteriorate. It would be 
both indefensible and implausible to argue for a system of redistributive immigration if it 
only exacerbated social inequalities in the host communities. From the point of view of 
social justice, to argue that the poor in rich countries would have to bear the burden of 
redistribution in favor of the poor of the world would be unprincipled, even if we thought 
that the former would still be better off than the latter. However, it seems to me that 
pro active labor laws and social policies could easily prevent su ch a situation in which 
poor members of society must compete with each other for ever declining wages and 
benefits. 
One way to avoid su ch pitfalls would be to regulate the wages of unskilled 
workers of whatever stock. The French government has recently shown the way by 
initiating a ruling at the EU Court of Justice arguing that laborers coming from abroad, 
su ch as the famous "Polish plumbers" in France, have to be paid according to national 
wage levels, and be insured and declared in their countries of employment. The French 
hope is that a ruling will reverse the hitherto legal practice of paying European workers 
71 
according to the standards of their home countries. To be sure, employers in the 
agricultural sector in the UK, for examp1e, have immediately bemoaned such initiatives, 
arguing that immigrant labor would no longer be economically viable. The who le point 
for them to employ immigrant labor, in other words, is to employ cheap labor, not to not 
employ British workers. However, and returning to the motivating principle underlying 
redistributive immigration schemes - namely that of fair equality of opportunity - it does 
not make sense to assume that this princip le would only apply until immigrants come to 
wealthy host-communities, where they would then have to put up with stark inequalities 
in remuneration for performing the same work as their home-grown counterparts. The 
principle of fair equality of opportunity applies, in other words, to questions of 
immigration, as weil as to questions of treatment of immigrants once they are living and 
working in host communities. 
That being said, redistributive immigration schemes are not to be added to 
existing immigration schemes, but are, instead, a new and entirely different way of 
thinking about immigration. To speH out aH the implications of such a change in the 
ethics of immigration wou Id go beyond the project of this thesis. lnstead, my brief 
summary of the theoretical bases of redistributive immigration policies, and my rebuttals 
to sorne valid common concerns, are intended to achieve two goals: first, to support my 
cIaim that immigration policy should not be ruled out as a measure to achieve fairer 
equality of opportunity on a global scale; and second, to challenge the assumption that 
more liberal immigration schemes would necessarily provoke more injustice in both host 
communities and countries of origin alike. 
At the same time, it is important to recognize that redistributive immigration 
policies, as 1 conceive them, are meant to work in concert with other efforts to promote 
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fair equality of opportunity at the globallevel. 1 envi sion immigration measures to 
constitute only one component in a more comprehensive global scheme for establishing a 
more just world - which 1 have characterized as one in which people would not need to 
leave their country of origin to find an adequate set of opportunities for living an 
autonomous life. While individuals should be enabled to search and find the best 
opportunities available to them, business or national interests should not be given the 
same right, even though the latter notion seems to be accepted widely today (Goodin 
1992). 
Of course, the extent to which redistributive immigration policies can in fact help 
achieve a more just world is up for debate, and 1 am not inclined to make any absolute 
assertions about their viability or effectiveness. Admittedly, then, 1 will not be able to 
con vince those who want ironclad proof that the measures to combat global inequity 1 
propose will be successful. To provide such proof is a nearly impossible task, due largely 
to the fact that we have only very limited empirical evidence of "open border" 
immigration schemes, let alone schemes of redistributive immigration. The one example 
we do have that might come close - that of the loosened immigration and employment 
regulations of the EU - seems to suggest that relatively free immigration flows work in 
favor of the poor parties to such schemes - witness, for example, the economic rise of 
Portugal and Greece, and particularly Spain since accession - while simuItaneously 
bolstering the economic welfare of richer parties. Sorne, however, might reject this 
successful example, pointing instead to the singular scenario of the post-World War II 
years of booming economic growth in the economically most important countries of the 
union, i.e. Germany, France and, to sorne extent, the UK, and their indirect subsidies to 
poorer member states. Critics might claim that these subsidies had more to do with the 
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economic development in poor member states than relaxed migration policies, while the 
economic boom assured that immigrants could be successfully integrated into the socio-
economic fabric of host communities. They could, in short, claim that the success of the 
EU was due to very specifie historical circumstances.58 
From a principled perspective, however, it seems to me that we cannot very easily 
ignore or rule out a policy of redistributive immigration simply because it might not 
work. There is little empirical evidence to validate su ch worries, since redistributive 
immigration policies have hardly been tried. What needs to be challenged, 1 think, is the 
assumption, without any real empirical evidence, that a change of immigration regimes 
based on redistributive considerations is anathema in terms of justice. 
6 Conclusion 
"We do not live in ajust world" Thomas Nagel writes (2005: 113). In the course 
of this chapter, 1 have argued that one element contributing and compounding 
international injustice is the national immigration regimes regulating the global flow of 
people. Such regimes favor the interest of citizens of rich countries compared to those of 
po or countries. The different conditions of life that result from the morally arbitrary fact 
of being born in one country compared to another pose a dilemma for liber al egalitarians 
concerned with conditions of individu al autonomy. 1 have explained the injustice of 
contemporary immigration schemes and have proposed that we adopt redistributive 
58 The opponents 1 have in mind might go further and argue that the latest accession round in May 2004 
will prove to be a failure, due to an oversized zone of free migration - even though the latest figures seem 
to indicate otherwise. In fact, only Austria, Denmark and Germany of the EU 15 (i.e. "oId" Europe) is 
determined to uphold work restrictions for citizens of the EU 10 (i.e. the new accession states) - ail other 
countries who had imposed such restrictions in May 2004 (which ail did, except the UK and Eire) are 
either determined to abolish these curbs, or are mulling Iiberalization (See The Economist, Il th February, 
2006: 41 f). 
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immigration policies in order to address such injustice. My proposaI for these schemes is 
premised on the assumption that we can translate princip les of fair equality of 
opportunity as Rawls characterizes them in his scheme for domestic justice onto the 
international scale. 1 have defended this assumption against those, including Rawls, who 
do not find such a translation plausible. 1 have argued that my proposaIs are meant to be 
measures of remedial justice that aim at providing individu aIs with adequate conditions 
of autonomous living. These measures are not part of an ideal theory. So far, then, 1 have 
defended my arguments for redistributive immigration schemes against objections that 
could be raised by liberal egalitarians. My blissful state of argumentation, however, is 
challenged not only from liberal egalitarian quarters, but by liberal nationalist authors as 
weIl. These theorists argue that liberal principles may ultimately justify more restrictive 
immigration schemes. My concern to refute liberal nationalist arguments thoroughly in 
order to defend my proposaI for redistributive immigration schemes will constitute the 
remainder of this project. 
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II Redistributive Immigration Polides Defended 
1 Introduction 
When we speak: about social justice, we are concerned with the moral state of 
society. Ideally, we believe, the world should be just because that is the condition in 
which individuals can flourish and lead the lives the y choose. If we take this assertion 
seriously, and if we believe that human beings are responsible for the moral outlook of 
the world - rather than, say, naturallotteries or metaphysicallaws - then social injustice 
implies that there must be something we ought to do, sorne action that is morally 
demanded of us but which we have yet to live up to. Conceptions of social justice are 
thus tied to ideas about the duties we have and which we must fulfill if we aim to realize 
our principles of social justice. In Chapter One, 1 have made the case that one way of 
making the world we live in today more just is to apply the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity on an internationallevel. In order to achieve fair equality of opportunity for 
the globally worst-off, 1 have argued that liberal egalitarians should adopt redistributive 
immigration schemes that would enable the world's worst-off to immigrate to countries 
in which they would enjoy vastly increased levels of opportunities. In this chapter, 1 
defend this argument against two possible objections from liberal nationalist authors, 
focusing on David Miller' s argument, while drawing on the writings of other liberal 
nationalist authors occasionally. The liberal nationalist objection is the most acute 
challenge to the premise of redistributive immigration policies since liberal nationalists 
endorse the goals of social justice and redistribution in a liberal egalitarian vein. Miller, 
however, whom 1 take to be the most lucid advocate of the liberal nationalist position, 
76 
explicitly rejects the argument for a cosmopolitan principle of redistributive justice - a 
stance that, as 1 have argued in Chapter One, would caU for redistributive immigration 
policies for the globally worst-off. Miller supports his argument with the daim that 
principles of social justice are socially contingent. Accordingly, he condudes that duties 
arising from our conception of social justice are equally circumscribed by the social 
context of our national community. We have, therefore, a different, "special", set of 
duties towards our compatriots than towards non-compatriots. Among the first set are 
duties of redistribution under the principles of social justice, while the second set - what 
can be called "duties of humanitarian assistance" - is defined by our obligation to 
pro vide for basic needs to all human beings. This latter set 1 have taken to be 
uncontroversially accepted duties we owe to all human beings. 
Miller' s work is important to discuss in the context of this thesis since his 
argument against global redistributive policies is motivated by concerns about the effects 
su ch policies might have on provisions of social justice in host communities. As 1 
explained in Chapter One, such concerns have to be taken seriously since the 
redistributive immigration policies 1 propose are aimed at promoting an increase in fair 
equality of opportunity for the globally worst-off, but cannot do so to the detriment of 
social justice in host communities. It is important, then, when making a case for 
redistributive immigration policies, to consider the objections of those concerned with 
the mechanisms of social justice in host communities. 
Liberal nationalist authors base their approach on what 1 caU the socially 
contingent model for principles of social justice and individual autonomy. 59 This model 
59 Miller himself refers to his concept of social justice as "contextual" to the community in which it is to 
apply (Miller 2002). 1 believe, however, that his concept is more appropriately characterized as 
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postulates a constitutive link between social justice and a shared national community and 
identity - a link 1 explain in Section 2. In Section 3, 1 further elaborate on the model of 
socially contingent social justice and move on to my critique in Section 4. There, 1 argue 
that if principles of social justice are not defined universally, they cannot serve as 
reference points to evaluate what is just or unjust in a global context. Second, 1 argue that 
the empirical evidence we have indicates that individu aIs do indeed compare their 
conditions of life with those of others on an intemationallevel. To argue for an account 
of social justice that does not allow to assess questions of justice from a principled and 
universally applicable perspective - that is, from a perspective that necessarily allows us 
to compare individual conditions of life in one country to those in another -
misunderstands the principle of fair equality of opportunity. More generally, it begs the 
question as to what use a principle of justice will have in a world in which individu ais 
live under extremely diverse conditions that allow for abundance for sorne, and hardi y 
enough to live for others. 
In Section 5, 1 investigate the liberal nationalist daim that we have a different set 
of duties towards our compatriots compared to non-compatriots. 1 explain that this daim 
is founded on an ethical particularist account of our moral duties. To tie ethical 
particularism to different sets of moral duties at home, compared to those we incur 
intemationally, relies on what has been called a concentric circle mode! of moral duties. 
The model is the subject of subsection 5.1, in which 1 argue that its progressive character 
makes it an implausible model to use. 1 then explore Miller' s assumption that the 
relationship between fellow nationals compared to the ones between non-compatriots 
"contingent" since norms of social justice as Miller construes them are not simply contextual to the 
community, but are furthermore contingent on a specifie set of conditions in a community, as 1 will explain 
in what follows. 
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warrants redistributive duties towards the former, but not towards the latter. I discuss 
three different kinds of relationships that may warrant special obligations, but argue that 
Miller can only plausibly refer to one. Employing what Samuel Scheffler caUs the 
distributive objection to special relationships (Scheffler 2001: Chapter 6), 1 maintain that 
even if we accepted that there are special relationships between fellow nationals, these 
would nevertheless not permit us to negate global redistributive duties of the kind on 
which redistributive immigration policies are premised. I conclu de that two fundamental 
objections that could be brought forward by liberal nationalist authors against these kinds 
of redistributive changes in immigration regimes are not convincing arguments. 
2 The Liberal Nationalist Definition of National Identity and National 
Community 
In order to understand Miller' s argument it is important to examine his concept of 
national identity and national community since it is the foundation for both his socially 
contingent model of social justice and his interpretation of ethical particularism. Miller 
argues that our belonging to a nationality, and thus having a national identity, is a 
moraUy relevant relationship that justifies an ethical particularist stance. To make sense 
of this argument, we need to clarify the liberal national definition of the concept of 
nationality. On this account, nationality describes a community of people bound together 
by history, language, culture and, usually, territory. Nationality is often tied to ethnicity 
and a shared cultural background. Fellow nationals recognize each other easily among 
themselves: they identify with each other, and share a sense of belonging (Miller 1995: 
25). Moreover, they identify with their common history as a nation and are conscious of 
being involved in the ongoing national project to the point to be willing to "die for our 
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nation." (Tarnir 1997). Liberal nationalists argue that nationality - or a shared national 
identity, terms 1 will use interchangeably - constitutes an important part of individu al 
personal identity. Sharing in a national identity allows us to partake meaningfully in a 
history larger than that of our individu al lives or immediate community. Our nationhood 
provides us with a "collective political subject - a 'we' - with the capacity to act 
collectively over long periods of time" (Canovan 1996: 72).60 And finally, national 
identity generates the solidarity and trust amongst compatriots needed to sustain the 
institutions of the democratic welfare state and believed to be responsible for cultivating 
and implementing our shared principles of social justice, such as redistributive taxation 
and a sense of "ci vic morality" (Letki 2005) or "ci vic virtue" (Macedo 1990). This 
function of national identity has been described as a stimulus or "battery" for the nation-
state (Canovan 1996: 80, see also Tamir 1993: 118).61 
How are we to conceptualize identity? The ernergence of the liberal idea of 
identity can be traced back to the ideas of the Enlightenment - a period in the history of 
political thought, to recall Chapter One, which initiated the slow embrace of what we 
now consider to be the core liberal ide as about how to autonomously decide on the shape 
of our lives. What characterizes a liberal conception of identity, then, is that it atternpts to 
recognize how individu aIs want to be identified and seen. Liberalism accepts that we 
should not be pinned down by ascribed identity features, but that we should have the 
60 1 should say that Canovan discusses liberal nationalism without necessarily endorsing it. 
61 It is important to note that while ethnicity, a shared culture and language are often referred to when 
identifying a nation, according to the liberal nationalist account, these markers gain their relevance and 
importance from the function they perform, which is to provide for a shared national identity as a condition 
of a liberal nation (Moore 2001: 9ft). According to the liberal nationalist account, then, these markers have 
value only in so far as they support a national identity. This distinguishes the liberal nationality from a 
simply nationalist account in which territory, for example, has intrinsic value and is employed to rally 
support and allegiance for the nationalist cause (see Ignatieff ] 994). 
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freedom to choose identity contexts that provide us with meaning in our lives.62 On this 
reading, 'identity' is a frame of references that allows us to make decisions in our lives, 
that allows us to be autonomous. Identity as a frame of reference pro vides us with 
possible ways to conceive of ourselves and of the relationship we want to have with our 
surroundings (see Kymlicka 1989). To embrace an individu al identity is therefore closely 
tied to the liberal ideal of individual autonomy and agency and the account of autonomy 1 
provided in Chapter One. There, 1 explained that my interpretation of autonomy followed 
that of Raz who construes individual autonomy to imply that we are "part author" of the 
lives we live, that we have adequate and viable options and opportunities available to 
take decisions and engage in projects that make life worthwhile living (Raz 1986: 365ft). 
Concomitantly, when choosing what kind of life to pursue, 1 may evaluate given values 
and create new ones around which 1 would want to organize my life. 1 do so based on the 
options before me, which are partly provided by my belonging to a cultural group. 
ln contrast, an illiberal interpretation of identity is characterized by a subscription 
to primordial features, like religion or race - in other words, the ascription of someone's 
identity for them.63 This is where potential conflicts between the liberal concept of 
identity and certain features of nationalism may lie. Nationalism, at least to sorne liberal 
and cosmopolitan minds, promotes a group identity that endangers and contradicts the 
Enlightenment notion of individu al autonomy. It does so by locking people into a 
particular cultural context irrespective of their wishes otherwise. Nationalism, so the 
critique goes, calls for adopting certain features of a group as part of one's own identity 
62 For a wide-ranging discussion of the emergence of the modern identity see Charles Taylor (1989); see 
also Axel Honneth (1998). 
63 Miller provides the stark example of Hannah Arendt who never really identified herself first and 
foremost as a Jew but who was driven to do so by the Nuremberg laws in Germany: "when one is attacked 
as a Jew, one has to defend oneself as a Jew" (quoted in Miller 1995: 44). 
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and invites one to privilege the welfare and concern of the members of our nationality 
group above the concerns of others. The concept of "Liberal Nationalism" seems, then, 
like an oxymoron (see Levinson 1995; Waldron 1995). 
As their name suggests, however, liberal nationalists believe that they can solve 
the conflict between the idea1 of liberal autonomy and the need for national identities. 
Miller believes that a synthesis can be achieved by proposing a "common public culture" 
that is to buttress our sense of belonging to a national identity. A national identity is then 
defined as, on the one hand, a common public culture - "a set of ideas about the 
character of the community which [ ... ] helps to fix responsibilities" (Miller 1995: 68) for 
each individual and a "sense of belonging together by virtue of the characteristics that 
[we] share" (Miller 1995:25)64 - while, on the other hand, encompassing and fostering 
individu al identities that constitute the context of identity choices individuals may have 
made. In this vein, liberal nationalism allows for what Miller has called "private 
subcultures," in which individu ais can realize individu al identity choices.65 
To summarize, liberal nationalist authors argue for a distinct account of national 
identity that is intimately tied to our identity as autonomous individuals. This account 
64 Through this open definition of a common public culture, Miller and other liberal nationalists make 
clear that they do not apply "blood-and-belonging" style criteria of nationality but instead account for the 
self-referentiality and subjectivity on which belonging to a nation relies (see Moore 2001: 5t). 
65 In fact, liberal nationalists argue that ethnic identities, to take one example of private subcultures, and 
ethnic diversity may be a constitutive part of a liberal national identity: because a common public culture is 
not all-embracing, but "may be seen as a set of understandings about how a group is to conduct its life 
together. .. [e.g.] through political princip les such as a belief in democracy or the rule oflaw [extending] to 
social norms and cultural ideals." A liberal national identity is thus "quite compatible with a diversity of 
ethnic groups" (Miller 1995: 25ff, cf. also Tamir 1990). However, later on, Miller articulates as one of the 
advantages of national identity over other forms of identity, like reIigious ones, that national identities are 
encompassing and ail embracing. This confusion is due to Miller's use of "all-embracing" as referring, 
both, to aIl aspects of our lives (a), which nationality does not coyer, and (b) to all people identifying with 
a nationality, i.e. as the unifying property of nationality for all those who share in it. This is not simply a 
semantic matter: if Miller aims to propose the national community as the only encompassingly valuable 
community, then it is impossible to adjudicate between potentially competing obligations we may have as 
members of different moral communities (Moore 2001: 47). 
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allows us, they claim, to define individu al responsibilities in the community while being 
instrumental for motivating us to contribute to the achievement of social justice in a 
liberal national community. 
3 The Liberal Nationalist Argument for Socially Contingent Standards of 
Social Justice 
In a next step, Miller explains how principles of social justice emerge. He argues 
for a socially contingent account of social justice and supports the idea that principles of 
social justice are closely tied and dependent on the character and the nature of the 
community in which they are applied. Miller claims that conceptions of social justice 
arise out of particular cultural, geographical, historical and cultural circumstances - and 
hence that a concept of global social justice would be an oxymoron. Equally implausible 
would it be to advocate the kind of global duties 1 wish to defend, namely global 
redistributive duties. How does he come to these conclusions? 
Miller finds support here in an earlier argument made by Michael Walzer, which 
is worth examining. According to Walzer, "the primary good we distribute to one another 
is membership in sorne human community" (Walzer 1983: 31). This premise is the basis 
for his argument supporting the conventional assumption on national sovereignty and 
immigration (Walzer 1983: 31- 63): since "the community itself is a good" (Walzer 
1983: 31) whose composition and protection requires attention, it should be within the 
realm of national sovereignty to determine who should and who should not be a member 
of the citizenry. In order to make sense of this claim, we should look at the arguments 
pertaining to the "community as a good" more closely. Why, we should ask, should we 
accept Walzer's claims? 1 assume here that, from a liberal perspective, we cannot accept 
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reasons originating in chauvinist beliefs about the superior value of our community when 
compared to others. Put differently, why should we assume that the "community itself is 
a good" for reasons other than that it is ours? One of the rationales for this argument, it 
seems to me, is the contingency that Walzer and Miller establish between our community 
- its standards of human welfare and the requirements necessary to achieve them - and 
principles of social justice that derive from such standards. Such a contingent 
relationship renders principles of social justice dependent on the make-up of our 
community. This point bears exploring. 
Walzer begins by arguing that most societies had "welfare state" provisions built 
into them - their public policy has always been geared towards the general welfare of the 
population. To illustrate, Walzer daims that general welfare constituted one of the 
constitutive values of many ancient communities (Walzer 1983: 68ft). Referring to fifth-
century Athens as one such example, Walzer contends that one of the polis' major 
concerns was the general health of the community and that such concern was the 
motivating factor for the annual election of a designated number of doctors who were to 
be paid from public funds and who, in turn, had a dut Y to assist those who could not pay 
for medical services (Walzer 1983: 69). A second value was the maintenance ofthe 
democratic process that required political participation in the running of the city-state. In 
order to allow for everybody, even those on the lower rungs of the socio-economic 
ladder, to take up their civic duties, Athens had a scheme of remuneration to compensate 
people for a missed day of work (Walzer 1983: 71). Similarly, Walzer explores the social 
provisions of medieval Jewish communities, for example in the domain of religious 
education for aIl children, indu ding children whose parents could not afford school dues, 
or provisions of food for the po or at times of religious festivities (Walzer 1983: 72ft). He 
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daims that these and other ex amples of welfare provisions pertained to areas of social 
life that were instrumental for the survival of the community: education was elemental in 
order to continue a tradition of scholarship and to keep alive the Jewish faith, as was 
providing for the poor. Rules about how to treat poor members of the cornmunity, then, 
reflected a concern for the overall welfare of the comrnunity and its survival. They were 
not, however, based on a universal concept of social justice. Put differently, welfare 
provisions in ancient Greece and medieval Jewish communities were not based on a 
universally applicable idea that aIl members should enjoy fair equality of opportunity or 
that wealth should be redistributed. Rather, these policies and provisions were intimately 
tied to the values and norms of the communities in question. 
David Miller makes a sirnilar case for the interdependence of norrns and values of 
the community, on the one hand, and our conception of social justice on the other. His 
argument can be broken down into several components - which should not be understood 
as necessarily foIlowing each other in the order 1 present them here, but rather to be 
mutually re-enforcing. First, Miller argues that our shared national culture, as weIl as the 
shared understandings it implies, forrns the essential background for the principles of 
social justice we adhere to (Miller 1999: 18). Second, Miller believes that the goods we 
want to distribute under a scheme of social justice will be deterrnined by what has social 
value to all in a given society; that is, they will depend on the particular needs we may 
have in this particular society (Miller 1999: 1In).66 Finally, Miller argues that the 
66 To refer to Walzer's examples, while religious education was a central social value in a community that 
was built on a common faith, political participation was what distinguished the social values of the 
Athenian city-state. If we were to apply this sc he me to a modern capitalist context, we could make a 
plausible case that participation in the market economy functions as a normative pillar of our society, thus 
explaining the emphasis that contemporary welfare policies put on "workfare" legislation aiming at the "re-
integration" of individuals into the market economy. These policies, following Walzer, could be read as 
aiming to en able aH members of society, albeit in varying degrees, to partake in the capitalist market 
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conception of social justice we adhere to will shape our understanding of what "counts as 
liberty" and how we should distribute access to it (Miller 1999:13).67 
ln light of my argument for global justice as it is motivated by concerns over 
individu al autonomy, this last step in Miller's argumentation bears further exploration, 
since to provide for conditions of individu al autonomy as a matter of social justice on a 
global scale is what motivates this thesis. In Chapter One, 1 interpreted Rawls' principle 
of fair equality of opportunity as derived from the postulates of social justice, which are 
principles that are in turn motivated by a concern with individual autonomy. To recall, 
the main rationale for liberal egalitarian considerations of social justice is to enable 
individuals to lead autonomous lives. The primary condition for meaningful choice is, of 
course, freedom from interference. While we need, most minimally to be in a position to 
enjoy freedom from interference in our decision-making process, some authors go 
beyond this negative definition of liberty and assume that we need to have a range of 
meaningful options available to us to make these choices. 1 have explained that it is this 
latter concern that is the subject matter of the principle of fair equality of opportunity, 
namely to ensure fair access to the social goods that pro vide individuals with a range of 
choices along which to design their lives. To what extent we subscribe to the different 
interpretations of the principles of social justice may be open to debate, or so at least 
libertarians might daim. The only point 1 aim to make here is that, from a liberal 
perspective, provisions for individual autonomy must count as the main aim of any 
scheme of social justice. 
exchange. Judith Shklar has proposed an argument along these lines explaining the integrative function of 
money in American citizenship construction (Shklar 1991). 
67 Sorne semantic clarification is called for at this point: Miller uses 'individualliberty' and 'individual 
autonomy' interchangeably (see also Miller 1991).1 will use "individual autonomy" for my own 
discussion, and employ "liberty" when relating to Miller's argument. 
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1 will begin with an investigation of the last component of Miller's argument, i.e. 
the link he posits between principles of social justice and individu al autonomy. Of 
course, precisely what constitutes individu al autonomy is highly debated, as is the 
essence of equality, for example. For Miller, though, "liberty" should not be understood 
as a concept in contradistinction to concems for social justice.68 Rather, as 1 intimated 
above, he argues for a contextual relationship between our understanding of liberty and 
our definition of principles of social justice: provisions for individualliberty have to be 
understood in the context of our particular account of social justice. Miller' s argument 
unfolds as follows: first, he holds that any account of social justice will be "an account of 
the basic rights of citizens [inc1uding] rights to various concrete liberties such as freedom 
of movement and freedom of speech" because an "extensive sphere of basic liberty is 
built into the requirements of social justice" (Miller 1999: 13).69 Starting from this 
vantage point, we can then explore "whether and when a lack of resources constitutes a 
constraint of freedom" (Miller 1999: 13). Put differently, once civic liberties are 
provided, we can assess the economic and social dimensions of liberties as they are 
defined in the context of a specific society and, accordingly, ask to what extent principles 
of social justice need to address the material welfare of members of the cornrnunity. We 
could thus imagine that what counts as an acceptable level of material welfare is an 
explicit reflection of particular social values.7o 
68 He is thus grappling with a tradition in political thinking promoted by libertarian or conservative authors 
who may flinch at any notion of social justice since they assume that it will violate principles of individual 
(negative) liberty (see for example Nozick 1974). 
69 This, of course, echoes the standard argument in liberal egalitarian thought - compare Rawls' Liberty 
principle as the first of the two principles of justice for institutions (Rawls 1971: 302). 
70 To illustrate: it used to be Illegal for the fiscal authorities in Germany to confiscate a television set from 
an individual who was in arrears with payments to the German Department of Revenue. To have to live 
without TV was considered undue hardship in German society, while 1 would suspect that no such clause 
exists in many other countries. 
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How does this relate to Miller' s two other points regarding the communal 
background of the deliberations about social justice and the social value of the goods to 
be distributed? If one accepts Miller's daim that social justice refers to the morally 
desirable state of society - which 1 think we can safely do - it follows that we need to 
have points of reference along which we can evaluate to what extent measures intended 
to bring about social justice will actually do so. What is to be evaluated, then, is the 
extent to which individu aIs have access to social goods that will enable them to have an 
acceptable degree of autonomy in a given society, to turn to the second point. Therefore, 
the goods that we should be concerned about are socially contingent. Miller accepts that 
there are sorne goods that would pertain to any concept of social justice, su ch as "incorne 
and wealth, jobs and educational opportunities, health care and so forth" (Miller 1999: 
11) since access to these goods determines the conditions of autonorny in any society. 
Beyond these, however, principles of social justice cannot and should not atternpt to 
come up with a list of goods that everybody would want,71 because the value of goods is 
contingent on the society we live in. Instead, Miller invites us to understand the question 
of what is needed to achieve social justice as one pertaining to 
a rnoveable boundary between justice-relevant and justice-irrelevant goods, the 
positions of the boundary depending partly on the technical capacities of our 
social institutions, and partly on the consensus that can be reached about the 
value of particular goods. (Miller 1999: 11) 
Now, if 1 understand Miller correctly, we need to make several decisions as to 
precisely what entity sets the value of social goods. For example, is it within the context 
of the local community or that of the national comrnunity that we deliberate about the 
71 Miller here takes issue with Rawls' characterization of primary goods as "things [ ... ] a rational man 
wants whatever else he wants" (cf. Miller 1999: 272, n. 21). Miller argues that while access to higher 
education surely is an issue of social justice, there would be man y rationallife plans that do not involve 
higher education and would hence not be wanted by rational man. 
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value of particular goods? Take higher education as an illustrative example of access to a 
good that may or may not faH in the purview of our socially informed principles of social 
justice. We could plausibly argue that for an individu al Inuit living in a remote Arctic 
community, access to higher education and the skills it is meant to provide may be of less 
value. Rather, excellence at traditional hunting practices, say, or at keeping traditional 
Inuit culture alive has value in the community. These, we might think, would be skills 
that enable an individu al Inuit to make choices about her life that a university degree 
might not provide. If she decided to leave the local community, however, and if she 
wanted to interact and work in a larger community like a Canadian province or the 
Canadian state, we cou Id argue that higher education would make a significant difference 
to her range of meaningfullife choices. Hence, we could argue that access to higher 
education would be a valu able good in the context of the Canadian state and should thus 
be addressed by Canadian principles of social justice. 72 This is how 1 reconstruct the 
rationale for Miller' s argument that the value of social goods may vary depending on the 
communal context in which we live. 
Having explored Miller' s claim for the contingent value of social goods, we 
should turn to his final claim. Miller takes the liberal nation that confers ethical ties to 
and special obligations on its members as the boundary-setting community that should 
72 Taking Inuit society as one that can be imagined to require access to different social goods than other 
cultures is not meant to historicize Aboriginal cultures, but to imagine a context in which access to 
different goods has a different impact on individual autonomy. The fact that this example may fail to 
convince may hint at the implausibility of Miller's argument for socially contingent social goods, as 1 
argue below. Very briefly, though - and taking Miller's own definitions at heart - the Inuit scenario could 
also be sketched differently. As 1 explained in this chapter, Section 2, liberal nationalists subscribe to the 
idea that a viable and vibrant cultural context is necessary for individuals to make autonomous choices in 
their lives (see my definition of autonomy, Chapter One; Kymlicka 1989; Raz 1986). Considered in this 
light, 1 can imagine that a university education is vital to keep an Aboriginal culture alive: for example, a 
law degree is indispensable when it is a matter of defending cultural Aboriginal rights in our legalized 
culture. This counter example, then, illustrates at the problem separating one socio-cultural community 
context from another. 
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serve as both the moral guideline for princip les of social justice and the basis of any 
assessment of whether or not we have implemented them successfully (Miller 1995: Ch. 
3). The national culture, which is based on a shareçl national identity and is encapsulated 
within the nation-state, suggests itself because it forms "a uni verse of distribution ... 
who se overall justice we can meaningfully assess" (Miller 1999: 5). Considering the 
practical implications of principles of social justice, i.e. the distribution of resources, 
Miller holds, first, that the national community pro vides us with a scheme or points of 
references for values we ascribe to goods to be compared; and secondly, that only the 
national community, in the form of the nation-state, has the institutions at its disposaI 
that are essential for any implementation of principles of social justice (Miller 1999: 5). 
This last point is important for Miller' s concept of social justice, and 1 concur 
with his methodological premise here: if we subscribe to the view, as Miller does, that 
concepts of social justice rely on moral agents, that they require somebody morally 
accountable for implementing or violating the principles of social justice rather than 
accepting that they can be violated by naturallottery, say, or bad luck73 , then we need to 
be able to identify who is responsible for the successes or failures of the system of 
distribution (Miller 1999: 14). Now, Miller argues that the nation-state has the 
distributive resources to implement social justice, and that if the institutions of the 
nation-state or their representatives fail to work towards implementing measures of social 
justice, we have an addressee of daims for accountability. We do not have a comparable 
address for daims about international injustice, and cannot, hence, hold anybody 
73 Recall my support, in Chapter One, for those who argue that rights claims need to have addressees in 
order to have moral clout. Without somebody specifically called upon to enable their realization, rights will 
tum into manifesto rights which everybody is happy to endorse, but nobody feels obliged to implement or 
protect. 1 thus share with Miller the assumption that social justice is tied to moral responsibility and 
accountability. 
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accountable for the failings of social justice in the international sphere. If implementation 
is tied to the nation-state, then, we should aiso accept the national culture as background 
of our principles of social justice, rather than universal principles, as cosmopolitans 
would have us do. 
The argument then cornes full circle - a testament to Miller' s very coherent 
argumentation - and can be summarized as follows: principles of social justice require 
moral standards; moral standards and principles are conveyed by our sharing in a 
common nationality because nationality is an ethical identity that entails certain duties 
and obligations to our fellow members. Principles of social justice beyond the 
distribution of very basic goods, furthermore, depend on local needs and standards of 
welfare, which can only be determined through deliberation in the community. The 
national community represents the ideal forum because it already has established norms 
of interaction among its members. Finally, social justice requires the institutional means 
to implement policies of social justice, which, again, in the CUITent world based on 
nation-states, only nation-states can carry out. So far, then, 1 have explained the rationale 
for Miller' s argument for culturally contingent principles of social justice. In a next step, 
1 will continue to discuss and eventually criticize his assumptions. 
4 Arguments Against Socially Contingent Standards of Social Justice 
One way of defending redistributive immigration schemes against the first liberal 
nationalist objection is to show that the argument for socially contingent norms of social 
justice is implausible. In attempting to do so, 1 will employ calls for international 
standards of social justice to support my assessment of today's immigration schemes to 
countries that pro vide the most extensive set of opportunities which, as 1 argued in 
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Chapter One, compound and perpetuate systematic global injustice (4.1). Arguments for 
transnational or universal standards of justice, 1 will continue, are supported by empirical 
evidence we gain when taking a doser look at the world in which we live, i.e. a world in 
which many people are willing to relocate at great costs to themselves and their families 
in order to get a "fair share" (4.2). 1 will then question the logic of making distinctions 
between duties of global humanitarian assistance - which Miller accepts as warranted in 
today' s world - and a global principle of redistribution - which, to his mind, is not 
warranted. The contrast between the two is overdrawn in so far as redistributive 
immigration policies could be based on the catalogue of goods Miller insists has 
universal salience (4.3). 
4.1. Normative Arguments for Universal Standards of Social Justice 
As we have seen, Michael Walzer and David Miller assume that principles of 
social justice, beyond very basic welfare, are defined by the societal context in which 
individuals live. In Miller's words, we should conceive of substantive principles of social 
justice as "distribution according to need," with need being "understood in terms of the 
general ethos of community" (Miller 1999: 27). To my mind, however, tying princip les 
of social justice exdusively to the "ethos of community" would lead to very unattractive 
consequences. In fact, it would be tantamount to prohibiting the development of a 
meaningful point of reference along which to evaluate justice and injustice in the world 
since it would prohibit comparison of conditions of living that need to be compared in 
order to assess whether or not a situation is just (see Caney 2003). If we refer people in 
unjust societies to their local norms of social justice, we put them in the 
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absurd position of having to invoke norms that are characteristically antithetical 
to the rights of women, children, ethnie and religious minorities, and the poor. 
The whole point of a universalistic conception of justice [however] is that it 
provides a basis on which both those inside and those outside a country can 
criticize practices and institutions that reflect local norms, which typically 
endorse discrimination, exploitation and oppression. (Barry 2005: 27) 
While accepting Miller' s premise that a concept of social justice requires a 
reference point, a moral guideline for its development, we still need to determine from 
where such a guideline can be derived from. Contrary to Miller, 1 support Barry' s 
argument that this moral guideline must necessarily derive from sorne universal 
principles, which to liberal minds are necessarily derived from liberal principles like 
equality, non-discrimination, individu al autonomy and liberty. This is the first critique of 
attempts to relativize the role that univers al principles of justice play in our 
understandingof social realities. 
Of course, Miller could retort that such an account neglects the fact that there 
may be local customs and traditions that are not captured by su ch universal principles-
recall, here, the example of an Inuit living in a traditional society. The argument for 
universal standards of social justice, to continue Miller' s potential rebuttal, is idealistic, 
at best, because it neglects local circumstances that determine what we need in order to 
live autonomous lives. Instead, we should conceive of social justice as "a moveable 
boundary between justice-relevant and justice-irrelevant goods [with] the position on the 
boundary depending partIy on the technical capacity of our social institutions" (Miller 
1999: Il). Daniel Weinstock has warned against su ch an institutional understanding of 
social justice since institutions and their outcomes are malle able to whatever intentions 
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we may confer upon them.74 Moreover, Miller's institutional focus sounds like an 
invitation to negate the responsibilities to de!iver certain goods. Imagine a society who se 
technical capacities prohibit it from delivering a social good - a poor country that does 
not have enough capacity to uphold a functioning health care system, for example. If 
social goods are evaluated along socially contingent !ines, we may console ourselves 
more easily by holding on to the idea that the good in question is not necessarily justice-
relevant. We might say that aH those living in the poor country are equally barred from 
access to health care and that it is thence not an infringement of principles of social 
justice that are determined by national boundaries. This kind of "stage-door exit" is 
prohibited if we apply universal principles of social justice, i.e. principles that compare 
the situation in one society to that in others. 
Now, Miller might daim that he accounts for universal principles of social justice 
by requiring that "basic needs" be provided for universally, but that beyond these needs, 
we need to account for socially contingent circumstances as 1 explained above. Yet this 
begs the question: if sorne needs are assessed through a universallens, then it is not dear 
why Miller would want to make an irondad assertion about the socially contingent 
character of principles of social justice for aH other goods. 
Second, Miller's blueprint also fails to assess meaningfully goods that transcend 
the social boundary. Assume, for a moment, that we accept Miller's distinction between 
goods that define individu al autonomy in any society and goods beyond these basic ones 
whose justice relevance is determined in the realm of a particular society. How should 
we conceive of the different opportunities we might enjoy if we immigrate to one country 
74 "We must be very wary indeed of reading substantial ethical conclusions from institutional facts, as 
these facts can embody significant injustices that we would thereby legitimize" (Weinstock 2003: 275). 
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compared to the ones accessible in our country of origin? Who should assess whether or 
not such differences are part of the subject matter principles of social justice should deal 
with? Should it be those who come from poor countries and who want to be able to enjoy 
social goods access to which is considered a concern for social justice in rich countries? 
Or should it be those living in rich countries who take access to su ch social goods for 
granted, but believe that they are part of a socially contingent blueprint of social justice? 
Needless to say, if individu al access to opportunities is circumscribed by the boundaries 
of the society of origin and not part of univers al justice considerations, immigration 
systems that are based on national needs and concerns rather than on principles of fair 
equality of opportunity will appear perfectly legitimate. Those living in rich countries, 
put another way, can then argue against changing their immigration ethics by resorting to 
the socially contingent model of social justice. 
To be sure, Miller could reply that he accepts that individu al opportunities 
including access to higher education should be part of universalized catalogues of social 
goods, but then we are back to the first criticism, namely that the distinction between 
socially contingent goods and universal ones is unhelpful. This bears on my third point in 
response to Miller' s assumptions regarding socially contingent principles of social 
justice. Barry conceives the role that univers al principles of social justice must play to 
investigate how the dynamics of distribution of, for example, rights, opportunities and 
resources affect individu al autonomy. Rather than assessing local social goods needed to 
live a meaningfullife - which is how 1 applied Miller' s argument in my Inuit examp1e 
above - Barry instead invites us to look at the systemic inequalities of individu ais that 
arise in aU societies in the world and which inhibit meaningful choices and the pursuit of 
autonomous lives. Principles of social justice can be applied in the social context of a 
95 
given society - however, they cannot be circumscribed by local norms, but must comply 
with universal norms of justice.75 To illustrate, if the economic elite of a given society 
holds more than its fair share of economic resources and access to opportunities, as is the 
case of corrupt officiaIs in Nigeria discussed in Chapter One, we can apply universal 
principles of social justice in order to criticize such an unfair distribution. Similarly, if an 
ethnic or gender group is systematically privileged in the distribution of opportunities -
if, for example, its representation in the best national universities is systematically higher 
than that of any other group - then we need to apply univers al principles of social justice 
to denounce this inequity. Such inequity is unjust regardless of the local costs of 
satisfying one's needs, regardless, for example, of the difference in purchasing power a 
university graduate will have compared to somebody without a university degree. 
To understand universal principles of social justice as reference points for 
evaluating the justness of distributive outcomes bears directly on the question of whether 
or not we should adopt redistributive immigration policies. In Chapter One, to recall, 1 
argued that CUITent immigration policies unevenly distribute access to opportunities. 1 
posited that, as a result, contemporary immigration schemes perpetuate and compound 
the unfair advantages that citizens of rich countries enjoy in accessing opportunities. 
Furthermore, 1 argued that access to opportunities is a primary social good that will 
determine individu al autonomy and well-being. And, in fact, 1 believe that Barry's 
argument lends credence to my daim that when focusing on the dynamics of distribution 
of opportunities as a social good in the global context, we realize that we are faced with 
an uneven distribution of opportunities. To be sure, 1 have conceded that, from a liberal 
75 Catherine Lu proposes a similar understanding of cosmopolitanism that transcends the local-global 
divide (Lu 2000). 
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perspective, there may be valid reasons for restricting immigration. The les son to draw 
from Barry's argument, however, is that in order to analyze and assess if unevenness in 
access to opportunities is also unfairness and injustice, we need universal principles of 
justice as reference points to assess the systemic dynamics and outcomes of immigration 
regimes. Only if we have a universal point of reference, that is, can we make these kinds 
of assessment. 
4.2. The World We Live ln 
Miller could, of course, concede that having univers al principles of social justice 
is what we should aim for - in fact, he advocates a universally applicable principle of 
national responsibility to further social justice, as 1 will explain further along - but that 
social justice is not assessed on a global scale. Instead, for every individual, justice 
considerations are necessarily couched in local norms and hence socially contingent 
which renders arguments for universal principles methodologically unsound. Such a 
rejoinder would be consistent the Miller' s methodological comments to be found in his 
work on social justice (see particularly Miller 1999: Ch. 1). There, he makes the case for 
a theoretical and normative framework of principles of social justice that builds on how 
we actually deliberate about social justice rather than one that takes its origins in abstract 
principles. To illustrate his position, let me relate one of Miller' s own examples. Miller 
claims that one of the reasons why principles of social justice are contingent to the 
national community derives from the fact that when talking about social justice, 
individuals compare themselves with their compatriots rather than with those living in a 
wider, multi-national or international community: 
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My claim is not that justice formally requires this particular sc ope restriction, but 
that the principles we use are always, as a matter of psychological fact, applied to 
bounded communities [ ... ] A Spaniard who feels that he is being underpaid may 
be comparing himself with other Spaniards generally, or with other workers in his 
factory or village, but he will not be comparing himself with Germans or 
Americans, say. (Miller 1999: 18, emphasis in original/6 
We should wonder, however, if this really captures the world we live in. Surely, one of 
the reasons why people travel and move beyond their own homelands has been - and 
indeed still is - that they think they will better their economic position when they work in 
Germany compared to Turkey, say, or in the US compared to Mexico. Those moving 
across borders - accompanied at times with high personal costs such as leaving farnily 
and loved ones behind, or at the risk of being caught and sent back - aim to get "their fair 
share" in life, to be able to attain the riches enjoyed by sorne, but withheld from them. If 
we were to follow the approaches espoused by Miller and Walzer, how should we 
capture what motivates people who cross borders, or what they hope to achieve? If we 
cannot characterize attempts to gain access to better economic benefits, better 
educational facilities for their children, better living conditions as arising from a 
universal comparison of living conditions, how should we characterize them? Miller's 
model of the national community as setting the context of social values - the national 
community providing us with the reference points along which we evaluate questions of 
justice - seems to fall apart in so far as it does not provide us with a model to account for 
what those who leave their countries of origin aim to do and what motivates them to do 
so. 
76 In a subsequent endnote, Miller states further that the reason for this sense of unfairness derives from the 
sense of belonging not only to a bounded, but also to a shared community (Miller 1999: 273, n. 32). 
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Miller' s final objection might hold that it may be true that citizens of poor 
countries compare their conditions of living to those of citizens in rich ones, but that, 
surely, liberals cannot be content to accept the status quo and risk the lives of those 
trying to come to wealthier shores.77 Although we undoubtedly live in grossly unjust 
circumstances, should we not rather aim for a situation where national govemments can 
take care of their citizens and provide conditions of fair equality of opportunity at home? 
Recall Miller' s point that only the nation-state, and its distributive institutions, is in a 
position to implement measures of social justice. In this vein, Miller argues against 
immigration schemes that bring people to our shores in order to better their chances at 
leading autonomous lives, promoting, instead, a univers al princip le of holding nations 
responsible for the well-being of their citizens. His world-order, he might say, would 
straddle the divide between liberal concems for global justice and his beliefs that the 
national culture and state are a vital ingredient for determining and implementing 
principles of social justice without, however, having to subscribe to a global principle of 
redistribution (Miller 2004).1 will discuss this blueprint in the following section. 
4.3. Humanitarian Assistance vs. Redistributive Justice? 
Miller accepts that rich countries, in fact, do have a moral obligation to secure 
minimal standards ofwelfare everywhere in the world (Miller 1995: 77; see also 2004). 
He accepts, in other words, that we have a dut Y to act in the face of the "absolute 
77 This last objection, nota bene, does not challenge my proposai for redistributive immigration policies 
since, to my mind, saving hopeful immigrants from drowning is a simple question of administration and 
implementation of such regimes, rather than a normative argument against such policies. We could simply 
imagine, as 1 suggested in Chapter One, that in the course of the immigration process, host-countries wou Id 
take responsibility for bringing immigrants into their countries in a safe fashion, along the lines of Israel' s 
immigration program for Ethiopian Jews in the 1990s when the Israeli military flew the new Jewish 
citizens to their destination. 
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deprivation" that dorninates the lives of the world's poorest. Absolute deprivation is that 
level of hurnan poverty that puts individuals in a position in which "decent hurnan 
functioning" is jeopardized (Blake 200 1: 258ff). As 1 have explained, Miller' sand 
Walzer' s accounts of principles of social justice are based on the ide a that there is a 
socially contingent set of goods that determine our standards of well-being beyond goods 
that characterize any concept of social justice, like "incorne and wealth, jobs and 
educational opportunities, health care and so forth" (Miller 1999: Il). These latter goods, 
Miller concedes, are vital to any hurnan life and are hence independent of one's social 
context. Miller explains the provision of vital - that is, universally necessary - goods 
with duties of humanitarian assistance. He rejects, however, the idea that global justice 
would require applying principles of egalitarian redistribution on a global scale (Miller 
1995: 104ff). This implies that we do not have a dut y to act in cases of "relative 
deprivation" i.e. in cases where we find a lack of goods in comparison to the bundle of 
goods others have (Blake 2001: 258ff), rather than absolute deprivation. To accept 
redistributive immigration schemes, as 1 have conceived them, aims to go beyond the 
obligations of rich countries to assist those in most dire need of the basic means of 
survival - in fact, 1 take these kinds of obligations as uncontroversial - and hence goes 
beyond relieving absolute deprivation. Instead, they are intended to address the relative 
deprivation in access to countries that provide for greater opportunities to lead 
autonomous lives that the worst-off suffer. Recall, here, the contrast 1 explained between 
desirable immigrants - who are typically from sirnilarly wealthy countries and who move 
with relative ease from one wealthy country to another- and undesirable ones - who are 
typically members of the global poor and who are barred access to wealthy countries. It 
is in this sense that the latter suffer from relative deprivation. 
100 
What should we make of the contrast between principles of humanitarian 
assistance and principles of redistribution? If Miller accepts that "income and wealth, 
jobs and educational opportunities" are part of every concept of social justice and hence, 
1 infer, ought to be accessible equally on a global scale, then his argument does not seem 
to stand in the way of accepting redistributive immigration policies. To recall, 1 argued in 
Chapter One that one of the rationales for such policies wou Id be to provide individu aIs 
with fairer access to opportunities and with the goods necessary to be "reasonably 
content" (Frankfurt) with the course of their lives. Such goods are, in both Miller' s 
argument and my own, the goods that guarantee individual autonomy in any society. 
Now, imagine a scenario in which aIl our attempts at providing humanitarian assistance 
fail insofar as we are not able to provide these vital goods to aIl human beings. If Miller 
accepts that we should work towards universal access to these goods, then there may be 
instances in which humanitarian assistance might best be provided by acting on 
redistributive principles - put differently, in some cases, redistributive immigration 
might be the most effective way of realizing and promoting duties of humanitarian 
assistance.78 Miller does not adequately explain why we cannot think of humanitarian 
assistance and redistributive principles as working in concert rather than as options 
between which we have to choose. As a result, his distinction between principles of 
redistribution and those of humanitarian assistance is ultimately unconvincing. 
78 This is how we can read Goodin' s argument that if we cannot "move enough money to where the needy 
people are we will have to cou nt on moving as many of the needy people as possible to where the money 
is" (Goodin 1992: 8). 
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4.4. Enabling Nations to be Responsible 
Nevertheless, Miller could hold that accepting the global redistributive principles 
1 propose does not address his two main arguments. First, it does not refute the 
assumption that each national community will be in the best position to take care of its 
members because it will best know their needs. To recaH, Miller argues that, "in each 
community there will be a specifie understanding of the needs and interests of the 
members which generate obligations on the parts of the members" (Miller 1995: 75).79 
And second, to adopt redistributive principles on a global scale does not account for his 
argument that only the nation-state has the institutional instruments to implement 
principles of social justice. In other words, we lack an international equivalent to nation-
state institutions vital to the realization of social justice. Therefore, Miller might maintain 
that instead of global principles of redistribution, an international system in which 
national cultures could actually take care of their members and have national 
redistribution measures in place would be preferable. And in fact, this is the kind of 
approach to international justice concerns he promotes: aH countries should work 
"towards a world order in which national responsibility becomes feasible and genuine for 
everyone" (Miller 2004: 269).80 According to this argument, then, it is not a question of 
us as individuals encountering sorne isolated individual in need of assistance, but rather, 
it is a question of us as members of communities encountering other members of national 
communities who qua community are in the best position to identify and satisfy 
individu al needs. This, to Miller' s mind, changes the drift of our reasoning about 
79 For a similar argument, see also Goodin (1988). 
80 This is a rallying call which implies that the international system of global capitalism and markets 
needs to be reigned in for national governments to be in a sovereign position to devise policies of social 
welfare for the benefit of their members (Miller 2004). 
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redistribution in a fundamental way. If we accept the role played by national identity and 
culture in determining principles of social justice, we should also accept that in a first 
instance, national cultures have the dut Y and obligation to cater to the needs of their 
members.81 Our own obligation is thus channeled through the compartmentalization of 
the international sphere into nation-states that embody national cultures. National 
cultures are then at least "partly responsible for the life chances of their adherents" 
(Miller 2004: 267, emphasis in original).82 Ifwe were to convince ourselves that tbis is 
the case, we could condude, with Miller, that we should hold nations responsible for the 
welfare of their members rather than subscribing to princip les of global redistribution. 
Put differently, the daim that national communities and their governments should be the 
primary holder of this responsibility has serious implications for our conception of global 
justice and thus warrants further discussion. 
1 concur with Miller's goal that nations ought to be held responsible for the 
welfare - or the lack thereof - of their citizens. lt would indeed be ideal to live in a world 
in which nations could be held responsible, and to promote such a world should be the 
aim of liberal theorists. LiberaIs should argue for democratic government and 
81 These proposaIs ought to be read in the context of Miller' s defense of the principle of national self-
deterrnination he elaborates in his earlier work On Nationality (Miller 1995: esp. 106-107 and Ch. 3). 
Miller holds that to argue otherwise would pave the way to a system of international interference in 
national matters. 1 have argued in Chapter One that individuals and their needs for the means to lead 
autonomous lives are at the center of my proposaI. 1 find the argument for national self-determination 
trumping concerns for individual autonomy therefore unconvincing. Moreover, Catherine Lu has 
successfully deconstructed the national self-determination argument as not trumping concerns for 
individual agency (see Lu 2006: esp. Ch. 6) 
82 Miller' s terminology here is fuzzy since he makes a distinction hetween national cultures that ought to 
take responsibility for the welfare of their members, while arguing in his earlier work that nation- states 
would he the only viable way of implementing the social welfare policies which could achieve this (see 
Chapter Three and Four, below). Admitting that not aU national cultures have their own state, he 
nevertheless makes the argument that in an ideal world, i.e. one guided by the ideal of national self-
determination, national cultures would be embodied in nation-states. This idea appears to he taken as the 
norm in his later piece (Miller 2004), hence the cIaim that national cultures are responsible for the welfare 
of their members. 
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accountability, for example, or impose international sanctions to help establish the rule of 
law in undemocratic, totalitarian or authoritarian states. Note that, in a similar fashion, 1 
have endorsed Rawls' conception of a Society of Peoples which is characterized by 
decent societies. However, redistributive immigration schemes do not stand in opposition 
to attempts to hold nations responsible. As 1 argued in Chapter One, in the case of 
members of Nigeria' s corrupt ruling class, it would not be appropriate to apply 
redistributive immigration schemes to those responsible for the lack of, or perhaps 
deteriorating, welfare of their compatriots. For aH others, however, and in the meantime -
that is, while we are still far from the ideal world in which all nations are well-ordered or 
just - redistributive immigration policies as an instrument of remedial justice should be 
considered in concert with attempts to strengthen indigenous forces for change in those 
societies that lack just or decent domestic institutions. 
ln fact, an argument could be made that enhancing the opportunities for 
individuals in such societies through immigration - such as access to education, for 
example - may help achieve the goal of promoting justice in their home countries. If an 
educated middle-class plays an important role in promoting liberal values such as 
democracy, accountable government and religious tolerance, it seems that enhancing 
more individuals' opportunities for education through immigration might contribute 
positively to the aim of transforming burdened societies into well-ordered and decent 
ones. To phrase this more generally, the assumption that "local change is a necessary 
condition for a sustainable improvement in well-being does not imply that international 
contributions are not also necessary, or could not accelerate the process if suitably 
employed" (Beitz 2001: 102). The argument for local or national responsibility, 
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therefore, does not negate my argument for international or global responsibility to 
stimulate the appropriate domestic changes. In fact, one may support the other. 
Furthermore, Miller' s proposaI raises sorne moral problems that are cause for 
concern. My first one pertains to what 1 have identified in Chapter One as the heart of 
liberal convictions and follows Carens' dictum that the privileges affiliated with 
citizenship - with citizenship understood, if 1 extrapolate Miller correctly, as membership 
in a particular nation-state and allegiance to a national government that should take care 
of its members - are part of the last vestiges of the arbitrariness and injustices reigning in 
feudal times (Carens 1992: 26). It is, in other words, simply a question of good or bad 
luck where one is born. Thus, not only the bad luck of living in autocratie states, which 
Miller himself acknowledges,83 but also the bad luck ofbeing born into a poor country, 
or one ravaged by easily preventable disease and AIDS, add "insult to injury" if we insist 
that national cultures and nation-states only are responsible for the welfare of their 
adherents. 84 
Finally, and, again, taking into account the non-ideal world in which we live, we 
need to ask why, from a moral and ethical perspective, we should delegate obligations for 
the well-being of people to national governments if the respective societies are not in a 
position to adequately "take care" of its members, to provide them with adequate means 
83 Miller accepts that the case may be slightly different for individuals in autocratically governed nations 
since "[p]eople who are struggling to stay alive are in a poor condition to resist the mixture of coercion and 
propaganda that keep [autocratie] regimes [ ... ] in power. In these circumstances, to hold them responsible 
for their own deprivation is to add insult to injury" (Miller 2004: 267). 
84 We could add other reasons why Miller's verdict sounds somewhat cynical. Among them, and one of 
the most neglected ones in today' s discussions of ways to alleviate poverty and promoting good 
governance, would address the arbitrariness of the nation-building process in man y of today' s poor 
countries. Especially evident in parts of Africa, the nations in question were drawn up in Western foreign 
offices, and not based on principles of democratic deliberation and liberal governance. These two 
principles, however, are requirements if we want to implement Miller's scheme of national responsibility, 
or so it seems to me. 
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of living, something rich societies could easily do. We could couch Miller's argument for 
national responsibility in what James Nickel has called the "the dut y to protect/duty to 
provide dichotomy" (Nickel 1993: 79). Miller might argue that his blueprint aims to 
foster an international system that enables national communities to provide for individu al 
members, and that the international community accepts the dut Y to protect the national 
governments in the sense of fostering an international system that makes these provisions 
possible. To evaluate if this is a justifiable division of labor, we need, according to 
Nickel, to investigate if there are 
persons, groups, or institutions that can succeed in fulfilling moral and legal 
duties to respect and uphold in relation to that liberty or interest. If this feasibility 
condition is met, then one must ask if it is reasonable to impose these duties to the 
identified parties. (Nickel 1993: 80) 
Nickel insists that it is feasible for us to bear the burden of a moral dut Y if we can 
do so "without abandoning other responsibilities that ought not to be abandoned" (Nickel 
1993: 81). And once we have determined that it might be feasible for us to bear a 
particular moral burden, we need to explore if we are morally required to do so (Nickel 
1993: 82). It is this last facet that should draw our attention when discussing Miller's 
argument for national responsibility. He agrees that somebody ought to be responsible 
for the welfare of individuals, but that it should be their national communities and 
governments rather than rich communities or governments of rich countries. To accept 
redistributive immigration schemes, however, would postulate that we accept at least 
partial responsibility to provide for the conditions of individu al autonomy of non-
nationals. Nickel acknowledges that it is plausible to argue, as Miller does, for the 
"primary duties" of governments to provide for their citizens (Nickel 1993: 83). However 
- and this, to my mind, refutes Miller' s argument - to identify primary duties does not 
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./". absolve other institutions and govemments from fulfilling what Nickel caUs "secondary 
duties": 
One key ide a here is that a morally justified right does not just disappear, or cease 
to direct behavior, when it is systematically violated. In such a case [ ... ] 
obligations may shift so as to increase the obligations of the secondary addressees 
[ ... ]. These responsibilities will faH on those countries with the capacity to make 
a difference. (Nickel 1993: 85) 
Rich countries have the resource capacity to address the lack of means for individuals to 
lead autonomous lives, or so 1 have argued in Chapter One. Furthermore, 1 have 
anticipated - and will support this argument further in Chapters Three and Four - that 
redistributive immigration schemes do not jeopardize the obligations national 
governments have towards their citizens at home. When faced with a situation where 
they can make a difference, then, and if it would not compromise their ability to fulfill 
other obligations, a moral dut y to apply principles of redistribution is a justified claim to 
make. 
My rejoinder to Miller is further buttressed by yet another argument for 
secondary duties. If we do not assist even though we could and might be successful at 
averting harm with relative ease and success, we commit what Judith Shklar has called a 
"passive injustice" - we fail "to stop private and public acts of injustice" (see Shklar 
1990: 6).85 Shklar's account of how we may commit an injustice by not intervening or 
lending a helping hand highlights the fact that we can be held responsible for injustices 
and their persistence even if we are not necessarily the ones directly committing them. 
Put differently, if we can do something to change or influence the outcome of an unjust 
85 "Injustice flourishes not only because of the mies of justice are violated daily by actively unjust people. 
The passive citizens who turn away from actual and potential victims contribute their share to the sum of 
iniquity." (Shklar 1990: 40) 
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situation yet do not actively do so, we can nevertheless be held morally accountable for 
the injustice itself. 
Note that, both, Nickel and Shklar endorse that it is important to be able to 
attribute responsibility for injustice, which should recall Miller' s position that in order to 
make successful moral claims about social justice or injustice, we need to be able to hold 
somebody morally accountable for the injustice, rather than claim bad luck or bad 
circumstances - what Shklar calls "misfortunes" (Shklar 1990: 51). More specifically, 
Miller argues that in order to assess whether or not a lack of resources is tantamount to 
an injustice depends on a conception of social justice, which designates somebody who 
can be held morally accountable for our lack of resources. Since he believes that only the 
nation-state will have the institutions to implement just or unjust resource distribution, he 
follows that only the nation-state can be held accountable for distributive outcomes. 
1 agree that in order to avoid what 1 referred to earlier as empty manifesto rights 
the moral accountability clause that enables us to assign duties to implement meaningful 
rights and to demand their realization is important. In fact, this principle is the motivation 
for my exploration of Nickel's argument for secondary duties. To satisfy Miller's 
condition for a meaningful concept of global social justice, then, 1 would have to show 
that there is somebody responsible for the lack of resources that has led to suffering from 
relative deprivation in access to opportunities to lead autonomous lives, and who can be 
held morally accountable for rectifying that situation. 1 explained earlier, in reference to 
the work of Pogge and Beitz, that the institutions of international trade and the World 
Bank, for example, may be held responsible for the lack of resources in sorne countries 
compared to others. So one way of challenging Miller' s argument could be to say that 
responsibility for the lack of resources of a woman in Mali, say, is attributable to the 
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international system of institutions operating against her interests. We could identify the 
international institutions that compound injustice and do not change the balance sheet in 
favor of the globally worst -off, as Pogge does (2002). We could also identify the fact that 
we profit from international systems of trade and tariffs because that makes our coffee 
cheaper; that we benefit from many Indonesian nurses coming to work in Western 
hospitals at the expense ofIndonesian health care provision (see The New York Times, 
24. May, 2006); or we could identify our own shortcomings when it cornes to making 
donations to charities, etc. Most importantly for this thesis, though, we could hold 
national governments that administer immigration policies that prevent individuals from 
moving to countries with adequate conditions for autonomous living accountable for the 
enduring unjust distribution of global resources and opportunities. In sum, if we accept 
ShkIar' s daim that we can in fact be held morally accountable for the things we do not 
do to avert injustice, then it seems to me that there are agents and institutions against 
whom we could make the daim that they are morally accountable for the lack of 
opportunities for the giobally worst-off. 
Both my rejoinders to Miller' s blueprint of national sovereignty are built on 
assumptions about moral duties we have. In the next section, 1 will analyze Miller' s 
daim that we have special duties towards our compatriots compared to non-compatriots, 
a stance to which he could revert in addressing my last point. 
5 The Liberal Nationalist Argument for Ethical Particularism and Special 
Duties to Compatriots 
As 1 have explained above, Miller makes a distinction between duties of 
humanitarian assistance incurred towards an human beings and special duties of 
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I~ redistribution that arise among fellow nationals. In this section, 1 will elaborate on what 1 
take to be the background for this assumption - what 1 referred to previously as Miller' s 
ethical particularism. 1 will compare this stance with its universalist or cosmopolitan 
counterpart. 1 will then explain how particularism conceives of the essence of duties and 
why it can lead to the conclusion, following Miller, that there are sorne duties towards 
compatriots, which do not exist towards non-compatriots. 1 conclude that even if we 
accepted that there are special relationships among compatriots, we nevertheless have to 
be wary of simply favoring compatriots over non-compatriots. 
Miller' s argument for special duties towards compatriots is based on the premise 
that personal "membership and attachments have ethical significance" (Miller 1995: 65) 
because "relations between persons are part of the basic subject matter of ethics, so that 
fundamental principles may be attached directly to these relations" (Miller 1995: 50). To 
put this another way, Miller holds that, to a large extent, individual relationships and 
attachments determine our moral obligations. Secondly, Miller postulates that our 
nationality describes a community that is bound by ethical ties, derived from our 
identification with our common history as a nation, and our involvement in the ongoing 
national project allowing us to partake meaningfully in a community's destiny and in a 
history larger than that of our individuallives. 86 These ethical ties confer "special 
obligations" and responsibilities as members of a historical community that fellow 
nationals accept because the y all feel that their own welfare is tied to the welfare of the 
community (Miller 1995: 67). We have seen above that liberal nationalists establish ties 
between individu al identity and autonomy on the one hand, and the national culture and 
86 In a similar vein, Moore argues for an understanding of liberal nationalism as Ha normative argument 
that confers moral value on national membership" (Moore 200 1: 5). 
110 
.r'-. 
national identity on the other. Liberal nationalist authors thus argue that an individual's 
culture provides her with the necessary backdrop against which to make autonomous 
decisions. Individuals have a very specifie and important relationship to their national 
community because they share in the common identificatory features it encompasses, and 
have incorporated part of the national identity as part of their own individual identity. 
Accordingly, they will not be indifferent to the poverty and misery of members of their 
community - indeed, they will accept that they should help provide for institutions and 
measures that ensure the implementation of principles of social justice. Hence members 
of the community will be happy, for instance, to pay taxes to support national health care 
schemes, educational facilities and the like.87 
The interdependence between personal identity and national community is 
important to keep in mind when detennining what kinds of duties we have and how we 
are to fulfill them. Miller argues that we embrace moral obligations arising from personal 
relationships because individual relationships have a specifie value to us as a constitutive 
part of our identity (Miller 1995: 65). This is central to his argument, and for two 
reasons. The first has to do with how liberals actually think of duties and obligations: 
from a liberal perspective, to be in a position to make sense of our duties, to accept the 
demands they put on us, to embrace them as "ours" - compared to obligations and duties 
simply irnposed on us by sorne outside agent - we need to be able to identify with the 
justifications for these duties. If our duties stem from relationships in which we 
voluntarily engage or through which we express who we are, then we have stronger 
87 See also Tamir who argues similarly that "[t]he willingness to assume burdens entailed by distributive 
justice ... rests on ... a feeling of relatedness to those with whom we share our assets" (Tamir 1990: 118). 
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moral reasons to live up to these duties than to obligations imposed on US.88 Indeed, it is 
this principle on which concepts of conscientious objection are built - that there may be 
requirements 1 face as a member of a group, soldiers, for example, or priests, but which 1 
cannot fulfill since 1 cannot bring myself to adopt them as my moral dut y . This may be 
due to the fact that my morality does not correspond with the motives or ration ale behind 
such duties or, perhaps, that 1 may feel that the duties imposed do not represent what 1 
thought my community should stand for. 89 
According to Miller, we "properly acknowledge obligations" to groups of people 
we have relationships with and distinguish these obligations from those we owe "to 
people generally" (Miller 1995: 65). Our personal relationships thus confer special moral 
obligations. And if we accept that relationships matter from a moral point of view, we 
should also accept that our relationships to those with whom we share a national identity 
matter when it cornes to the definition of our moral duties. Miller, we can then say, bases 
his argument for redistributive duties that we incur towards compatriots on the 
interdependence between individual identity, the relationship we have with our 
compatriots and the nature and origins of ethics, which he locates in individual 
relationships. He argues, in other words, from an understanding of moral duties that is 
88 The liberallogic behind this is captured in the literature as "endorsement constraint" which holds that in 
order for something to have value for us as autonomous individuals, we need to "endorse" it - or, in 
Dworkin's original formulation: "no compone nt contributes to the value of a life without endorsement. ... 
It is implausible to think that someone can lead a better life against the grain of his profound ethical 
convictions than at peace with them" (Dworkin 1989: 486). 
89 Consider a young Israeli recruit who refuses to serve in the West Bank. Sorne Israeli "refusniks," as the y 
have been called, refuse what in common parlance is considered their dut y as Israeli soldiers, because they 
believe that Israeli military policy goes beyond what is necessary to sustain and protect the well-being of 
the Israeli nation, even though the Israeli state may defend its actions as being vital for its survival. The 
refusenik is faced with a conflict between individual sense of dut y, and the dulies and obligations imposed 
by military protocol. 
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based on ethical particularist assumptions. Is this a plausible and defendable position to 
adopt? 
To take first things first, 1 believe it plausible and uncontroversial to hold that 
questions of ethics arise only when we "interact" with others. In fact, duties and 
obligations require an addressee for our actions, somebody towards whom we have 
duties and obligations. To illustrate, imagine a person stranded on an uninhabited island. 
Assume that she is not a religious person in the widest sense, i.e. somebody who does not 
feel it necessary to pray, meditate, or otherwise engage in the intellectual worship of God 
in order to observe her moral duties. Unless we believe in a concept of duties that 
includes ethical or moral thoughts - which is how we may distinguish religious ethics 
from others90 - it is hard to imagine what duties she may face in such an isolated 
position. The first lesson we can draw, then, and without wanting to overstate a truism, is 
that questions of duties and obligations relate to the interpersonal sphere, to that realm of 
life in which we encounter others.91 In this respect, Miller's account of "relations 
between persons" as "part of the basic subject matter of ethics" (Miller 1995: 50) is a 
sound assertion. One way to dispute Miller's hesitations over global principles of 
redistribution would thus be to show that we do in fact have sorne kind of relationship 
with people all over the world, as for example Pogge has argued (Pogge 2001), or as 
Nussbaum has established (Nussbaum 2000). Or, we could argue that we acknowledge 
the relational origins of moral duties, but that we abstract universally applicable duties 
90 One could argue that even in the case of religious ethics, though, their ethical dimension is equally 
related to their interactive properties: if one has immoral thoughts, one violates the laws set by God. Only 
living in conformity with God's laws, i.e. what has divine, not human origins, can we live ethicallives. 
91 Sorne, like Peter Singer, have of course expanded this narrow definition of where ethics applies, and 
have instead made arguments for the inclusion of other forms of life into our ethical considerations (Singer 
1981). The main point of my argument here is independent of the question of who we need to take into 
consideration when deliberating about ethical principles, since it only underlines that we need to take into 
account other beings outside ourselves. 
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from these origins (Singer 1972; Wellmann 2005). In this vein, 1 would not have to 
worry about moral duties while on my own on the deserted island, but that as soon as 
somebody arrived, 1 would immediately incur moral duties without having actively 
"established," as it were, a relationship with the new arrivaI. Instead, 1 would derive the 
definition of my moral duties from references to abstracted princip les of moral duties. 
Second, and accepting Miller' s assertion that the realm of personal relationships 
informs the domain of ethics, we could follow Thomas Nagel's account of how we 
deliberate about ethics. Nagel believes that we cannot "sustain an impersonal 
indifference to the things in life which matter to us personally" (Nagel 1991: Il) - nor, 
indeed, should we be required to do so. In this respect, his concept of the subject matter 
of ethics and Miller' s ethical particularist stance overlap. Because both positions begin 
from what has relevance for the individual, it is plausible to say that both share the same 
point of departure for ethical deliberation, i.e. the individual and her concerns. In the first 
instance, then, Nagel seems to confirm what particularists postulate, namely, the 
relevance of our personal perspective, which includes personal relationships and the ties 
we have. Nagel continues, however, that we need to move from the personal perspective 
to an impersonal take on ethical principles. Put differently, if 1 adopt the personal 
standpoint and accept the value of sorne goods for myself, 1 should conclude that this is 
true for everybody else. "[S]ince the impersonal standpoint does not single you out from 
anyone else, the same must be true of the values in other lives. If you matter personally, 
so does everyone" (Nagel 1991: Il). To put this yet another way, because we accept the 
value of the personal standpoint as origin for our reasoning, because we do attribute 
moral value to the self, its personal ties and values, we need to come to accept what 
Nagel caUs the "the impersonal perspective" when thinking about moral duties. The 
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.r'. impersonal standpoint accounts for the fact that sorne things 1 value, like my life and 
health are equally valu able for everybody else. In fact, and contrary to Miller, Nagel 
argues that "ethics and political theory begin from the impersonal standpoint" (Nagel 
1991: Il) and that only the integration of the personal and impersonal perspective will 
provide us with a sustainable ethical theory (Nagel 1991: Ch. 2). If we subscribe to this 
principle and scrutinize the conditions in which the world's poorest live, Nagel argues 
that ethical impartiality will necessarily lead to global principles of redistribution.92 
So far, then, we can summarize that sorne of the challenges to ethical 
particularism, and specifically to the conclusions Miller draws from it, come from both 
authors writing from an ethical impartialist perspective93 and from those arguing for 
cosmopolitan duties. 1 propose to take a different route to explore and critically assess 
Miller's argument. To my mind, Miller's account implies that one's personal 
relationships determine the nature of our duties. To argue for different duties depending 
on where people stand in relationship to me implies that the further somebody is 
"removed" from me, the weaker my duties towards her will be. The following section 
will provide a description of the model often used to illustrate this assumption. 1 argue 
that the concentric circles model neglects the fact that the nature of my duties changes 
92 If we scrutinize different levels of access to social goods that people enjoy from an impersonal 
perspective, Nagel believes, we will realize that many people have far too Httle access to the goods that 
may secure the things they value, like security, health and safety, while sorne have far more than the y need 
to do so. Hence, Nagel argues, if we were serious about applying the impersonal perspective, we would 
extract egalitarian principles of redistribution from the circumstances we find in today's world (Nagel 
1991: 12). The impersonal perspective, to put this differently, necessarily entails that we adopt a 
comparative stance when thinking about questions of justice. 
93 Note that Miller addresses Nagel's blueprint and criticizes Nagel for assuming that particularism is 
always necessarily partial, thus charging Nagel with muddling up rather than clarifying the divide between 
ethical particularism and ethical impartiality. Instead, Miller argues that even in the context of our 
particular stance we need to act impartially, if impartiality is conceived as "applying the rules and criteria 
appropriate to that context in a uniform way, and in particular without allowing personal prejudice or 
interest to interfere" (Miller 1995: 54). What Nagel addresses, however, is preciseiy how we come about 
the rules and criteria that we ought to apply. To my mind, then, Miller's criticism is misguided. 
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and that, beyond the very intimate group of friends and family, most people, including 
compatriots, stand in a similar relationship to me, namely that of strangers. 1 will then 
investigate why Miller proposes that the relationship between compatriots is moraUy 
more significant than relations with non-compatriots. 1 discuss three possible models 
Miller might employ to substantiate his claim and argue that two of these would be 
implausible for him to refer to, and that the third one - which 1 will call the contractarian 
account of our relationship to our compatriots - while being plausibly employed, is by 
Miller' s own account based on principles of fair play and mutual benefit. Assessed from 
a liberal egalitarian perspective, however, principles of mutual benefit must be 
contextualized in order to avoid creating a club of lucky ones who share and reinforce 
mutual advantages. Following Scheffler, 1 caU this "the distributive objection," which 
applies to our relationships and, in tum, the duties that arise from them. 
5.1. Ethical Particularism and the Concentric Circle Model of Moral Duties 
Attempts to delineate moral duties, to answer the question of what we owe to 
whom and on what grounds, have a long-standing history in political theory. The 
concentric circle model, for example, has been traced back to the Stoics, Hierocles in 
particular, and their attempt to articulate a principled view of the moral duties towards 
strangers (Nussbaum 2002: 9).94 The model and the argument built upon it can be 
summarized as follows: each of us is situated at the center of a set of concentric circles -
very much like those 1 cause when throwing a stone onto a still surface of water. The 
second circle is made up of those closest to us, encompassing immediate family members 
94 To determine who was a stranger was equally part of the debate. In another piece, Nussbaum discusses 
how differently Cicero would have responded to our contemporary assumptions (Nussbaum 2000). 
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and friends. Each subsequent eircle, then, consists of a group of people to whom we 
relate less - until, in the last instance, the individual at the center is very far removed 
from those who populate the outer circle. This outer circle is, furthermore, so imprecisely 
defined in its perimeters and so vast, that it is impossible to fathom a meaningful 
relationship to those in that circle (if really a eircle it still is - to remain in the analogy, it 
would rather constitute the rest of the lake). The last circle, in other words, is populated 
by people whom we do not know, in whom we do not take any specifie interest, and for 
whom we assume such indifference to be reciprocal. 
According to the concentric circles model, the extent of our duties is strongest at 
the center - towards those in the circle closest to us - and diminishes slowly as we move 
from the center to periphery. We accept duties and obligations more or less 
unquestioningly towards those close to us - those in the second circle - while accepting a 
different, diminished set of duties and obligations, more begrudgingly perhaps, for those 
in the third, and so on. In short, the model assumes that we make decisions about what 
we owe to others depending on where they are situated in the circles. Note, then, that this 
model putatively takes into account our personal relationships, and the sense of 
obligation and dut Y we may feel arising from them. Now, to make sense of the liberal 
national argument for special moral duties towards compatriots, the national community 
would have to be situated in one of the eircles that are relatively close to me - hence 
inducing me to feel and live up to my duties towards my compatriots and be concemed 
with their welfare. Is this a plausible model for conceptualizing duties? 
As Henry Shue notes, the problem with the concentric circles modellies in the 
"progressive character of the decline of priority as one reaches the circles farther from 
the center" (Shue 1988: 692; emphasis in original). Why should we assume that our 
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duties towards those in the sixth circle are reduced by a third when compared with our 
duties towards those in the second circle? To make sense of this assumption, we need to 
clarify what it is we have a dut Y to do. The progressively decreasing extent of our duties, 
1 believe, only makes sense if we understand the nature of our duties in the intimate 
circles to be similar, if not identical, to those further away from the center. If that were 
the case, it would indeed be hard to assume that we have the same set of duties to our 
family members as we have towards others. But this seems an implausible conception of 
moral duties. To my mind, the nature of our duties differs in kind between what we owe 
to those with whom we have personal, intimate relationships and what we owe to those 
with whom we have other kinds of relationships. This point bears illustrating. 
The assumption often made is that we will take care of our elderly parents in 
illness, dedicating time and resources, without resenting the acts we perform as 
particularly onerous or the demands put upon us as unjustified. While these moral duties 
of personal dedication - what 1 will call caring duties - are hard to perform, their 
demanding nature is softened by the emotional ties we have with those benefiting from 
our having performed them. We assume, somewhat intuitively, that at least sorne of the 
duties we perform for those who are part of the inner core are "acts of love." Rence, we 
do not resent them for the demands they put upon us. Further along the circles, on the 
other hand, the assumption is that we need to feelless compelled to perform such 
extraordinary tasks because they wou Id be too demanding in light of the actual emotional 
interest we have with those who are at the receiving end. 
What the model fails to take into account, however, is that the nature of the duties 
we are called to perform changes dramatically. Clearly, when thinking about univers al 
redistributive duties we are not called upon to attend to an ill or dying person somewhere 
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- anywhere - by washing sheets and providing food and company.95 ln other words, it is 
not a question of performing duties that build on, and whose demands are softened by, 
feelings that characterize intimate personal relationships. Rather, as 1 argued in Chapter 
One, to accept global redistributive duties implies that we accept a dut Y to promote 
international justice as much as we can from our position of unequal advantage. The 
progressive character of diminishing duties implied by the concentric circle model, 
however, does not appeal to duties we perform for reasons of egalitarian justice and 
principles of fairness. Instead, the model relies on the character of those duties that we 
incur because of our personal, intimate ties to the recipient. The concentric circle model 
only works, put differently, if we assume that caring duties of the sort mentioned above 
are the starting point from which our duties progressively diminish instead of accepting 
the fundamentally different nature of our duties towards those outside of the intimate 
Now, assume that we do not dispute that the moral duties we owe to others are 
fundamentally different between the immediate circles of family and friends, that of 
personal acquaintances, and everybody in the subsequent circles. If that is the case, then 
it seems to me that everybody outside the immediate circles is comparable - including the 
members of my university, neighborhood, city and nation.97 Rather than construing a 
95 Of course, sorne working for aid-organizations obviously do think that such are our duties. This does not 
undermine my argument about the different natures of our duties, however. Why, we should ask ourselves, 
do we admire those who dedicate their lives to help ease the pain of others if not partly at least because 
they perform a task out of the ordinary, beyond, as the saying goes, "what dut Y would cali for"? 
96 To be sure, we may make arguments for duties of egalitarian redistribution arising in the intimate circle 
- duties that do not rely on our feelings as much as on our concerns to attend to different needs in an 
egalitarian and fair way. But the reverse is not the case: duties we perform outside the intimate circle do 
not rely on personal feelings. 
97 As 1 explain below, we may incur duties towards people with whom we share membership in a 
university college, for example, but these duties derive from specific properties of specific relationships, 
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progressive change of duties as we move along the sequence of circles, therefore, it is 
more plausible to assume that once we leave the circle of relative intimacy and caring 
duties behind, "a stranger is a stranger" (Shue 1988: 693). The progressive decline of our 
duties, though, is necessary to make sense of the liberal nationalist argument against 
duties of global redistribution. Only if we accept that national communities figure in the 
intimate circles - i.e. in one close enough for us to feel compelled to accept caring duties 
- does the idea of national boundaries determining our duties towards others make sense. 
But if a stranger is a stranger - as aIl those outside of the intimate circles must be - it 
makes little sense to assume that we have more of a dut Y to provide redistributive justice 
to those in the next city than we have towards those on the next continent. 
5.2. MoraUy Relevant Relationships 
Another potentialline of argument Miller might take in defense of special duties 
towards compatriots could reiterate his assumption that we have a special relationship 
with compatriots. To be sure, Miller accepts that sorne international ties exist, as 1 
explained before. These are, however, not of the same kind as the relationship we have to 
our national community and hence international relationships do not warrant the same 
kind of duties to those we incur in the context of our national community, but different 
ones. Therefore, Miller can easily accept international duties of humanitarian assistance 
but refrain from accepting international duties to redistribution. 
Samuel Scheffler proposes different models of relationships based on which we 
could make arguments for special moral obligations. 1 will discuss the reductionist and 
e.g. that we exchange promises to work together. They do not occur sim ply because we both are members, 
neither are they diminished versions of caring duties. 
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the voluntary model that Scheffler describes as possible ways to account for relationships 
that carry special moral obligations and duties (Scheffler 2001: Ch. 6). Relationships that 
are to serve as the basis of moral duties, Scheffler argues, must be non-instrumental, 
which is to say that they are not characterized primarily by their instrumental benefits for 
the parties involved. In other words, we incur special duties "not by citing any specifie 
interaction between us and the beneficiary, but rather by citing the nature of our 
relationship to that person" (Scheffler 2001: 97). 1 will describe what these kinds of 
relations entail and evaluate if Miller could plausibly refer to them when making his 
argument for special duties towards compatriots. 1 will conclude that it would be 
implausible for Miller to refer to any of the relationship models that Scheffler believes to 
warrant special moral obligations. And, in fact, Miller employs another relationship 
model to justify special duties to compatriots, which 1 will caU the contractarian model 
and which 1 understand to be and hence criticize as highly instrumental. Considering 
Scheffler' s objection against distributing benefits simply based on membership in an 
instrumental association, 1 will hold that contractarian relationships cannot serve as a 
morally relevant basis for special duties. 
5.2.1. The Reductionist Model 
One position from which Miller could draw support for his stance is to argue that 
special duties can only arise from specifie relationships and concrete interactions with 
others. Concrete relationships and interactions can take different forms, like membership 
in a club or the exchange of promises, or both. Membership might imply that we have 
interactions with others, that we have exchanged promises to obey the club charter, for 
example, and always attend annual assemblies to discuss matters conceming the club. 
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Such membership will determine the kinds of obligations we incur. To use one of 
Miller' s examples, imagine that two students come to seek my help and 1 only have time 
to attend to one. If one of them belongs to my college and the other does not, and aIl else 
being equal, then 1 could say that the calI for help by the former has more moral weight 
on my decision whom to attend to than the one by the latter since being part of the same 
college, we have an understanding that, indeed, 1 should be at her disposai. Put 
differently, her joining the college implies an obligation for those working there to be of 
assistance (Miller 1995: 48ft). These moral obligations, Miller could continue, derive 
from the fact that we acknowledge, as he puts it, that "membership and attachments have 
ethicai significance" (Miller 1995: 48), that caUs to dut y from those with whom we share 
membership have more moral clout than a calI for help from somebody with whom we 
do not. Similarly, we could be led to believe that our moral obligations to our 
compatriots can be reduced to the fact that we share membership in our national 
community. 
The reductionist position, however, assumes that we have actual interactions. 
Interactions can take many forms, of course: sorne are loosely formalized - not cast in 
mIes and procedures that govem our interaction - while others are highly formalized. 
The exchange of promises to work together, which Miller invokes in the college 
example, have moral relevance not primarily because of our interaction but because of 
the form our interaction takes. A promise is given to a new student joining the college 
that those teaching there will be available to help and assist her. And to make a promise 
does indeed carry a moral obligation with it. 
However, membership per se does not necessariIy require that 1 interact in a 
morally significant way, i.e. in a way that engenders duties towards my fellow members. 
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1 do not always sign a club charter or give a promise regarding my future action that 
affects my fellow members. My membership of "People for the Ethical Treatment of 
AnimaIs" (PET A), for example, may oblige me to donate money on a regular basis to 
promote animal welfare but it does not oblige me to work for justice for fellow animal 
rights activists. Sorne memberships, in fact, do not imply that we actually interact in the 
sense of exchanging promises, and 1 would argue that our membership to our national 
community falls into that category. We simply do not have much contact with most of 
our compatriots and thus we do not actively exchange promises.98 
Second, our membership in a national community does not necessarily imply that 
we share mutual benefits unless something eise is in place. We will not enjoy mutual 
benefits from our membership in our national community unless sorne social or 
institutional provisions are in place to promote social welfare or redistributive justice. 
Yet if something other than simple membership has to be given in order for us to enjoy 
mutual benefits from our membership, then membership in itself cannot be used to 
explain why we have a special dut Y towards our fellow members. Miller assumes that our 
membership in the national community provides mutual benefit (Miller 1995: 61), and 
that, as a result, we incur a set of special duties towards our fellow members. But we will 
only enjoy these benefits if we have already agreed on principles of social justice. 
However, to provide for social justice through redistribution we need to accept special 
duties in the first place. While this may sound highly interdependent, it is in fact a 
circular argument. To put it more clearly, Miller's argument begs the question: if 1 am a 
98 Nota bene, this is different than membership in a national institution, like the army. To return to my 
example of the Israeli refusenik, we could say that by accepting to join the army - rather than object to 
being drafted - an individual subscribes to a specifie membership code that implies special duties towards 
compatriots. 
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member of two communities, neither of which would provide me with any benefits 
unless 1 worked actively towards a mutual bene fit scheme, why should 1 opt for one over 
the other? It is undear how membership in the nation can serve as an argument for 
special duties if special duties depend on my performing them. To justify special duties 
towards compatriots based on the reductionist model of morally meaningful 
relationships, 1 would therefore argue, is not convincing.99 
5.2.2. The Voluntarist Model 
Instead, Miller could opt for a second way of conceptualizing our relationships 
with compatriots and adopt a voluntarist account of our relationships and the ensuing 
special duties. A voluntarist might daim that we have to be able to choose those towards 
whom we have special duties. This view is based on the idea that our relationships are 
part of our individual identity and indeed corresponds to Miller's daim - summarized 
earlier as the liberal postulate of the "endorsement constraint" - that we have to embrace 
moral obligations as 'ours' to be in line with liberal ideas about duties. Second, Miller 
argues for the special relationship we have with our national community because this 
relationship defines to a large extent who we are. From a voluntarist perspective, we need 
to be able to choose and to agree to the relationships we enter because if we are not 
allowed to have our say, we might find ourselves locked into relationships and duties that 
we have not agreed to. Miller might argue that a liberal account of moral duties 
99 Margaret Moore has proposed a similar critique of Miller, arguing that he conflates the moral and the 
political national community. Such a conflation, Moore believes, thwart a thorough analysis of the precise 
source of our obligations towards fellow nationals. In this vein, if the nation is a political community with 
certain principles, like the support of a domestic welfare state, then "our obligations derive from these rules 
governing the nation" (Moore 2001: 36). They do not derive from the feeling of belonging to the nation per 
se. 
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necessarily takes a voluntarist turn. We could argue that if we were to incur special duties 
based on relationships that we do not consent to, the self-deterrnining part of our identity 
would be jeopardized. We would have to live up to duties arising from relationships we 
do not endorse, which are not part of ourselves. Hence, following the vol un tari st model, 
it cannot be justified that we base special duties on relationships we have not consented 
to. 
Of course, it would be very difficult to show that we all individually consent to 
relationships with our compatriots. We may recall, though, that Miller argues for close 
ties between our personal identity and that of our nation as a fundamental condition for 
the working of the nation-state. To reiterate, the liberal nationalist account of our 
personal identity states, first, that our personal identity is embedded in our national 
identity and, second, that we accept and confirm the latter in everyday practice. By 
participating in everyday socio-cultural practices of the nation, like celebrating national 
holidays or cheering for a national soccer team, or by paying taxes to support the national 
health care system, one could argue that we signal our acceptance of and agreement to a 
relationship with our compatriots. Our relationships to non-compatriots, on the other 
hand, have not been voluntarily chosen and hence should not produce special duties 
towards non-compatriots. 
However, Miller also refers to our national identity as providing the background 
of our moral reasoning. As 1 explored in reference to Kymlicka's and Raz' work - both 
of whom have provided accounts of individual autonomy that support Miller's argument 
- our cultural background provides us with the necessary options and values along which 
we can take autonomous decisions about our lives. If this is the case, however, then a 
fundamental part of our identity is not chosen and self-deterrnined. Even if we were to 
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reject our national ties, we would still define our personal identity with reference to our 
national identity - as somebody who has cut ties with her national identity. In the same 
vein, a large part of our relationships is not chosen either. In this sense, our individu al 
identity is not voluntaristic, but "for the most part unchosen and unreflectively acquired" 
(Miller 1995: 43). Miller accepts this and, indeed, denies the wholehearted voluntarist 
account of our identity. As he writes, "[b]earing a national identity means seeing oneself 
as part of a historie community which in part makes one the person that one is: to regard 
membership as something chosen is to give way to an untenable form of social atornism" 
(Miller 1995: 59). It would hence be implausible for Miller to refer to the voluntaristic 
account of moral relationships as the basis for special duties to our compatriots while, at 
the same time, acknowledging that this very relationship is not voluntarily chosen. 
5.2.3. The Contractarian Model 
ln fact, 1 take Miller to argue from yet a different perspective, namely the 
contractarian model. This model conceives of the national community as based on 
principles of fair play and mutual benefit which have been arrived at through deliberative 
democracy and its representative institutions. Remember that Miller argues for a socially 
contingent account of social justice: he assumes that it is within the realm of our nation 
that we will be able to determine what goods we need to have access to in order to lead 
autonomous lives. As a nation, we will engage in deliberations about what we think has 
value in our society and we will use the political tools of the nation-state to implement 
our shared principles of social justice. The politico-institutional set-up according to 
which we agree on principles of social justice and their implementation is thus akin to a 
contract. lndeed, Miller invites us to regard 
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poli tic al co-operation not as a voluntary matter in the strict sense, but as quasi-
contractual in nature. Here the emphasis is placed not on actual consent but on 
the mutual exchange of benefits. My obligations to the state and to my fellow 
citizens derive from our common participation in a practice from which all may 
be expected to benefit. The appeal here is to a principle of fair play which does 
not require that 1 should have made a voluntary decision to join the practice. 
(Miller 1995: 61) 
Assume that we can convince ourselves to subscribe to the argument and to 
accept that in order to justify special duties of domestic redistribution, we construe the 
relationship between fellow nationals as grounded on a kind of social contract. 100 Should 
we therefore be convinced by Miller' s argument that it is from the contractarian 
relationship to our compatriots that special duties like duties of redistribution flow and 
that we do not incur these duties in our dealings with non-compatriots? Can the 
contractarian model of relationships justify special duties? Note, here, that Scheffler 
accepts membership in a "socially recognized group" (Scheffler 2001: 102) as producing 
a relationship in the relevant sense. 101 Prima facie, then, and based on this second 
criterion, to argue for the national community as bearer of special relationships seems 
100 The concept of consent Miller employs calls for elaboration. Imagine that the members of a society 
come to the conclusion that higher education, to follow one of Miller's own examples, is a social good 
which should be made accessible to ail members of society. Access to higher education, we could argue, is 
a social good that provides us with meaningful options, allowing us to choose what life we want to lead. 
Thus, we cou Id say that access to higher education should be provided through welfare policies. In order to 
fund easy access to higher education, we would have to raise taxes to finance institutions of higher 
education, government loans to students of low-income backgrounds, and the like. Taxation, however, 
demands that sorne of us will be required to part with sorne of our riches, in order for the state to have the 
necessary funds. The nature of our consent, we could argue, is manifest in the fact that our society cornes 
to the conclusion that higher education is a viable social good that should he endorsed. Miller seems to 
construe consent in light of Rawls' postulate that state action is legitimate if it is "in accordance with a 
constitution the essentials of which ail citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of the 
principles and ideals acceptable to [us] as rational and reasonable" (Rawls 1993: 217). Our consent, in 
other words, does not have to be given individually on each policy or measure of redistribution, but rather 
is assumed as gi ven to sorne of these policies. If we accept Miller' s c1aim that the members of a society 
deliberate about what social goods should count as relevant to social justice, we cou Id say that our consent 
to policies aiming at providing these goods cou Id be reasonably expected. See Miller (2000) where he 
elaborates on his deliberative ideal of the state further, and see Bell (2003) for a critique of Miller' s 
deliberative ideal. 
101 Scheffler has more definitional criteria for non-reductionist relationships to which 1 do not attend since 
they are \ittle salient to my purposes of evaluating Miller' s concept of the contractarian relationship a 
national community is engaged in (see Scheffler 2001: 102f). 
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plausible. Scheffler accepts that "[a]mong the things that we value are our relations with 
each other. [ ... ] Thus, in so far as we have good reasons to value our interpersonal 
relations, we have good reasons to see ourselves as having special responsibilities" 
(Scheffler 2001: 103). Is this enoughjustification for Miller to argue for the special 
relationship between compatriots and, hence, ensuing special duties? 
First, 1 believe that it is far-fetched to speak of an "interpersonal" relationship 
with our compatriots. As 1 explained in my discussion of the concentric-circ1e model of 
duties and the two previous models of morally meaningful relationships, it is implausible 
to argue that we have an interpersonal relationship with our compatriots. We can neither 
reduce this relationship to tangible interactions nor can we c1aim that we have entered 
into it voluntarily. In this respect, the relationship with compatriots is comparable to that 
with non-compatriots. 
Second, Miller' s definition of the contractual set -up of the political nation does 
not support the case for special duties to compatriots. To reiterate, Miller argues that, 
"[m]y obligations to the state and to my fellow citizens derive from our common 
participation in a practice from which aIl may be expected to benefit." (Miller 1995: 61). 
The fact that it is with the idea of mutuaI benefit in mind that Miller attempts to justify 
special duties of redistribution towards compatriots raises sorne problems since this 
seems to contradict Scheffler' s stipulation that only those relationships that are non-
instrumental can generate special moral obligations, or so it seems to me: Scheffler 
specifies that, "if a pers on only has reason to value a relationship instrumentaIly, then the 
principle 1 have stated does not treat that relationship as a source of special 
responsibilities" (Scheffler 2001: 101). Scheffler further exc1udes 
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reasons that are reflexively instrumental [ ... ] if attaching non-instrumental value 
to a certain relationship would itself be an effective means of achieving sorne 
independently desirable goal, the principle 1 have stated does not treat that as a 
reason of the responsibility-generating kind. (Scheffler 200 1: 101; emphasis in 
original). 
In light of Miller's definition, however, the relationship between compatriots and the 
state is highly instrumental. 
To conclude this section, 1 will aim to expand on what Scheffler might have in 
mind and apply his principled approach to relationships that may generate special moral 
obligations to questions of immigration. In my discussion of immigration schemes as 
they exist today, 1 have argued that there may be good reasons for national govemments 
to restrict immigration in a certain way. One argument may be that bilateral agreements 
concerning immigration between Germany and Canada, say, may be in the mutual 
interest of the two countries. They may both benefit from Canadian engineers 
immigrating to Germany, and German artisans immigrating to Canada, either because 
they have a shortage of the se professions or they value the education the other country 
provides in these fields. 1 have observed that the mutual benefit principle is applied on an 
everyday basis when deciding immigration policies. However, 1 have also held that it is 
not a comprehensive principle of justice since it excludes those with nothing to offer. In 
other words, if we accepted the mutual bene fit of a relationship as generating moral 
duties, we would infuse moral clout into a relationship that may simply lead to the 
establishment of a club of the weIl-off who can trade and exchange benefits. Mutual 
interest, put yet differently, does not provide us with moral principles about how to 
adjudicate potentiaI conflicts over resources. This is weIl articulated by what Scheffler 
caUs the "distributive objection" to special relationships that bear special duties. 
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It may be understood to hold that such responsibilities confer additional 
advantages on people who already benefited from participating in rewarding 
groups and relationships and that this is unjustifiable whenever the provision of 
these addition al advantages works to the detriment of those who are needier, 
whether they are needier because they are not themselves participants in 
rewarding groups and relationships or because they have significantly fewer 
resources of other kinds. (Scheffler 2001: 85)102 
We can thus hold that even in cases where we accept special moral duties, these 
special duties cannat stand isolated from a bigger framework of moral considerations. 
Instead, even when we accept that we have special relationships that generate special 
duties, we need ta ensure that the benefits flowing from these special relationships are 
integrated into a general system of fair access to opportunities. We must, in other words, 
have an eye on the outcome of our dutiful action. If we neglect this, we simply foster and 
promote a system that protects the club of the wealthy and privileged rather than one 
based on principles of justice. 
Miller might argue, however, that the distributive objection implicitly denies the 
fact that we have special relationships. If we are not allowed ta act on special 
relationships, he might continue, how can we still qualify them as "the subject matter of 
ethics"? 1 would disagree. To situate it in the debate between ethical particularism and 
ethical impartiality, the distributive objection ta special relationships does not prescribe 
the position of the aloof rational observer who forgoes the temptations laid out by 
persona! concem. It only objects to siding with su ch special duties at the expense of a 
general sense of justice. 
102 Scheftler himself, while not negating the merits of the distributive objection, does not entirely 
subscribe to it; see Scheftler (2001: 86ft) and (ibid: 97ft). Thomas Pogge, on the other hand, does embrace 
the distributive objection; see Pogge (1992; 2001). 
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.~. 6 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to de fend my proposaI for redistributive immigration 
policies against those who believe that we have two different sets of duties towards our 
fellow nationals and non-compatriots, and that this distinction supports domestic 
redistribution, but not the application of principles of redistribution on a global scale. 1 
have explained from where this distinction in its liberal nationalist interpretation derives. 
First, 1 have provided an account of the liberal nationalist concept of national 
community and the definition of socially valued goods. 1 have argued against what 1 have 
called the socially contingent model of social justice and have instead made a case for 
univers al standards of social justice. Only if we accept univers al standards of social 
justice as reference points can we actually achieve what liberal blueprints of social 
justice aim for, namely to compare and assess differences in individu al opportunities, and 
to work for better conditions of individual autonomy everywhere. 
1 then discussed a second argument liberal nationalists might make against 
redistributive immigration schemes. To provide its context, 1 have examined the liberal 
nationalist concept of national community, national identity and their ties to individual 
identity. The interdependence between these is the foundation for liberal nationalist 
beliefs about the origins and the extent of moral duties. Liberal nationalists subscribe to 
ethical particularism that accounts for the value of personal relationships in our moral 
reasoning, and which warrants that we differentiate between what we owe to those with 
whom we share close relationships and everybody else. Deconstructing the underlying 
ration ale for su ch distinctions - what 1 have identified as the concentric circle model of 
our moral duties - 1 have shown that to adopt redistributive immigration schemes does 
not require members of the host community to perform duties similar to those 
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appropriate for intimate relationships. Furthermore, 1 have questioned the argument that 
compatriots share special relationships that imply special moral obligations. 1 have 
referred to Scheffler' s distinctions between relationships that might bear special duties, 
but have not found the liberal nationalist model of the relationship compatriots share to 
correspond to any of the ones Scheffler lists. Instead, 1 have shown that Miller' s idea of 
the special relationship between compatriots derives from mutual benefits and have 
argued that such an instrumental relationship cannot provide moral reasons to privilege 
compatriots over non-compatriots when thinking about redistribution. 
ln the next two chapters, 1 will address a different category of objections liberal 
nationalist might voice against redistributive immigration schemes, namely that my 
proposaIs for redistributive immigration policies may lead to a deterioration of conditions 
of social justice in the host communities. 
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III Fears about Redistributive Immigration Polides - Part 1: 
What happens to Social Solidarity? 
1 Introduction 
ln previous chapters, 1 have made a case for changes in the ethics of immigration 
and have proposed redistributive immigration policies as a tool with which national 
governments can achieve such changes. 1 have defended redistributive immigration 
policies against arguments by liberal nationalist authors who propose that we should 
think about social justice in a socially contingent way and that, concomitantly, we incur a 
set of special duties towards our compatriots - including duties to redis tribu te - which 
we do not incur towards non-compatriots. In this and the following final chapter, 1 want 
to address two different possible objections against redistributive immigration policies, 
which originate in fears about the social consequences that may ensue for ho st 
communities if they were to implement redistributive immigration schemes. 1 speculate 
that these fears may arise from a concern over the state of social justice within the host 
community. 
To recaIl, in Chapter One 1 supported those who argue that it would be 
implausible to advocate redistributive immigration policies if such policies were to result 
in deteriorating conditions of social justice in the host community. While redistributive 
immigration policies are aimed at improving chances of opportunity and at providing 
access to means of autonomous living for people who enjoy neither, it would be 
implausible to implement them at the expense of conditions of autonomy for the least 
weIl-off in host communities. Put in another way, any policy measure that were to 
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challenge or jeopardize social justice cannot plausibly be premised on and justified by 
that same principle. Instead, the implementation of redistributive immigration policies 
has to be considered an essential part of policies of redistributive social justice that 
pertain to al! aspects of sociallife, not only to the domain of immigration. 
As outlined in Chapter One, the most basic principle of a liberal egalitarian 
conception of social justice is the idea of redistributing rights, opportunities and 
resources in order to ensure that the needs of aIl those to whom the principles are applied 
are met to the extent of enabling an adequate level of opportunities and of autonomous 
functioning. When these conditions are satisfied, everyone can lead an autonomously 
chosen and thus meaningfullife. This definition of what principles of social justice target 
and want to distribute constitutes a basic common denominator among the majority of 
liberal egalitarians writing about social justice (see for example Barry 2005: 17ff; Barry 
1995; Miller 1999: 11ff; Rawls 1971 :60). Most arguments about social justice, thus, 
associate principles of social justice with ideas about redistribution. Very minimally, 
social justice, in its redistributive interpretation, refers to the idea that of that those who 
are weIl endowed should give up sorne of their riches in order to ensure that the less 
weIl-off are provided with adequate access to social goods. 
Now, one argument against redistributive immigration policies might be that they 
undermine social justice in the ho st community by undermining the social conditions that 
make domestic social justice possible. Sorne liberal authors argue that one of the 
achievements of liberal egalitarian societies is the establishment of functioning welfare 
states. 1 will refer to a social welfare state as one that implements principles of 
redistribution in order to achieve social justice. 1 agree that having a viable social welfare 
state is an important tool for furthering social justice, and one that is worth protecting. To 
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reiterate, the underlying premise for my argument for redistributive immigration policies 
is based on the idea that we should promote the principle of fair equality of opportunity 
on a globallevel. My position demands that we aim to find ways to further the 
implementation of that principle everywhere. Taking this position thus entails that it 
would be implausible to advocate a policy change that might jeopardize domestic social 
justice or the tools that help its realization. If we understand the system of a social 
welfare state as attempting to provide fair equality of opportunity on a nation-state level, 
then this is obviously an achievement in line with the overall goal of providing aIl 
individuals with fair equality of opportunity. In other words, any policy measures that 
were to challenge or jeopardize the social welfare state as an instrument of social justice 
could not plausibly be premised on or justified by that same principle. In this vein, sorne 
could argue that if we have achieved a social welfare state, we need to ensure that the 
social conditions it relies upon are not challenged or jeopardized by changes in 
immigration regimes. 
1 identify two potential conditions of social justice that liberal nationalists fear 
might be challenged if we were to implement redistributive immigration policies: social 
solidarity and social trust. Liberal nationalist authors might daim that redistributive 
immigration schemes wou Id bring about a significant change in the make-up of society 
and that such a transformation will be accompanied by a change in the trust members of 
the host community put into the workings of the welfare state. Similarly, sorne authors 
might daim that a change in national identity and culture will initiate a transformation in 
the traditional sense of social solidarity in a ho st community. Put in another way, with 
different and new members involved, the original rationale for supporting a scheme of 
redistribution - that those contributing and benefiting are aIl part of the same nation -
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may no longer apply if individuals previously excluded from it are to become part of it. 
Only if a community is able to in still feelings of social solidarity and social trust, though, 
can it achieve social justice. 1 will call this the social solidarity caveat and concem for 
social trust. 
1 will explain why social solidarity and social trust are considered to be essential 
ingredients for a functioning welfare state. Both social solidarity and social trust are 
taken to be necessary to motivate individuals to contribute to a social welfare state, to 
agree, for ex ample, to the redistribution of income through its taxation. In the course of 
the next two chapters, 1 explain both conditions and the fears related to them in more 
detail and discuss to what extent such fears are warranted. This will help me to assess if 
and to what extent they may serve as arguments against redistributive immigration 
policies. 1 start out exploring the social solidarity caveat, which holds that the 
implementation of redistributive immigration policies might challenge our concept of 
community and that this change might induce us to feelless solidarity with compatriots 
and to have less social trust. In this chapter, 1 will focus on the concem for social 
solidarity, although to explain the link between social solidarity and the social welfare 
state, 1 will briefly touch upon the issue of social trust. The systematic discussion of 
social trust and its links to provisions of the social welfare state will be provided in 
Chapter Four. In the course of this present chapter, 1 make a case for understanding 
social solidarity as a moral ideal that stands in relation to our concepts of social justice. 1 
explain the moral ideal and put it in the context of my argument in Chapter Two, where 1 
discussed what kind of duties we incur towards our compatriots compared to those we 
have towards non-compatriots. The first lesson 1 draw is that social solidarity cannot be 
plausibly circumscribed by national boundaries. 
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1 will then explore what 1 calI the instrumental argument for social solidarity, 
which ties social solidarity to the functioning of the social welfare state. 1 explain that, 
for liberal nationalist authors, a social welfare state depends on feelings of solidarity 
towards other members of the community and that such feelings are fostered and 
promoted by a common national identity. 1 challenge this argument with other accounts 
of the basis of welfare contributions - returning, at this point, to a discussion of Rawls-
and question the argument that only sharing a national identity can bring about 
solidaristic behavior su ch as tax compliance. Based on findings from the UK, 1 show that 
immigrants contribute dutifully to the British welfare state - overwhelmingly more, in 
fact, than the y benefit from welfare state provisions. This example challenges arguments 
that solidaristic behavior in the context of the social welfare state depends on feelings of 
shared national identity. The instrumental argument for social solidarity and its ties to a 
national community is not convincing if those who are prima facie "new" to the national 
context - i.e. those who live in its boundaries but who have not yet established feelings 
of nation-based identity - nevertheless contribute. This ex ample thus verifies my own 
definition of the social ties necessary for the support of a social welfare state - what 1 caU 
a sense of civic mindedness. Civic mindedness does not prejudge the type of community 
belonging we need for a social welfare state to flourish. My example, in other words, 
does not support the liberal nationalist daim that actions of solidarity depend on a feeling 
of shared national identity. Instead, it supports the idea that the social welfare state relies 
on a set of norms of behavior according to which individuals interact and cooperate. 
Fears over the deterioration of the social welfare state, as the y are proposed in the context 
of ideas of social solidarity, are hence not convincing arguments against implementing 
redistributive immigration policies. 
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2 The Social Solidarity Caveat 
The social solidarity caveat cautions us against the transformation of our 
community to the point where such changes may make sorne or many compatriots 
uneasy and may induce them to withdraw solidarity from the community. This caveat 
bears contextualization. David Miller - whose work 1 choose as the basis of my 
discussion - argues that when thinking about social justice and the social welfare state, 
we have to consider the conditions that bring about and sustain the functioning of the 
social welfare state. One of the most important conditions is social solidarity. Social 
solidarity is putatively tied to the fact that individuals identify with their community, 
which, following the logic of Miller's argument, cornes along only in the context of a 
shared national identity. My proposed revision of the ethics of immigration, one might be 
led to believe, challenges social solidarity since it would ask national communities to 
welcome immigrants from potentially very different ethno-cultural, religious or political 
backgrounds. 
Note that earlier on, 1 have made a distinction between fears of increased numbers 
of immigration, and a change in the countries of provenance from where immigrants 
come (see Chapter One). 1 have held that to promote redistributive immigration policies 
does not necessarily bring about an increase in the overall numbers of immigrants but, 
instead, implies a redistribution of resources to those hitherto barred from access to such 
resources. In this vein, 1 have argued that the issue arising may be one of selection 
insofar as redistributive immigration schemes wou Id give individuals who have hitherto 
been excluded from the benefits of immigration access to immigration. Recognizing to 
whom redistributive immigration polices ought to be applied - i.e. to the globally worst-
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off concentrated in the world's southem hemisphere - it is plausible to speculate that the 
implementation of redistributive immigration might result in more ethno-cultural 
diversity in the midst of host communities.103 The worry is that changing the selection 
criteria for immigrants who will import their own ethno-cultural, religious or political 
identifièatory features might change the traditional concept of national community 
previously possessed by members of the ho st community. Liberal nationalists could 
caution that we should therefore be wary of adopting immigration policies that may 
change the make-up of our community for fear of what might happen to feelings of social 
solidarity that are necessary to motivate the implementation of social justice. What 
should we make of this daim? 
Miller argues that social solidarity is tied to a shared national identity. In fact, 
while Miller first writes about a nationality's power to "increase" people's sense of 
solidarity (Miller 1995: 36), he soon sheds his reserve and writes that "among large 
aggregates of people, only a common nationality can pro vide the sense of solidarity that 
make [democracy and social justice] possible" (Miller 1995: 98, my emphasis).104 He 
continues to explain the concept of national identity as a tool to achieve social justice in 
the face of problems arising from collective action. To Miller' s mind, social trust and 
social solidarity are essential for successful collective action: 
103 To be sure, most countries already live under conditions of ethno-cultural diversity, either because of 
the prevalence of national minorities with a different ethno-cultural background, or because of ethno-
culturally diverse immigration groups as part of the national make-up (see Kymlicka 1995: Ch. 1). The 
difference that might arise from redistributive immigration policies is that they might result in higher 
numbers of "feH" non-compatriots in our midst. The distinction of "felt" foreigner is helpful in expressing 
the fluent boundaries between those of whom many do not think as foreigners - a white Canadian in 
Britain, for instance - compared to those who "seem to look different". Needless to say that those who 
"look different" may nevertheless be compatriots. 
104 See also his comments in an earlier piece, where he writes that "nations are the only possible form in 
which overall community can be realized in modern societies .... Without a common national identity, there 
is nothing to hold citizens together" (Miller 1989: 245). 
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Much state activity involves the furthering of goals which cannot be achieved 
without the voluntary co-operation of citizens. For this activity to be successful 
the citizens must trust the state, and they must trust one another to comply with 
what the state demands of them. [ ... ] Since adhering to the rules the state 
proposes will usually have costs, each person must be confident that the others 
will generally comply - and this involves mutual trust. (Miller 1995: 90f) 
Collective action problems are part and parcel of social welfare programs. For 
any social welfare policy to achieve its goals, individu ais need to act as contributors to 
schemes of redistribution and cannot simply opt out of them, neither can they consider 
themselves merely as beneficiaries of su ch schemes. In order for the state to be able to 
implement policies of social justice, like taxation of income, members of the community 
need to be convinced that others will be equally taxed and that they will comply with the 
taxation laws. The assumption behind Miller's argument is that collective action is most 
easily facilitated within the realm of a shared national identity. 1 have explained in 
Chapter Two that liber al nationalist authors understand a liberal national identity as a 
"battery" that generates a sense of common purpose and of being involved in a common 
project. According to the liberal nationalist argument, su ch a sense of common enterprise 
is most easily stimulated and sustained if all share in a national identity. The need for a 
strong national identity is thus explained by the assumption that only it can provide the 
seminal conditions for any kind of social co-operation. 
Second, in order to implement policies of redistribution, Miller argues that we 
need a certain level of social solidarity. For this, again, we require a common 
identification: 
If we believe in social justice and are concemed about winning democratic 
support for socially just policies, then we must pay attention to the conditions 
under which different groups will trust one another ... Trust requires solidarity not 
merely within groups but across them, and this in tum depends upon a common 
identification that nationality alone can provide (Miller 1995: 140, myemphasis). 
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As we have seen, Miller' s conception of nationality describes a community of people 
bound together by history, language, culture and, usually, territory. Nationality is thus 
tied to ethnicity and a shared cultural background (Miller 1995: 25). Following this 
interpretation, then, social solidarity and social trust are by-products of historical 
collective interaction and of a collective memory. Immigrants would not be part of the 
community that shares a collective memory and history yet and hence feelings of social 
solidarity and social trust might be jeopardized. This explains Miller' s daim that 
communities aiming for social justice should be allowed to regulate immigration 
"according to the absorptive capacities of the society in question" (Miller 1995: 129). In 
other words, if a community lacks a common national identity, or if it welcomes so 
diverse a group of immigrants as to exceed its "absorptive capacity," it may compromise 
the national features or sentiments necessary to maintain a social welfare state. We can, 
in this instance, imagine the relationship between identity and absorptive capacity as 
correlative in that a community "absorbs" or integrates newcomers successfully if it is 
able to maintain the level of identification necessary to maintain social solidarity and 
hence the support for the social welfare state. 
The concem about "absorption" might be aimed, of course, to address questions 
of numbers. If that were the case, a defense of redistributive immigration polices should 
come easy since their implementation need not lead to higher immigration numbers, but 
are meant to motivate a change of selection criteria. Judging from my previous 
exploration of Miller's position, however, 1 believe that Miller is not primarily interested 
in numbers, but rather that he wants to pro vide principled guidelines regulating the 
diversity of immigrants that national communities could in faimess be asked to welcome. 
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What actually counts as absorption, though, is not clear: Do immigrants need to embrace 
the national culture, which they might happily do, or do members of the host community 
have to embrace immigrants as, henceforth, belonging to it? How is "absorption" 
different from assimilation? Andrew Mason has criticized liberal nationalism in this vein, 
arguing that the necessary conclusion to be drawn from Miller' s link between national 
community and social welfare provision is that liberal nationalists advocate an ethics of 
assimilation (Mason 1999).1 agree that one could read Miller along such lines, and 
speculate that a society which "absorbs" immigrants is one capable of integrating 
immigrants to the point of assimilation. On the other hand, though, one could accord 
Miller more ethno-pluralist credentials in light of his view that the public culture in a 
liberal nation eould embody private ethnie subcultures which would make an equation 
between absorption and assimilation of immigrants seem counterintuitive. 105 But even if 
we can convince ourselves that to calI for immigrants to be absorbed is not meant to 
assimilate them, sorne problems with this concept nevertheless remain. 
An example may illustrate that a calI for absorbing immigrants is an imprecise 
goal of public policy, and potentially one that is at odds with ide as of social justice. 
David Bell, Chief Inspector of Sehools in Britain, reeently emphasized that while 
diversity and the aeceptance of different cultures were potentially a great strength for 
Britain, they could also undermine Britain's "coherence as a nation". To illustrate his 
105 As we have seen, Miller's conception of a national identity, on the one hand, eschews building liberal 
nationality on ascriptive characteristics, like ethnicity or common religion. In fact, Miller argues that 
different ethnicities can form "private subcultures" that can be part of and integrated into the framework of 
a common national identity. Thus a liberal national identity is "quite compatible with a diversity of ethnie 
groups" (Miller 1995: 25ff, cf.. also Tamir 1990). On the other hand, 1 have already shown how a shared 
nationality could be understood to be tied to a shared ethnicity and a shared cultural background (Miller 
1995:25). Moreover, a contextualization of Miller' s ideas about multiculturalism, policies of minority 
group accommodation, and their detrimental effect on social solidarity strongly suggests that absorption is 
tantamount to assimilation, as 1 explain below. 1 thus side with Mason's assessment ofliberal nationalist 
tendencies towards assimilation. 
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concerns, he singled out the growth of Islamic faith schools in Britain and claimed that 
traditional Islamic education did not equip Muslim children for living in modern 
Britain. 106 In response to Bell, representatives from Muslim schools held that they were 
indeed promoting British values. Many British Muslims, in fact, consider themselves 
"British". 107 
This disagreement highlights two problems with Miller' s account of national 
identity and his argument for limits on immigration based on absorptive limits of the host 
society. First, the example of the British School Inspector's despair over the lack of 
traditional British values in Muslim school curricula exemplifies that what actually 
caunts as the agreed public culture a national identity is to embrace, and into which 
immigrants would be integrated or "absorbed" is not clear. Second, assimilation can 
never really work ~s a tool of liberal integration since it is a one-sided process that 
demands a lot from "the other" but hardly any adaptation from the host community (see 
Young 1999).108 Members of the "immigrant" community - aka UK citizens of Muslim 
faith - may believe to have integrated to the point of absorption by having built a school 
system similar to that of Jewish or Catholic faith schools supported by the state in the 
106 Quoted in The Guardian, ISth January, 2005, page 1. 
107 The same conflict characterizes debates about religious minorities in France. We could wonder, for 
example, if the c1aim can be made that the demonstrations of French Muslim women who demand the right 
to wear headscarves anywhere they choose, inc1uding schools, are in fact a sign of the appropriation of the 
French state and its democratic institutions by French Muslims who are fully integrated into the liberal 
democratic state. Put otherwise, is their self-confidence in asking the state to accept their ways and choices 
in life a reflection of the fact that they have integrated weIl into the democratic and deliberative framework 
of the state, while the state and sorne other parts of society have not? Alan Patten has argued that liberal 
societies need to make distinctions between the kind of adaptation they can reasonably expect from first 
generation immigrations on the one hand, and the different obligations the liberal state has towards second 
generation immigrants, on the other (patten 2003). 
108 This otherness can take many different forms - ethnic, cultural, linguistic etc. And surely, many 
pressing needs for integration derive from more "otherness" rather than less. 1 do not find it plausible 
however, to question "otherness" and un veil it as a "construct" when talking about immigration and 
integration (cf. Benhabib 2002: Ch. 2; Honig 2001). Even though it is a "construct", its consequences are 
nevertheless more than real, especially for those who are kept out because of "being other". 
143 
UK. They may, in fact, believe to have adopted and appropriated the democratic make-up 
of their country of citizenship. This does not mean, however, that traditional members of 
the host community will accept their way of adaptation and integration - rather, they 
may have further expectations of adaptation, as Bell' s statement seems to suggest. 109 
Miller believes that the problem of sourcing and sustaining social solidarity and 
social trust is solved through reliance on a common national identity. It is now evident 
why Miller advocates a common nationality as a pre-requisite for a successful social 
welfare state, namely because of the interdependence between a shared national 
community, social solidarity and social trust. To summarize the link between social 
solidarity and trust in this vein, then, we could say that only once members of a 
community have a sense of belonging and interdependence, which is implied in Miller's 
definition of a liberal national identity, will they co-operate. What is worth underscoring 
at this point is that Miller' s argument at least implies that his argument for a shared 
national identity seems to be based on the assumption that compatriots are more prone to 
share a sense of solidarity and hence will thus be more likely to engage in collective 
action the social welfare state requires if they have to co-operate with those who share 
their ethnic background rather than if they are called upon to co-operate with those who 
do not. Redistributive immigration policies might challenge this model of the conditions 
for social justice because they would lead to feelings of social solidarity being 
undermined. 
109 Public opinion assessing whether or not immigrants have successfully integrated is not only imprecise, 
but also very volatile. Witness the discourse in the UK after the 07/07 bombings in London last year, which 
underlined the fact that the bombers had been religious and had worshipped regularly. Something, in other 
words, that might inspire respect and confidence - it seemingly does in Tony Blair or the Queen - was 
portrayed as hinting at underlying problems in integration because of the implied equation between 
religiosity and Muslim fundamentalism. 
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A further objection to su ch policies rnight derive from the fact that redistributive 
immigration willlikely increase the ethno-cultural pluralist character of the host 
community, and that an ethno-culturally plural or multicultural character of a community 
works against social solidarity and social trust. In other words, even if members of the 
host community accepted different ethno-cultural groups as part of the nation, 
multicultural polities will nevertheless be faced with problems of collective action. 
Consider, here, Miller's recent argument that 
[c ]ultural differences do create barriers to trust - there is no question about that -
but given the right pattern of interaction these barriers may be overcome. At the 
macro level, what matters is the availability of an inclusive identity that is 
accessible to members of aIl cultural groups. The debate here is about whether 
this needs to be a national identity in the normal sense, or whether a common 
loyalty to a set of political institutions - sorne form of constitutional patriotism -
may give a sufficiently strong sense of shared identity. (Miller 2004a: 29) 
1 will discuss this quote in more detail in Chapter Four. Suffice it to sayat this point that 
if we take Miller' s 1995 definition of national identity as that of a national identity "in 
the normal sense" then it seems that ethno-cultural diversity provoked by redistributive 
immigration policies may indeed cause serious concerns for social solidarity and social 
trust. Miller cautions that a multicultural community might not be able to agree on 
common principles of social justice. This, in fact, is the conclusion drawn from the link 
he establishes between national identity as an expression of a national culture and, 
concomitantly, as a purveyor of agreed-upon social goals and ideals - what 1 have 
characterized in Chapter Two as Miller' s socially contingent account of social justice. 1 
have argued against this concept, pointing instead to a more universal account of social 
justice. Even if multiculturalism might allow for universal agreement on principles of 
social justice, however, those called upon to implement them might not apply them to aIl 
members of society equally. In other words, "cultural groups might be willing to practice 
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justice towards insiders [of their own group] but not towards outsiders" (Miller 2004a: 
16). Miller thus suggests that ethno-cultural pluralism may lead to intra-group solidarity 
rather than society-wide feelings of solidarity. 
Taking his writing in this vein seriously, sorne have accordingly inferred Miller to 
argue that the ide al community for the implementation of a social welfare state is an 
ethnically homogenous community (see Soroka et al 2004: 34). And while 1 have tried to 
stress Miller' s ethnic pluralist credentials, su ch a reading of Miller' s work may be 
legitimate for two reasons. First, Miller bedevils attempts by "radical multiculturalists" to 
accommodate (ethnic) difference within national communities as divisive and harmful to 
the building of a strong national identity, and to the goals of social justice (Miller 1995: 
131ff; see also Miller 2004a). The rationale for su ch reservations vis-à-vis 
multiculturalism is provided by Brian Barry when he daims that a 'politics of difference' 
- of which Canada's multiculturalism and more broadly, theories of multicultural 
citizenship as a means to accommodate ethnic minorities are examples - "rests on a 
rejection of what we may calI, in contrast, the 'politics of solidarity'." The latter would 
be characterized by citizens' subscription to a common social project, like the 
establishment of a social welfare state, while "the who le point of the 'politics of 
difference' is to as sert that the right answer is for each cultural group to have public 
policies tailored to meet its specific demands" (Barry 2001: 300). For Miller and Barry, 
the achievement of social justice requires a common stance and both seem to see this 
kind of front challenged by feelings of belonging to diverse ethno-cultural groups. They 
might argue, for example, as Eisenberg imagines, that efforts by trade unions to mobilize 
collective action in support for new tariff agreements may be hampered if not 
jeopardized if sorne members also want to achieve cultural accommodation rights for 
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ethno-religious minorities (see Eisenberg, 2006, forthcoming). Different ethnicities, we 
could thus speculate, might stand in the way of effective redistributive collective action 
because trade unions, for ex ample, might not engender enough social trust and social 
solidarity among their membership to cross ethno-cultural group and interest lines. Such 
concerns have been referred to as the heterogeneity/redistribution trade off(see 
Kymlicka, forthcoming) - the trade-off, put differently, that modern societies may be 
faced with between the accommodation of ethnie minorities and measures of social 
justice aimed to help members from its lower socio-economic rungs. 
As 1 accepted earlier, the implementation of redistributive immigration schemes 
would most likely lead to ethno-culturally pluralist immigration. If ethno-cultural 
minorities were accommodated through group-specifie policies and, as a result, support 
for the social welfare state were to dwindle because members of the host community 
loose their feeling of belonging to the national community, the fears of the 
heterogeneity/redistribution trade-off would be substantiated. It would then be plausible 
to say that in bringing about ethno-cultural diversity to the point of undermining social 
solidarity, redistributive immigration would have jeopardized the social welfare state. 
Redistributive immigration schemes could then be legitimately objected to. Following 
such a reading of Miller's critique of multiculturalism - and if we can convince ourselves 
that the implementation of social justice depends on a common identification to generate 
feelings of social solidarity - we might also be convinced that the ideal community for 
implementing social welfare is ethnie aIl y homogenous and cannot easily be multiethnic 
in nature. 
Up until now, then, 1 interpret Miller to be postulating a three-step argument to 
substantiate his daim that there is a link between a shared national identity, social 
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solidarity, social trust and a functioning social welfare state. First, he holds that both 
social solidarity and social trust are important for collective action in a general sense; 
followed by the argument that collective action is necessary if we aim to achieve social 
justice through means of the social welfare state; and daiming that social trust and social 
solidarity are tied to sharing a national identity that builds on a shared ethno-cultural 
history. To my mind, Miller's use of the social solidarity caveat makes two different 
daims that are worth separating in the context of this project. The first is that feelings of 
national identity are the basis for feelings of social solidarity. The second daim worth 
distinguishing is that social solidarity is seminal for social justice since it encourages and 
supports community members to contribute to the welfare state. These two daims are 
different in nature and scope and, in fact, are not as interdependent as liberal nationalists 
suggest. 1 will address these daims in tum, starting with what 1 analyze to be a moral 
daim about the nature of social solidarity, before retuming to the instrumental daim 
about social solidarity in Section 4. 
3 The Moral Ideal of Social Solidarity 
To assess whether it is plausible to argue that feelings of social solidarity are 
based on a common national identity, we need to determine what we mean when 
speaking about social solidarity. Miller posits that feelings of social solidarity will come 
about because individuals are ethically tied to their national community, its welfare and 
that of its members. His account of social solidarity implies that something morally calls 
for individu ais as members of national communities to be solidaristic. Joe Carens 
proposes a definition of social solidarity that accounts for this moral component. Social 
solidarity, Carens writes, 
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is a moral vision of human beings as interdependent and connected, with duties as 
weIl as rights against one another [ .. .it is] a sense of social responsibility, of 
commitment to community. (Carens 1986b: 685) 
This, to my mind, is the clearest definition of what we actually mean when we speak: of 
social solidarity. 1 will use this definition as the baseline of my argument and refer to it 
as the moral ideal of social solidarity. Without reference to su ch a moral ideal, 1 posit, 
the concept of social solidarity cannot serve the uses liberal nationalists put it to. 
Particularly if we think of social justice in its redistributive form - that is, if we subscribe 
to principles of sharing wealth in order to make social goods accessible to aH - we need 
to make reference to su ch a moral ideal of social solidarity because only the moral ideal 
may motivate us to redistribute. We do not contribute to the social welfare state for 
reasons of self-interests but because we believe that to contribute is the right thing to do 
in favor of the goals of the community - what we may call the common good (see Mason 
1998). 110 
In adopting this definition of social solidarity, 1 account for the liberal nationalist 
assumption that social solidarity is tied to feelings of interdependence with others - what 
Miller describes as the national community. Others have referred to this feeling of 
solidarity as "empathy" - a feeling of concern for others, mostly for those who are less 
weIl-off (see Mason 1998). For the purposes of addressing the social solidarity caveat, 
however, 1 will rely on Carens' conceptualization rather than Mason's. A sense of 
110 One could make the argument, of course, that we contribute because we think the common project our 
national community is engaged in is morally good or will produce ethically valuable goods (see Miller 
1995: Ch. 3). Simon Caney has criticized this model for taking national identity as the foundation of ethical 
obligalions, stating that for us to believe in the moral values the nation pursues is not enough - many 
Germans during the Third Reich might have thought so. Rather, for us to be ethically lied to the nation 
would entail that a nation has to pursue objectively moral goals (see Caney 1999, see also Hurka 1997). 
This raises another problem, though, which is weIl articulated by Alistair McIntyre: if a national 
community commands feelings of solidarity because it pursues an objectively moral goal, would we then 
not have to agree that ail nations who pursue objectively moral goals should compel us to support them 
(see MacIntyre 1984)? 
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empathy, it seems to me, does not capture why liberal nationalists believe "solidarity" to 
be necessary as a basis for schemes of redistribution and the implementation of the social 
welfare state. 1 can empathize with the world's poor or the homeless person outside my 
door which may lead me to lend a helping hand or donate money; this is different, 
however, from thinking of such actions in terms of social justice, of rethinking the 
injustice in the distribution of goods between us, or of subscribing to a scheme of social 
welfare measures. Such a scheme would ask me to contribute part of my money on a 
regular basis, in the form of taxes, to pro vide housing for low-income members of my 
neighborhood. To do so, we cannot rely only on empathy, which is something we will 
also have with victims of "misfortunes" (Shklar 1990, passim) or victims of bad luck-
i.e. individuals who may have been hard done by, but whose poor sort is distinct from 
being an injustice since nobody can be held morally accountable for it. 111 Empathy, in 
other words, may be a necessary condition of social solidarity, but it is not a sufficient 
condition to motivate social solidarity, as it is putatively needed for social justice. 
Second, Carens' definition of human beings as interdependent and connected also 
accounts for the liberal nationalist premise of the national community to be an ethical 
cornmunity determining our sense of duties and obligations - the extent, as it were, of 
our feelings of social solidarity. It highlights the fact that social solidarity is based on the 
idea that we have duties towards each other, that we owe certain things to each other as 
members of a community. So prima facie, we could convince ourselves that feelings of 
social solidarity are tied to sharing in a national identity. Carens, however, does not 
prejudge the national community as the only one in which we accept responsibility. 
111 Recall that 1 agree with Miller that in order to make sense of principles of social justice, we need to be 
able to hold somebody morally accountable for the implementation of these principIes or for the injustices 
suffered if the y are not implemented. ' 
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Instead, 1 interpret the moral ideal of solidarity to invite us to clarify the concept of 
community we employ when formulating ideas about social solidarity. In this vein, 
Margaret Cano van has asked 
what sort of polit y would have to exist for contemporary ideas about social justice 
to make sense? Would it have to be astate that was also a community? And is a 
state that is a community in fact a nation? (Canovan 1996: 26) 
As we have seen, liberal nationalists affirm Canovan's suggestion and promote 
the idea of a national community as the basis for achieving goals of social justice. 
However, and based on my response in Chapter Two, we could also conceive of social 
justice in a more cosmopolitan vein. This raises the question then, if, in light of Carens' 
definition, we could not conceive of a cosmopolitan community - with its accompanying 
rights and obligations. Can we conceive of interdependent relationships with individuals 
outside our national community? FoHowing my earlier argument about duties and 
obligations and the relationships circumscribing them, it is not obvious why we should 
tie our sense of social solidarity excIusively to the national community. In this vein, 1 
have proposed a concept of social justice that builds on a global principle of fair equality 
of opportunity and individu al autonomy. 1 have posited that in an ideal and just world, aH 
individu ais would have fair access to the opportunities that make their lives worthwhile 
living and make themselves reasonably content with the life they lead. Accordingly, 1 
support a concept of social justice that pre scribes the redistribution of rights, 
opportunities and resources in order to provide conditions of autonomous living on a 
global scale. Taking this position entails the acceptance of social responsibility in a more 
cosmopolitan vein. 
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To be sure, Miller questions that we can speak of a global concept of social 
justice as 1 construed it, and 1 would speculate that he would find a global concept of 
social solidarity unconvincing. Using Carens' dictum of what the moral ideal of 
solidarity requires, Miller could argue, for example, that the world we live in does not 
qualify as one in which "human beings [are] interdependent and connected" (Carens 
1986b: 685) and hence that the idea of having feelings of social solidarity generated by a 
sense of belonging to a cosmopolitan community is implausible. 1 have already referred 
to authors like Pogge and Nussbaum who think otherwise. Pogge argues quite 
convincingly that the world's population is, in fact, interdependent (see Pogge 2002: esp. 
Ch. 1 and Ch. 8). His case for global interdependence is situated in the realm of macro-
economics and trade. But we can also find sorne very obvious instances of global 
interdependence in the context of immigration; in fact, questions of immigration policy 
provide an excellent, albeit negative, example of the welfare of citizens of rich countries 
being intimately tied to that of those living in poor countries. Imagine a standard 
immigration scenario today in which life gets harder and scarcer in the country of origin. 
Sorne of those suffering from deteriorating conditions of life have the will to move to 
more prosperous shores. Such moves will have an impact on the welfare of those living 
in rich countries. Very minimally, it is fair to say that European states DOW spend more 
money and resources on border patrols, detention camps and the removal of rejected 
asylum seekers than ever before. 112 Recall, here, the case of the Spanish government now 
112 1 am aware, of course, that there is a distinction to be made between asylum seekers - i.e. those who 
leave their countries and do not have high hopes to go back there, be it because war is raging, or because 
they are persecuted as religious or ethno-cultural minorities - and immigrants more generally. This 
distinction is based on the ide a that there are deserving and undeserving immigrants, which 1 have rejected 
as untenable in Chapter One. Second, the distinction has liule relevance when it cornes to the expenses 
national governments will shoulder in order to assess the merits of individual daims for immigration. 
Indeed, one cou Id argue that because many European countries treat many individuals as unwelcome 
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deploying patrol ships to pick up those in rickety boats trying to make the crossing into 
Spanish territory. Consider, as weH, the actual asylum policy in the UK where a detained 
asylum seeker costs the government a monthly average of GBP 5000. Teresa Hay ter has 
calculated that the total expenditure for the British asylum detention scheme - including 
border controls and detention facilities - amounts to "about 12 times what it would cost 
to pay [asylum seekers] income support and housing benefit, let alone allow them to 
work" (Hay ter 2000: 163). By the end of December 2003, the British government 
detained 1,615 people, of which 1,285 were asylum seekers. Of the latter group, about 
950 were detained longer than a month, with 330 being detained longer than 3 months 
(Home Office 2004: 31). With more people trying to get to Europe, this unfortunate and 
expensive trend is unlikely to change. Needless to say, these are su ms that governments 
will not be able to spend on national health care schemes, pension plans or education. 
Of course, Miller could retort that his idea of social solidarity includes principles 
of reciprocity and mutual advantage. And to be sure, Europeans may doubt the 
reciprocity of their relationship with Sub-Saharan Africans, for example, and might 
wonder what the advantages of their relationship with people from the southern 
hemisphere are - although in Chapter One 1 pointed out sorne tangible benefits that come 
in the form of the arrivaI of qualified and highly-skilled health workers in the UK as an 
example. From a moral perspective, moreover, we need to remember the limits 1 have 
elaborated in Chapter Two on relationships of mutual advantage and reciprocity: 1 have 
supported the distributive objection which stipulates that we cannot build moral 
arguments for obligations and duties based on purely instrumental relationships. It is 
intruders indiscriminately, these governments have actually proven my daim that the distinction between 
deserving asylum seekers and undeserving other immigrants is spurious. 
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therefore unconvincing to daim that we are not interdependent in a morally relevant 
sense simply because we do not immediately draw advantages from our relationships. 
We cannot make the moral ideal behind solidarity malleable to the point of it simply 
servmg our own purposes. 
So far, then, 1 have argued that the ties liberal nationalists construe between social 
solidarity and social justice necessarily rely on a moral ideal of social solidarity. Only if 
we accept that solidarity entails duties and obligations towards others - and, 
concomitantly, a sense of responsibility for the common good - can we understand how 
social solidarity could serve liberal purposes of implementing measures of the social 
welfare state and cou Id contribute to the realization of principles of social justice. To 
subscribe to a moral ideal of social solidarity, though, does not imply acceptance of the 
link liberal nationalists posit between it and a shared national community. Instead, 1 have 
argued for an understanding of social solidarity that is tied to the fact that we live in a 
world with diverse resource distribution and to the acknowledgement that our welfare is 
tied to that of people beyond the relatively small group of our compatriots. 
Assume, for the purpose of the argument, that Miller accepts the daim that the 
moral ideal of social solidarity transcends the boundaries of national identity. Regardless 
of the definition and sources of social solidarity, and aIl el se being equal, however, he 
cou Id nevertheless main tain that we need feelings of social solidarity in order to be 
motivated to support the implementation of principles of social justice. In other words, he 
might acknowledge that the moral sense of solidarity may come from sources more 
cosmopolitan than he anticipated and, as a result, he might support a more global concept 
of social solidarity, but might in si st that the essential core of his argument remains 
unchallenged: we still need feelings of social solidarity if what we want to implement is 
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the social welfare state. Because he argues for the nation-state as a necessary instrument 
for the implementation of principles of social justice, he may emphasize that we need to 
stimulate feelings of social solidarity in the national context and hence be wary of 
challenging a sense of social solidarity through changes in the make-up of the 
community, or through multicultural policies. This brings us to the instrumental 
argument about social solidarity and the workings of the social welfare state. 
4 The Instrumental Argument for the Ties Between Social Solidarity and 
Social Welfare 
l have supported Miller' s daim that a social welfare state is a good worth 
preserving because it is an important tool for achieving social justice, which is the 
leitmotiv of this project. We have seen that Miller assumes social solidarity to be tied to a 
shared national identity because it is the battery that generates our motivation for 
solidaristic behaviour and collective action. The instrumental argument holds that only 
social solidarity can motivate us to help implement principles of social justice by 
contributing to the social welfare state. What characterises the instrumental argument 
about national identity and social solidarity, then, is that it promotes national identities 
because of their value for the functioning of the social welfare state as a vehide to 
achieve social justice while, at the same time, evoking the moral underpinnings of social 
solidarity as l have just discussed them. 
In this section, l want to address the daim that the realization and implementation 
of a social welfare state is tied to a shared national identity - put differently, l want to 
question that a shared national identity is needed to provide us with incentives for social 
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cooperation. 1 13 To my mind, there are two options to confront this challenge. First, we 
can explore whether something other than a sense of a shared national identity can 
function as the basis for policies of social justice and can stimulate support for such 
policies as effectively as liberal nationalism. Second, we can investigate if something 
other than social solidarity can motivate us to conform to the norms of a common 
project, namely, the dut Y of paying taxes and contributing our share to the workings of 
the social welfare state. 
4.1. Social Justice, Social Solidarity and Social Co-operation 
To address the first challenge, we can ask whether, other things being equal, we 
can find accounts of social justice that are not premised on ideas of shared national 
identity and social solidarity. To start, 1 propose to explore how John Rawls 
conceptualizes our motivations to contribute to schemes of redistribution. Lawrence 
Crocker has argued that when investigating Rawls' A Theory of Justice, we will not find 
links between national identity, social solidarity and the implementation of social welfare 
(Crocker 1977). According to this reading, Rawls' arguments for support of principles of 
redistribution are not premised on a shared sense of belonging to a national community 
or derived from solidaristic bonds. Instead, Crocker reads Rawls as arguing that 
individuals in the original position subscribe to the difference principle for reasons of 
rational self-interest and risk-aversion. We are motivated to redistribute because we act 
according to the maximin principle - i.e. from a position in which everybody wants to 
maximize personal gains while minimizing risks (Rawls 1971: 152f). Because we do not 
113 The instrumental argument for links between social justice, social solidarity and national identities is 
akin to a Russian dol! since there is, as Margaret Moore has pointed out, another instrumental argument 
underlying this, which is that for strong national identities (Moore 2001: Ch. 4). 
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know what our actual access to social goods will be, we want to maximize the position of 
the worst -off in society because this might mean maximizing our own gains. 
Concomitantly, this helps minimize our risk in the event we find ourselves among 
society's best-off. One might conclude, then, that Rawls' blueprint for social justice does 
not rely on principles of social solidarity as 1 have defined them: on this reading of 
Rawls, a rational individu al simply would not forgo self-interested goals in favor of the 
goals of the community. 
Philippe Van Parijs' discussion of Rawls, on the other hand, argues that Rawls' 
theory can only work if one assumes "solidaristic patriotism" as a background condition 
in a society that aims to achieve egalitarian justice (see Van Parijs 1995b). Only because 
1 share a sense of solidaristic patriotism with other members of my community would 1 
refrain from tax fraud, say, or from moving into another country that does not apply the 
difference principle. 114 In response to Crocker, Van Parijs could say that it is not 
plausible to assume that individuals lack a sense of social solidarity in A Theory of 
Justice. Instead, the fact that they do not move abroad even though a move might 
maximize their personal gains shows that individuals have a sense of social solidarity.115 
Van Parijs' comments thus seem to lend credence to Miller's argument that we need to 
pro vide and secure conditions of cooperation before we can get to deliberate about, say, 
114 To be sure, 1 might avoid paying taxes not only because 1 lack a sense of solidarity, but rather, because 
1 do not trust the authorities to do what they ought to with the tax monies, as 1 will explain in the following 
chapter. Not aIl behavior that seems unsolidaristic is necessarily so in nature. However, for individuals to 
simply not wanting to pay taxes because the y want to keep more of their money for themselves is a 
different story, and one that might convincingly be explained with a lack of social solidarity. 
115 Moving abroad, however, would not necessarily fuI fi Il the condition of minimizing the risks that works 
as a motivation in Rawls' proposai to accept obligations of redistribution. ln this respect, 1 believe that Van 
Parijs underplays Rawls' and Crocker's argument about individual risk-adversity. 
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taxation for purposes of redistribution· 116 In other words, Miller and Van Parijs postulate 
an interdependence between social solidarity and national identity in the sense that a 
shared national identity will provide the background conditions for collective action. 
Successful collective action, social theorists argue, depends on a high level of 
social capital, i.e. a dense "web of cooperative relationships between citizens that 
facilitates resolution of collective action problems" (Brehm and Rahn 1995: 999). How 
does Rawls conceptualize collective action or, as he caUs it, social co-operation and the 
motivations for it? What is necessary to provide for conditions of social co-operation? 
The ideal of social co-operation "is to hold for free and equal moral persons, and views 
social co-operation not simply as productive and socially coordinated activity, but as 
fulfilling a notion of fair terms of co-operation and mutual advantage" (Rawls 1999b: 
325, see also 1999c: 396). As we have seen in Chapter Two, Miller advocates an idea of 
society, not unlike Rawls, as built on principles of cooperation and mutual benefit. It 
seems legitimate, then, to compare the two in their description of social cooperation and 
how it cornes about. 
For Rawls, the basic structure of society is a system of social cooperation, which 
constitutes the subject of his theory of justice. Put differently, the goal of social justice is 
to establish a society based on a fair system of cooperation. Social cooperation that 
fulfills the postulate of fairness presupposes "each participant's rational advantage or 
good [ ... ] cooperation is guided by publicly recognized rules and procedures which those 
who are cooperating accept and regard as properly regulating their conduct" (Rawls 
116 In this vein, Miller states explicitly that deliberative democratic set-ups like that proposed in Rawls' 
theory implicitly rely on a background of strong national identities if they are to work at ail (Miller 1995: 
93; and 2000: Ch. 9). His and Van Parijs' interpretation could draw support from Rawls' stipulation that 
principles of social justice apply to "the basic structure of society" with a society defined in terms of the 
nation state (Rawls 1971: 7ff; see also Kymlicka and Straehle 1999: 65). 
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1999c: 3950. Individuals need to accept the rules and goals according to which the y 
ought to cooperate before it is fair to be expected to cooperate. In fact, quite contrary to 
Miller' s argument for cooperation as based on and furthered by feelings of belonging, 
Rawls' argument postulates that the kind of social cooperation that is required to buttress 
and further social cooperation is built on reasonable consent to the norms and rules 
regulating social cooperation.117 Rawls' definition of the basis and motivations for social 
cooperation, furthermore, does not correlate with the instrumental uses 1 have 
extrapolated. Instead of taking social cooperation as a tool to arrive at social justice, 
Rawls argues that cooperation and the conditions under which it occurs is a fundamental 
part of social justice deliberations. The terms under which we cooperate, put otherwise, 
form part of our deliberations of what is just and fair. 118 1 would argue, then, that Rawls' 
conception of social co-operation distinguishes itself from the instrumental purposes for 
which Miller wants to employ it. 
To be sure, Miller could argue that this might be the idealliberals should aim for. 
He could, nevertheless, insist that the facts on the ground are different and daim that it 
makes a difference for collective action in the realm of the welfare state whether or not 
we share a sense of belonging to a national community. Recall his goal related in Chapter 
Two that he wants to theorize questions of social justice from a perspective of non-ideal 
theory, and instead take into account how people intuitively think about questions of 
social justice. Miller might hold that the facts point to a strong link between solidaristic 
) 17 See FN 100 for the conditions and Rawls' definition of reasonable consent. 
118 A very similar argument, and indeed one that immediately addresses the purpose ofthis project, is 
made by Jürgen Habermas. Habermas argues that in the age of pluralism, the only just way societies have 
to stimulate support and cooperation among their new members is the Rawlsian concept of agreement on 
principles and fair terms (see Habermas 1999). 
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behavior and shared national identity. But this, as 1 will argue in the following section, is 
too hast y a conclusion. 
4.2. Immigrants and the Social Welfare State 
ln order to challenge the liberal nationalist claim that a shared national identity is 
the basis for solidaristic behavior, my second strategy is to see if something other than a 
shared national identity might be at the root of community-oriented behavior. 1 posit that 
if national identity in its common understanding were a requirement for social 
cooperation, we would likely witness less tax contributions from immigrant communities 
or more attempts at tax evasion. 1 propose, in other words, to investigate how recently 
arrived immigrants - that is, those who do not yet share in the national identity - behave. 
This will, secondly, permit me to assess the fear that redistributive immigration policies 
might threaten the social conditions required to pro vide successful social welfare. 1 
hypothesize that if those who do not share in a common national identity nevertheless 
contribute their fair share to the workings of the social welfare state through honest tax 
contributions, then the argument that ties solidaristic behavior to feelings of belonging to 
a national community loses much of its argumentative clout. 
1 have chosen the UK as a test case to verify my hypothesis that immigrants are 
not draining the resources of the host community and are, instead, contributing their fair 
share. The UK is an interesting society to study in the context of social solidarity, and for 
two reasons. In one sense, the UK is not a traditional immigration society, like the 
societies of Canada or Australia. Its social narrative, so to speak, is not one of 
immigration and integration, but still relies, to a large extent, on traditional "British" 
beliefs when rallying support for public policies. What exactly constitutes the national 
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identity in immigration countries today is subject to more thorough debate than in non-
immigration countries. Witness, for ex ample , the debacle in Germany over suggestions 
that multiculturalism should be adopted, but that it needs to be couched in a German 
Leitkultur, an embodiment of "German" cultural and religious values and norms. Public 
dise ourse in the UK is more nuanced than its German counterpart. Nevertheless, we do 
find instances that illustrate the limits of British multiculturalism - witness the ex ample 
of the School Inspector who bemoaned the lack of British value education in British 
Muslim schools. Needless to say, he did not address precisely what the "coherence of the 
nation" consisted of and in the course of the ensuing debate, no one asked David Bell 
what precisely those British values were. 
On the other hand, the UK is an immigration society with a considerable 
immigrant community from a wide variety of countries. The government officially 
supports multiculturalism, as opposed to, say, the French approach to dealing with 
immigration, and indeed, David Bell did emphasize that diversity and the acceptance of 
different cultures were potentially great strengths for Britain. In this respect, then, the UK 
is in fact comparable to immigration societies and 1 refer to it in this respect as an 
example of the struggles European states will have to face in the 21 st century, a time, 
which, as 1 anticipated earlier, will be dominated by questions of immigration. So how 
does immigration affect the British welfare state? 
The authors of a recent report published by the Institute for Public Polie y 
Research (IPPR) in London make a clear case against any suspicions concerning the 
exploitative effects of modern immigration on the British welfare state. In fact, the 
findings are so diametrically opposed to common stereotypes that they are worth quoting 
at length: 
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Our analysis suggests that the contribution of immigrants to public finances is 
growing, and is likely to continue to grow in the near future. In 1999-2000, 
immigrants accounted for 8.8 per cent of government tax receipts (and 8.4 per 
cent of go vern ment spending). By 2003-04, immigrants accounted for 10.0 per 
cent of government tax receipts (and 9.1 per cent of government spending). Total 
revenue from immigrants grew in real terms from f33.8 billion in 1999-00 to 
f41.2 billion in 2003-04. This 22 per cent increase compares favorably to the six 
per cent increase for the UK-born. Our analysis also suggests that the relative net 
fiscal contribution of immigrants is stronger than that of the UK-born, and has 
been getting even stronger in recent years. In each of the years we have examined, 
immigrants have become proportionately greater net contributors to the public 
finances than non-immigrants. (IPPR 2005: 13, my emphasis) 
What we can conclu de from this report is that, when considered from a fiscal perspective, 
immigrants contribute to the social welfare state, through taxes, more than they actually 
benefit from it. The first les son we should draw from this finding is that immigrants act 
in a solidaristic fashion by contributing to the social welfare state before they adopt the 
national identity of the host community. 
Now, those favoring CUITent immigration schemes might argue that this first set 
of findings proves their raison d'être in so much as they show that careful selection and 
admission of immigrants will turn out for the benefit of both the ho st society and the 
immigrating person. To illustrate, they might refer to the case of many doctors who 
supplement the overstretched British health care system with their education and 
knowledge. It is surely to the advantage of immigrants to come to a new country in 
which their skills are needed in so far as they will easily find employment and the 
welfare and status that come with it. In order to ensure that we can match employers' 
demands with skills, however, we need to have stringent selection criteria for immigrants 
in place, like, for example, certain levels of education, language skills and the like. 
The economic argument is, of course, hard CUITency in immigration debates and 
is those who refer to it often tie the economic argument to successful integration. 1 have 
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supported those who promote integration as one important and vital feature of successful 
immigration. One could therefore propose that the fact that carefuIly selected immigrants 
perform weIl in the host economy lends credence to arguments that stipulate successful 
integration. But this is not enough, 1 postulated, to argue against redistributive 
immigration policies. Instead, this chapter has tried to explore to what extent such 
immigration might pose a threat to achievements of social justice in host communities, 
i.e. the functioning of the social welfare state. In a first instance, then, the findings related 
above suggest that economic arguments do not show that immigration per se jeopardizes 
the social welfare state. 
But what if immigrants who arrive through redistributive immigration schemes 
do not fare so weIl in our economies? Since such policies target the worst-off, chances 
are that their skills will not push them into the higher earning echelon of society and one 
could speculate that they would not perform as weIl as immigrants who are admitted 
under current schemes. One could be led to believe, then, that immigrants admitted under 
redistributive immigration schemes might be more of a burden to the welfare state than 
their contemporary counterparts. As 1 explained before, though, redistributive 
immigration polides have not been tested yet, and the only ex ample we have for relaxed 
immigration regulations for unskiIled workers we might refer to - the EU in it's early 
days - does not support su ch fears. Moreover, if immigrants are not what our 
homegrown economies are looking for at the moment only means that we will not 
immediately benefit from their immigration -it does not show that we would incur 
unbearably high costs in opening our borders to them. To simply accept the economic 
argument would neglect the distributive objection to inegalitarian advantages for those 
with whom we share special relationships. 
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Finally, 1 would hold against those who think that CUITent immigration schemes 
are vindicated by the IPPR report coming from London that we cannot reduce the social 
solidarity caveat solely to an argument about the economic usefulness of immigrants. 
Such an interpretation wou Id neglect the moral component of social solidarity 1 have 
illustrated. Reducing people to their economic usefulness would disregard liberal 
convictions that require us to respect people as ends in themselves rather than as means 
to our own ends. We do not engage in debates about the economic worth of humans 
because we accept that such cost-benefit calculations violate the fundamental human 
right to moral equality and for equal access to goods that make life worth living. In fact, 
this postulate, as we have already seen, is at the very heart of our system of welfare state 
provisions and at the heart of moral ideas about social solidarity. 
With the economic argument dismissed, we should turn to the second daim, i.e. 
that a national identity will help us support a functioning social welfare state because of 
the feelings of solidarity it generates. In this instance, it is worth analyzing another report 
commissioned by the British Home Office, in whieh we learn that British-born members 
of ethnie minorities - that is, those who, according to Miller' s blueprint, would be 
members of a shared national identity while potentially holding on to ethno-cultural 
"private subcultures" - and newly immigrated members of ethnie minorities perform 
relatively equally in the economic sector, with equal numbers of them unemployed and 
dependent on welfare benefits (Home Office 2002). In other words, those who are part of 
a national identity are not, in their economic performance based on employment, distinct 
from those who have yet to become members of the national community. 
What we can read instead is that sharing in a common national identity cannot 
give us assurances about solidaristic behavior among compatriots since there income 
164 
differences of considerable extent between British-born members of ethnic minorities 
and their British-born white counterparts. The gap is widest for workers of Bangladeshi 
des cent who are paid up to 40% less for the same or comparable work than their peers 
(Home Office 2002: Ch. 7). If we set this second set of findings that describes the 
difficulties both, ethnic minority immigrants and ethnic minority British-born citizens 
face when trying to find adequate and equally paid employment into context with the 
social solidarity caveat, a different picture presents itself. These findings show, 1 would 
argue, that the question is not to what extent ethnic minority immigrants take advantage 
of the social welfare state, but rather, to what extent they and their British-born peers are 
allowed to actually participate in and contribute to it. The overlapping figures for British-
born and foreign-born ethnic minorities members do not indicate a problem for social 
solidarity arising from the distinction between those inside the established borders where 
British-born members of ethnic minorities obviously are - they hold British citizenship, 
go to British schools, enjoy British culture and pay British taxes - and those outside. 
Rather, these findings indicate a problem for social solidarity arising from racist 
prejudice against employing members of ethnic minorities. If members of ethnie 
minorities do not get a chance to find adequate employment that would en able them to 
contribute taxes, it should come as no surprise that publie opinion turns against them as 
abusers of the hard earned system of social welfare.1I9 
Based on the actual data, it is hence unconvincing to make a case against 
redistributive immigration schemes based on a concern for social welfare. Members of 
ethno-cultural minorities contribute dutifully to the social welfare state if given the 
119 A similar point can be made in regards to asylum seekers who are prohibited from taking up 
employment that could support them and their families while their asylum status is evaluated, or to live on 
regular welfare benefits, for that matter. 
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chance to do so, oftentimes before they even share in the national identity. But what, one 
may wonder, motivates them to contribute to a system of income redistribution before 
they share in the common national identity? This is the last question 1 want to deal with 
in this chapter. 
4.3. Social Welfare and Civic Morality 
Members of ethno-cultural minorities, 1 believe, contribute to the welfare state for 
reasons that are less tied to feelings of belonging than to a sense of social responsibility. 
For the purposes of this project, i.e. to evaluate conditions of a functioning social welfare 
state, 1 construe the sense that we need to prevail in a functioning social welfare state as 
civic morality that "entails obedience to the rules, and honest and responsible behavior" 
(Letki 2005: 2). 1 borrow the definition for civic morality from Natalia Letki who 
continues that: 
[Ci vic morality] refers to the sense of civic responsibility for the common good, and 
thus entails obedience to the rules, and honest and responsible behavior. Unlike 
'private morality' which is derived from the religious or privately held values, [ci vic 
morality] is rooted in community membership and implies accepting duties as given 
by society and owed to aIl of its members or society in general. Civic morality 
constitutes an opposition to dishonesty and corruption: it deters individu ais from 
wrongdoing, be it in relation to fellow citizens or to the institutions. (Letki 2005: 2) 
To employ this conception of civic morality, it seems to me, accepts two fundamental 
premises about the social conditions of a successful welfare state. First, my use of ci vic 
morality acknowledges the fact that we need sorne sense to make it plausible to believe 
in the trustworthiness of others with whom we live in a community, and towards whom 
we are called upon to have a sense of moral obligation - what 1 refer to as a feeling of 
social trust. Second, the definition of civic morality asserts that we need a sense of our 
moral obligations towards fellow members of our community. It accounts for the fact 
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that if we want to implement a functioning social welfare state, we incur a specifie set of 
obligations to those with whom we share its institutions. This set of obligations, 
however, does not derive from a feeling of belonging to a shared national community but 
rather to a sense of belonging to a political community that pursues a common social 
project: namely, that of social welfare. The source of social solidarity, in other words, 
lies in the behavioral norms of the community that derive from the common project a 
community undertakes. In distinction to liberal nationalist beliefs about the moral value 
of the national community, however, the community buttressing a sense of civic morality 
is a political one. The moral consequences derive from the fact that we agree to the rules 
and norms guiding community life, along the lines of the principles Rawls has set out for 
the political community that motivates social cooperation (see Section 4.1. above). 
To contextualize the proposaI for civic morality in reference to the original 
challenge posed by Miller - who wonders whether we need to have a "national identity 
in the normal sense, or whether a common loyalty to a set of political institutions [ ... ] 
may give a sufficiently strong sense of shared identity" (Miller 2004a: 29) - it seems to 
me that we can embrace a non-national form of identity when seeking support for 
measures of the social welfare state. Social solidarity, as we need it to support the social 
welfare state does not need to rely on anything other than a principled approach to 
institutionallife. 
5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, 1 have acknowledged that redistributive immigration schemes 
might be depicted as posing a threat to the social conditions of social justice in host 
communities. 1 have supported those who argue that a functioning social welfare state is 
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a tool by which we can arrive at social justice and hence a good worth protecting. 1 have 
then summarized two fundamental conditions for the workings of a social welfare state, 
social solidarity and social trust. 1 followed this with an account of social welfare and 
social justice in the liberal nationalist mode, focusing on David Miller' s argument that 
postulates a link between social welfare, social solidarity and a shared national identity. 1 
argue that Miller makes two daims that are worth distinguishing. The first daim is that 
feelings of national identity are at the basis of feelings of social solidarity. The second 
daim is that social solidarity in its liberal national interpretation is seminal for social 
justice since it encourages and supports community members to contribute to the welfare 
state. 1 have explained that liberal nationalist daims rely on the moral ideal of social 
solidarity, which stipulates the duties, and obligations we have, as weIl as a sense of 
social responsibility. The moral ideal of social solidarity, however, cannot justify the 
daim that solidarity should only extend to the realm of our national borders. This is the 
first challenge to the liberal nationalist argument. Secondly, 1 have shown that there are 
other accounts of the basis of social cooperation that do not rely on ide as of national 
community. Finally, 1 have illustrated these accounts with findings from the UK where 
immigrants dutifully contribute - indeed, more than their British peers - to the tax 
income of the government. 1 have conduded that it is not a shared national identity that 
motivates individu ais to contribute to the social welfare state, but, rather, a sense of civic 
mindedness that transcends ethno-cultural group boundaries. 1 will elaborate on my 
definition of civic mindedness in the following chapter where 1 explore putative links 
between social trust and national identity. 
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.f'. IV Fears about Redistributive Immigration Polides - Part II: 
Social Welfare, Social Justice, and Social Trust 
1 Introduction 
Up until now, 1 have defended redistributive immigration schemes against the 
fear that su ch policies might underrnine one vital social condition of a functioning social 
welfare state, what 1 have referred to as social solidarity. 1 have challenged David 
Miller' s argument for the interdependence between social solidarity and national identity, 
which he proposes in the context of questions about collective action. 1 have explained 
that problems of collective action today are often discussed in the context of social 
capital, as part of the literature, in other words, which discusses "the web of cooperative 
relationships between citizens that facilitates resolution of collective action problems" 
(Brehm and Rahn 1995: 999).1 have shown that successful collective action can be 
motivated by something other than feelings of shared nationality - what 1 have referred 
to as a sense of civic mindedness or morality. In this chapter, 1 want to address the fear 
that a second condition for collective action and a functioning social welfare state might 
be jeopardized by redistributive immigration schemes, namely social trust. Social trust, it 
is argued, is a "predisposing condition" (Barry 1989: 171) for social solidarity and its 
policy-oriented uses, such as the collective action to support schemes of social welfare. If 
we can con vince ourselves of the necessity for social trust to reign within a given society 
airning to sustain social solidarity and solidaristic behavior, it is important to investigate 
how to generate and instill social trust. Is it indeed the case, as Miller argues, that social 
trust depends on a shared national identity (Miller 1988; 1989: Ch. 9)? To investigate 
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this daim is important in order to counter the fears that liberal nationalist authors might 
voice against redistributive immigration policies, what 1 have summarized as the social 
solidarity caveat. In this final chapter, therefore, 1 expand the scope of the argument from 
addressing the instrumental and moral stances of the social solidarity caveat to include 
the component of trust when assessing redistributive immigration policies and the co st 
they may impose on the ho st community.J20 
Miller and others, like Barry, seem to think that the only way to achieve the kind 
of trust we need to buttress policies of social justice can be found in societies that have 
strong national identities and which, incidentally, discourage multicultural diversity (see 
Barry 2001: 8 and passim; Miller 1995: 90ff). 1 have referred to this stance as one that 
expresses concerns about the "heterogeneity/redistribution trade-off' (see Kymlicka, 
forthcoming), about the trade-off that modern societies may be forced to make between 
the accommodation of ethno-cultural121 minorities at the expense of measures of social 
justice aimed to help members from its lower socio-economic rungs. In Chapter Three, 1 
explained that if ethno-cultural minority groups - to which many immigrants would 
belong - were to calI for accommodation through group-specific policies, and if 
subsequently, support for the social welfare state were to dwindle because members of 
the host community have lost confidence and trust in the system, thus provoking the 
collapse of the system, then the fears of the heterogeneity/redistribution trade-off wou Id 
be substantiated. It would then be plausible to say that the social welfare state has been 
jeopardized as a result of a change in immigration. In bringing about that kind of ethnic 
120 To recall, the social solidarity caveat against immigration holds that achievements towards social 
justice in the host society, like a social welfare state, should not be put in jeopardy for the sake of change in 
the ethics of immigration 
121 1 will use "ethnie" minorities and "ethno-cultural minorities" interchangeably. 
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diversity, redistributive immigration schemes in short, would undermine social trust and 
could thus be legitimately to. 
But while it may sound convincing, the last step of the argument warrants 
investigation. As 1 will explain below, 1 accept social trust to play a vital role in 
determining support for schemes of social justice. However, 1 do not think there are 
convincing grounds to share reservations over redistributive immigration policies-
reservations which are based on the belief that redistributive immigration policies will 
lead to increased ethnie pluralism in our midst and thus undermine social trust. In fact, 1 
want to challenge the assumption that social trust - the kind we need for the support of 
policies of social welfare - depends and needs to rely on ethnie homogeneity. To do so, 1 
will examine findings in social theory in order to evaluate how convincing the theoretical 
argument against an immigration regime change actually is. This kind of analysis is 
particularly relevant in light of the burgeoning literature on social capital, whieh was 
accompanied by an increase in the number of studies into social trust, as 1 will 
summarize below. Such socio-political findings on trust, however, often seem 
disconnected from political theoretical writing (see Warren 1999 for a similar complaint) 
even though they have a fundamental impact on theorizing social trust. Recently, several 
studies have taken up the challenge to examine possible links between social trust that is 
expressed in support for the welfare state, and multicultural polities (e.g. Banting et al, 
forthcoming; Banting and Kymlicka 2004; Crepaz, forthcoming), or between ethnie ties 
and trust (e.g. Marshall and Stolle 2004; Soroka et al, 2004; Uslaner and Conley 2003). 
These studies support the assumption that social trust plays a vital role in support for 
social welfare programs and they indicate, as 1 will discuss further along, that ethno-
cultural identity does indeed affect what 1 will refer to as interpersonal trust. The 
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interesting disconnection, however, is that ethnic pluralism does not seem to pose an 
insurmountable obstacle to raising support for the welfare state, or so 1 interpret studies 
about Canada, which can be classified as high on the ethnic diversity index. Judging 
from the Canadian case, something other than the interpersonal kind of trust must be at 
play in ethnically diverse countries that maintain broad popular support for their welfare 
state policies. 1 therefore ask what kind of trust we need to stimulate and sustain in order 
to facilitate collective action, as it is needed to implement measures of the welfare state. 
If the studies on Canada are taken as a guideline, 1 hypothesize that it is less a question of 
instilling interpersonal trust - since this is dependent on ethnicity - but rather one of 
institutional trust in the workings of those state institutions meant to preserve and protect 
the social welfare state. In distinction to the particularized feelings of interpersonal trust, 
what we need is what Luhman has termed a more general stance of "confidence" in the 
system (see section 2, below). 
To make sense of discussions about trust, 1 will offer a c1ear definition of the 
concept. 1 do so through an overview of the literature on trust (section 2), followed by an 
analysis of David Miller' s take on trust (section 3). 1 will then provide a definition of the 
kind of social trust needed to support the social welfare state, i.e. institutional trust 
(section 4). 1 will follow this with an exploration and analysis of the Canadian case study 
which, to my mind, supports my argument that with the help of "just institutions" 
(Rothstein), social trust as it is required to support and sustain the social welfare state can 
be instilled (section 5). 
If successful in synthesizing the different strands of this chapter, 1 will be able to 
raise doubts over the argument as it is made by those espousing the social solidarity 
caveat. If institutional trust is accepted as the social condition for effective collective 
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action, then the creation and maintenance of the conditions of a functioning social 
welfare are a matter of effective institutional design and implementation rather than 
something tied to the demographic make-up of the polity. In other words, if there are 
ways to stimulate and instill the trust necessary for the support and upkeep of the social 
welfare state "from above" as it were, by having just institutions, then the argument that 
more ethnie pluralism in the wake of redistributive immigration policies might jeopardize 
social trust and social solidarity does not hold. And if this is the case, the concern for 
social solidarity can be diffused, and objections to redistributive immigration as an 
impediment to social trust can be refuted. 
2 Trust, Confidence and Social Co-operation 
Trust is important, and for different reasons. On a very fundamentallevel, trust is 
necessary for most actions we perform in daily life, for most interaction we have with 
others, or even for getting up in the morning. 122 We trust that drivers know how to 
maneuver their vehicles, rather than sweeping us off our feet while walking on the 
sidewalks. We trust that bus-drivers, plumbers and doctors have the professional 
qualifications to perform their jobs appropriately.123 From a different perspective, we 
trust that plumbers (or doctors, or bus-drivers) have no intention or motivation to harm us 
by abusing our trust, by willfully doing a shady job with our plumbing, for example (see 
Baier 1986). 
122 "With a complete absence of trust, one must be catatonie, one could not even get up in the morning" 
(Hardin 1993: 516). 
123 Therefore, it is newsworthy, for example, if somebody has performed operations or dentistry without 
having the necessary medical training. On a second order, or so this implies, we also trust that the training 
people receive would qualify them to carry out such procedures. 
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We also trust in people more specifically, that individu aIs will live up to the roI es 
they play in our lives: we trust parents to work for the benefit and interests of their 
children, we assume partners and friends will not betray the trust we put into them by 
endowing them with su ch special significance, by singling them out as partners and 
friends. And there is a socially sanctioned sense that 1 am wronged if, say, my partner 
betrays the trust put into him by plotting against me in order to be able to share his life 
with somebody else. 124 When examining the nature of the betrayal of trust, Russell 
Hardin suggests that we draw a distinction between the trust we put into others, on the 
one hand, and others actually being trustworthy in the sense of living up to the trust we 
have put into them. We should talk about trustworthiness rather than trust since only the 
former may be morally betrayed, while trust itself cannot be betrayed, or so Hardin 
believes (Hardin 1996: 28). Or, to put this into the context of the example of my 
plumber, "offering a contract is a matter of trust, and performing it, a matter of 
trustworthiness" (Bohnet, et al. 2001: 131). The same distinction should apply to the trust 
we put into institutions of the government (see Hardin 2002: Ch. 7). 
What, then, does it actually mean to trust? To Hardin's mind, trust is simply an 
expectation regarding the behavior of others, while trustworthiness is a conception of 
others as to be counted on and to act in our interest (see Hardin 1996; 2001: 16ff; 2002: 
passim). Furthermore, to trust can be refined as having a rational expectation of 
another's behavior, as a "reliance on role performance" (Seligman 1997: 25) that is 
warranted in the absence of any pressing and rationally comprehensible reasons not to 
perforrn a specific role. It is, for example, unlikely that 1 wou Id understand my plumber 
124 To what extent conjugal trust is sanctioned as a social norm can be gleaned from the fact that betrayal 
is such a recurring theme in big Hollywood movie productions, with the betrayer being cast in the role of 
the evildoer. 
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to have betrayed my trust if 1 asked her to fix my car. Assume she takes pit y on my 
mechanical ignorance and tries to help out, yet my car breaks down, again, during my 
next outing. Since her role and her credentials are not those of a mechanic, 1 cannot daim 
that she was not trustworthy. 1 will return to this link between role expectation and our 
assessment of trustworthiness in my analysis of the conditions of institutional trust. 
Accordingly, one way of framing the act of trusting is to say, with Hardin, that 
we engage in a rational exercise in which we assume something or somebody to perform 
a role that is socially contingent, clearly defined and which suggests sorne kind of 
behavior that is reasonable to expect. 125 This, we could say, constitutes the part of 
trusting that is tied to our shared social context. We formulate our expectations of other' s 
behavior along the lines of what we think we can reasonably expect them to do based on 
social standards and roles. But what is the personal, psychological component of trust? 1 
follow the argument that the basic action of "trusting" - what we actually do when 
extending our trust - can be distilled to mean that we "bet about the future contingent 
actions of others" (Szompka 1998: 25, my emphasis). In the case of institutional trust, for 
example, we could say that 1 bet on the person in charge acting according to the rules and 
the laws of the institution in which she works and which she represents, that she will be 
125 But see Uslaner (2002) and Hollis (1998) for a critical stance on construing trust as a rational 
enterprise. Their critique is, while quite diverse, worth mentioning at this point. HoUis argues that to 
conceive of trust as solely a rational exercise will only provide sub-optimal conditions for collective action. 
He therefore holds that, rationally speaking, the action of trust should not be conceived entirely in rational 
terms. Uslaner, on the other hand, argues that trust - while to sorne extent learned and hence essentially 
rational - will nevertheless rely on a host of other factors, like levels of education, or age, for example. 
Hence he believes that to construe it in rational terms is somewhat unhelpful when thinking about the 
social conditions of trust. 1 will return to a discussion of Uslaner further along. Hollis' point, on the other 
hand, may be weIl taken - but not, it seems to me, relevant to my project. Whether or not rational 
expectations about another's behavior do provide us with sub-optimal results does not challenge the fact 
that in a social context of strangers, most people will take decisions on whether or not to trust others based 
on what they think they know about the odds of having their expectations fulfilled. Put differently, we do 
not get sub-optimal results because we decide whether or not to trust based on rational consideration, but 
rather, we get sub-optimal results because of the nature of trust, which implies "not knowing" or a sub-
optimallevel of information about others, as 1 will explain just below. 
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impartial, say, and give my demands an honest hearing unless sorne other form of 
behavior can be reasonably expected. Regardless of the addressee of our trust, then, and 
regardless of the social denominators that may determine our expectations, the attitudinal 
and psychological component of trust is characterized by the fact that 1 simply have no 
way of knowing whether or not my plumber will act in a way 1 think appropriate for her 
to act qua plumber; instead, 1 behave as though 1 knew, "as though the future were 
certain" (Luhmann 1979: 10). 
Because of this assumed certainty, Luhmann also speaks of everyday situations in 
which we rely on instances of "confidence" rather than trust. Confidence is what gets me 
up in the moming, a set of expectations about the sequence of events during the day. Part 
of these expectations is the assumption that nothing out of the ordinary, or unusual, 
terrible or harmful will happen, and that things will work out the way 1 anticipate 
(Luhmann 1988: 97). Confidence, to provide further context, is tied to situations of 
"familiarity," to settings that 1 know intimately enough to make me comfortable and 
which make it reasonable to believe that 1 may know what to expect (Luhmann 1988). 
Trust, on the other hand, relates to situations in which there is a considerable risk 
involved in our expecting others to behave in a certain way because our trustees just 
might not behave the way we anticipated (see also Seligman, 1997: 21f). An example 
may help to clarify this: we require trust rather than confidence wh en "entrusting" our 
child to the baby-sitter or the nursery staff because of the risk that she will not be 
properly looked after and might potentially come to harm. Boarding a bus in the 
moming, on the other hand, requires confidence rather than trust. To be sure, the driver 
of the bus may decide to take a different route to his final destination. While this may 
inconvenience those passengers wanting to get off at stops on the way of the original 
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route, 1 believe we would be hard pressed to call this a serious risk. We could say that it 
might harm their interests to get to their destination as quickly as possible. However, 
such a scenario is not one that leads us to reconsider our options very carefully every 
morning before taking the bus. 1 might reconsider leaving my child at the nursery, 
though, whenever 1 see a child being injured at nursery.126 It is the latter sense of harm 
that constitutes a risk, and which 1 take Luhmann and Seligmann to have in mind as 
requiring trust, rather than confidence, in another' s behavior rather. 127 
Consistently fulfilled trust can lead to a setting of confidence. If, for example, 1 
come to believe that the electoral trust 1 put into my political representatives is honored 
and that they live up to their campaign promises, 1 may slowly find myself with 
confidence in the political system, as one in which campaign promises are kept. 1 may 
then conclude that 1 can be confident that my interests are weIl represented (Luhmann 
1988: 98). This step in Luhmann's argument is important: if we can envisage a 
translation of one set of fulfilled trust into something broader, that the trust 1 put into my 
political representatives can merge into or lead to social or institutional trust - in the 
proper functioning of our representative institutions, say - then we can understand 
Luhmann' s concept of confidence to refer to a sense of generalized social trust. In this 
sense, 1 will use generalized trust and confidence interchangeably. Put differently, 1 
propose that a sense of socio-political confidence can be understood as implying that we 
believe that certain principles apply to the public sphere, and that they are in fact 
126 This is in line with Luhman's distinction: 
If you do not consider alternatives (every morning you leave the house without a weapon!) you 
are in a situation of confidence. If you choose one option in preference to others in spite of the 
possibility of being disappointed by the actions of others, you define the situation as one of trust. 
(Luhmann 1988: 97) 
127 We can, of course, avoid taking the risk of having somebody betraying their trust, "but only if [we] are 
willing to waive the associated advantages" (Luhmann 1988: 97), like being able to go to work in the 
morning, rather than staying at home to baby-sit. 
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observed. For example, 1 expect that the mIe of law is observed - 1 go out of the house 
tmsting that 1 will not be picked up by the police and incarcerated on bogus charges - or 
that civilliberties like freedom of opinion and freedom of speech are implemented and 
thus protected - 1 will not be arrested simply for complaining to my colleagues about the 
latest govemment policy fado Or, to retum to the institutions of social welfare, 1 may 
have the confidence that my case will be assessed based on my needs rather than depend 
on whether 1 am able to please and endear myself to an individu al social worker on 
who se decision will depend how much social assistance 1 will receive. 
To be sure, these expectations vary according to the societies in which we live. 
The citizens of certain countries, for example, might not be so confident about their 
welfare benefits or perhaps their sense of entitlement varies from ours. In this sense, it 
may be that what we need in order to develop a sense of confidence depends on our sense 
of what is socially just. 1 have, to recall earlier chapters, supported a concept of social 
justice that subscribes to principles of redistribution. 1 have supported this stance with a 
liberal-egalitarian account of individu al autonomy and of the conditions and social goods 
individuals need in order to live autonomous lives. According to my account of social 
justice, then, certain modes of behavior from our political representatives will instill 
confidence - if, for example, they observe the mIe of law and principles of impartiality -
while others, which might instill confidence in other societies, will not. 128 If 1 am lucky 
enough to live in one of the liberal-democratic welfare states, such will be the kinds of 
128 Being influenced by my concept of social justice, 1 would not develop a trusting relationship to a tribal 
eider or leader who organizes access to social goods according to degree of family relation, for example. 1 
would not think such behavior trust inducing. In this sense, our concept of what is trust-worthy behavior is 
intimately tied to our concept of social justice. 
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expectations 1 will harbor, and the kinds of roles 1 expect the institutions of the state to 
fulfill. 
Conversely, if we are continuously disappointed in our confident attitude, we may 
find ourselves reverting to a different stance, to one of lowered expectations in the 
poli tic al system. We might revert to a setting in which we would suffer less from our 
unfulfilled trust. This is important in the socio-political context, or so it seems to me: if 
our "betting on the contingent actions of others" proves unwarranted, we are not 
restricted to a state of remaining in bed catatonie, but rather, we rearrange ourselves 
based on the newly gained knowledge that man y political promises are not necessarily 
fulfilled, to remain within Luhmann's example. We may become cynical about the 
poli tic al process, and we may decide to forego our franchise. Decreasing social trust in 
the political system, though, is not tantamount to a decrease of trust in other individuals, 
su ch as our neighbor, doctor or plumberl29 - partly, of course, because this would imply 
that at least the social part of our lives would come to a standstill. Since this is hardly 
possible, we arrange ourselves differently - either by having lower expectations of 
people or the political system. In the political context, it is important to note then that the 
opposite of trust, or the stance we take in the absence of trust, is not necessarily one of 
distrust or, in Baier's words, "anti-trust" but simply the absence of trust130 that may make 
us take refuge in the things we know and believe to be able to gauge more adequately 
and thus successfully. 
129 And conversely, just because we have a high level of interpersonal or particularized trust does not 
imply that it will be paired with a high level of social or political trust, as 1 will explain further below. This 
hypothesis is supported by Inglehardt' s analysis of different levels of trust around the world, particularly 
his findings on China. Even though political corruption is endemic among Chinese politicians and officiaIs 
on allievels, China exhibits a very high level of interpersonal trust (see Inglehardt 1999: 9lff/n. 103 on 
China). 
130 This is a point underscored by Hardin (1992: 154). 
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The distinction between absence of trust and distrust is worth underlining. 
Absence of trust do es not invite trusting behavior towards others or the political system, 
while distrust will make us more vigilant, as it were, against abuses of trust. In fact, 
"'distrust' iS ... the attitude in which the cognitive assumptions are continuously tested 
and scrutinized which regulate the allocation oftrust" (Offe 1999: 76). In this sense, 
public dis trust is actually a very important feature of democratic government since it will 
lead to the necessary checks on democratic institutions by those of civil society like 
"investigative journalism, public hearings, or campaigns of opposition parties and 
movements" (Offe 1999: 76). Distrust mobilizes citizens in a political sense, while the 
absence of trust will not necessarily do so. Instead, if citizens do not trust in the system, 
they may simply refuse to participate in - or, in extreme cases, comply with the rules of-
a political system which they see as unworthy of their trust. 
To illustrate, we can refer to a comparison between Sweden and Russia. Bo 
Rothstein describes a visit he made to Russia, du ring which he was asked by a high-
ranking Russian tax official about the behavior of Swedish taxpayers. In Sweden, 98% of 
taxpayers pay up to 57% of their salary to support what they seem to perceive as the 
successful administration of their tax-contributions by the Swedish tax-authorities and, in 
more general terms, the Swedish administration. In contrast, Rothstein's Russian 
interlocutor related that only 26% of Russians paid their taxes, a behavior that prevailed 
despite the fact that Russians cherished the services that the monies wou Id support 
(Roth stein 2000: 477). Unfortunately, though, the majority of Russians did not believe 
that others would do the same, that others would also live up to their tax duties and pay 
their taxes. Second, the delinquent Russian taxpayers did not believe that tax-money 
would actually be channeled into the programs and services that should receive funds but 
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,r---.. that it would instead stuff the pockets of corrupt Russian tax officiaIs. Rothstein 
concludes that "in both cases, trust in others was in short supply" (Rothstein 2000: 478, 
emphasis in original) yet it was not necessarily a healthy dose of constructive distrust 
that was prevalent. In a case of distrust, one could imagine popular protests of the kind 
we witnessed after the Ukrainian elections in 2004, a popular movement that was to a 
large degree bred by the popular disillusionment with corrupt state officiaIs. And while it 
would be difficult to assess whether or not the suspiciousness of the Russian taxpayers is 
actually warranted, 1 would venture that one explanation for the divergent behavioral 
patters is that, so far, Swedes have found their expectations about what should happen 
with their taxes fulfilled, while Russians have not. 
Rothstein's recollections illustrate the consequences of losing what 1 have 
described as confidence in the system, or institutional trust. In fact, Sissela Bok goes so 
far as to say that societies collapse without trust (Bok 1999: 28) and we may speculate as 
to what extent Russian society may be collapsing, if our definition of society 
encompasses ideas of social solidarity and duties towards each other. Rothstein's 
example shows how important it is for the working of societies and, in particular, the 
working of the social welfare state, to have an adequate level of social trust, since only 
such confidence in the political system will enable social co-operation. In this vein, the 
ex ample of the Russian taxpayers also highlights a problem greater than the one currently 
faced by the Russian tax authorities: namely, what to do once confidence is lost and how 
to re-kindle confidence in the system. The vital question, in other words, is how to 
stimulate and to sustain trust. How could we imagine Russian citizens coming to trust the 
state to the point of faithfully paying their taxes? What is the source of social trust? It is 
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to these questions 1 will now turn, before re-examining the links between social trust and 
social cooperation. 
As far as 1 understand the big divide in the literature on the sources of social trust, 
we can distinguish three distinct schools of thought. First, there are those who argue that 
formaI and informaI ways of socializing between people stimulate trust. For Robert 
Putnam, most notabIy, social capital is directly constituted by "social connections and the 
attendant norms and trust" arising from sociallife (Putnam 1995: 665f). Most 
prominently promoted in Making Democracy Work (Putnam 1993), Putnam's 
assumption is that we willlearn to trust through interaction in civic and voluntary 
associations we choose to join, in which we will get to know people and they will get to 
know us (Putnam 1993: 171-174). Putnam, in fact, refers to the relationship between 
trust and participation as a "virtuous circle" that will perpetuate itself (ibid). 
A number of authors in the field of social capital, however, have expressed 
doubts about the trust-generating properties of voluntary associations. This group 
constitutes the second school of thought on social trust. Both Uslaner and Stolle have 
argued, for example, that voluntary associations do not occur easily across ethnie lines. 
Instead, they hold that the associations which do occur show that those who associate 
will do so with their own "kind", as it were (Stolle 2001; Uslaner 2002: Ch. 2). Civic and 
voluntary associations, then, only stimulate trust in people like me, but not in people who 
are very different from me or in all members of society. To substantiate these findings, 
Uslaner and ConIe y have shown that many Chinese immigrants in the US are more likely 
to associate with members of their own ethnic group than with non-Chinese/ Asian-
Americans (Uslaner and Conley 2003). Similarly, in a case study evaluating trust among 
mixed racial neighborhoods in Detroit, Marshall and Stolle found that sharing a 
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neighborhood with Black Americans did nothing to increase the trust white residents put 
in their Black neighbors, or Black Americans in more general terms. The opposite seems 
to have been the case, so that stereotypes about African-American behavior were in fact 
reinforced (Marshall and Stolle 2004). Such findings support Stolle's daim that trust in 
others will precede civic engagement rather than result from associationallife (Stolle 
1998). 
The extent to which associationallife can be assumed to produce the kind of 
social trust needed to buttress social solidarity is also questioned by Rosenblum in her 
analysis of membership in voluntary associations su ch as religious and para-military 
ones. Rosenblum makes a very compelling argument that membership in at least sorne 
associations does not further an overall sense of trust in and solidarity with others - in 
fact, they may be detrimental to and prevent su ch feelings (Rosenblum 1998). 
Participation in civic associations and the social norms that are bred by them - Putnam 
singles out those of reciprocity and trust among their membership - do not necessarily 
translate into a generalized sense of social trust conducive to collective action. As Cohen 
wonders: 
Why does the willingness to act together for mutual benefit in a small group su ch 
as a choral society translate into willingness to act for the common good or to 
become politically engaged at all? Indeed, is the interpersonal trust generated in 
face-ta face interactions the same thing as 'generalized' trust? (Cohen 1999: 220, 
emphasis in original) 
Cohen acknowledges that interpersonal trust may be raised in voluntary 
associations, but sheds doubt on the assumption that this is the same kind of trust we 
need in order to support, say, contributions to the welfare state. This raises the question 
of what kind of trust we are hoping to stimulate or, put differently, what kind we would 
need in order to foster social solidarity and thus support the welfare state. Supporters of 
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this second school of thought on social trust seem to believe that the trust needed to 
support the welfare state can be derived from a general confidence in the administrative 
process and a well-functioning government (e.g. Cohen 1999; Rothstein 1998; Stolle 
2001a; Warren 1999). 1 will further elaborate on this position in section 4. 
Finally, 1 believe that we can find a third school of thought about the sources of 
social trust in the writings of those who formulate constitutive links between a shared 
ethno-cultural identity and a prevailing sense of social trust. Because of the asserted ties 
between social trust and shared cultural background, this third approach poses the most 
serious challenge to redistributive immigration schemes that might bring about ethno-
cultural pluralism in a host community. This diversity, it is believed, will undermine 
social trust and the social capacity to collective action. 1 will explain and analyze this 
position in the next section in sorne detail. 1 will argue that while in line with sorne of the 
findings about people's preferences "for their own kind" when asked to extend 
interpersonal trust, this approach to social trust neglects the arguments of those, like 
Cohen, who make distinctions between different kinds of trust. This li ne of argument on 
the sources of social trust, 1 contend, fails to distinguish between the kind of trust 
required to support a social welfare state, what 1 call institutional trust, and the kind that 
is not necessary, namely interpersonal trust. 
3 Social Solidarity, Social Trust, and Shared Cultural Identity 
For sorne, the only chance for cornrnunities to develop a sense of trust capable of 
buttressing collective action and bringing about a functioning social welfare state -
which, in turn, supports and perpetuates social trust - is through belonging to a shared 
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cultural identity (Barry 2001, 1989; Fukuyama 1995; Miller 1995, see aIso my Chapter 
Three). Social trust then seems a by-product of an active cultural community: 
If we believe in social justice and are concerned about winning democratic 
support for socially just policies, then we must pay attention to the conditions 
under which different groups will trust one another .... Trust requires solidarity 
not merely within groups but across them, and this in turn depends upon a 
common identification that natianality alane can provide. 131 (Miller 1995: 140, 
my emphasis) 
We could call this Miller' s own version of Putnam' s "virtuous circle," in that a shared 
national identity brings about trust and solidarity which, in turn, is expected to enhance 
feelings of national identity and belonging. This interpretation of the source of trust is 
shared by Francis Fukuyama (1995) to name but one of the most prominent authors on 
the subject.132 According to this interpretation, trust is a by-product of historical 
collective interaction and of a collective memory, which is most effectively sustained by 
and re-enforced by national communities. 1 have explained Miller' s reservations against 
multiculturaI policies in this respect (see Chapter Three, section 2). To Miller's mind, 
multicultural accommodation of ethno-cultural groups might hamper social justice, either 
because too many diverse ethnic groups in a society might be unable to agree on the 
shared goals of principles of social justice or because different ethno-cultural groups 
might apply principles of social justice only towards their own members. 
131 1 will treat a shared nationality, as Miller has it, synonymously with a shared cultural identity. As 1 
explained in Chapter Two, nationality in Miller' suse describes a community of people bound together by 
history, language, culture and, usually, territory. Nationality is thus often tied to ethnicity and a shared 
cultural background (Miller 1995: 25). 
132 Jean Cohen provides a detailed discussion of this school which she characterizes as neo-conservative in 
the wake of communitarian beliefs, and among whom she situates au th ors like Fukuyama and Bellah 
(Cohen 1999). 1 agree with her assessment of the authors she discusses and 1 think it wou Id be easy to 
classify Fukuyama as a neo-conservative. 1 hasten to add a note of clarification at this point: to be sure, 
Barry and Miller are far from being ideologically close to Fukuyama's neo-conservative take on 
economics, and 1 am equally far from suggesting so. As 1 reiterated, both Miller and Barry are concemed 
with social justice and the underlining conditions because of their liberal egalitarian convictions and 
perspectives, rather than conservative ones. Both authors, though, seem to share the foundational beliefs 
about sources of trust with some conservative communitarians, like Fukuyama, and it is only in this respect 
that 1 suggest kinship between the two sets of authors. 
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Because of the role a shared national identity plays in his characterization of the 
conditions for social trust, sorne have understood Miller to be arguing that the ideal 
community for implementing a social welfare state must be ethnically homogenous (see 
Soroka et al 2004: 34). And while 1 have given Miller's ethno- pluralist credentials more 
credit because he accepts that individuals may subscribe and celebrate private "ethnic 
subcultures" and that the shared public culture which is at the basis of the shared national 
identity should be open and accommodating to aIl members of the community, such a 
reading of his ideas may be legitimate, as 1 have elaborated in Chapter Three. 
If 1 understand Miller's argument correctly, he postulates a three-step-argument 
to substantiate his daim that there is a link between a shared cultural identity and social 
trust. First, he holds that social trust is important for collective action in a general sense; 
second, Miller daims that collective action is necessary if we aim to achieve social 
justice through means of the social welfare state; and, finally, that the kind of trust we 
need to sustain a social welfare state is tied to sharing a cultural identity. As 1 will 
explain in the pages that follow, while 1 believe there to be good reasons to subscribe to 
the first two daims, it seems to me that a doser look at the daim connecting social trust 
and shared cultural identity is warranted. 
Miller' s account of the connection between social solidarity and social trust 
indudes two different conceptual points of departure. In the first instance, Miller seems 
to say that solidarity requires trust (Miller 1995: 90ff). As 1 have explained earlier, we 
can conceive of social solidarity as an ideal stance, in which members of a community 
consider themselves interdependent, understanding their own fate to be "bound up with 
the community" (Miller 1995: 67), and as having rights and incurring duties towards 
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each other. For Miller, this ideal is tied to problems of collective action. Collective 
action, in turn, requires a healthy portion of social trust: 
Much state activity involves the furthering of goals that cannot be achieved 
without the voluntary co-operation of citizens. For this activity to be successful 
the citizens must trust the state, and they must trust one another to comply with 
what the state demands of them. [ ... ] Since adhering to the rules the state 
proposes will usually have costs, each person must be confident that the others 
will generally comply - and this involves mutual trust. (Miller 1995: 90f) 
In order for the state to be able to implement policies of social justice, members of the 
community need to be able to trust that others will be equally taxed and that they will 
comply with the taxation laws. So, if solidarity requires trust, we cou Id say that we need 
to trust each other before we can actually have any feelings of interdependence, or before 
we accept having duties towards each other. Miller also accepts the reverse dependency 
in his second point of departure, though, wh en he daims that "trust requires solidarity" 
(Miller 1995: 140, my emphasis; see also Miller 1988; 1989: Ch. 9). We could thus 
summarize, following this second point, that only once members of a community have a 
sense of interdependence - or, solidarity - will they trust each other. Both ways of 
conceptualizing trust seem to confront us with a problem of sequence, which derives 
from a certain circularity between the concept of trust and its ties to social solidarity: 
trust is sometimes conceptualized asflowing from solidarity, and at other times as being 
a prerequisite of solidarity. This kind of circularity is often found in writings about trust 
(see Misztal 1996: 8 for a similar charge) and those on social capital. As 1 explained 
previously, the question of sequence seems to pit those who believe that social 
interaction leads to trusting relationships and increased social capital (see Putnam 1993) 
against those who believe that only because people already trust one another will they 
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choose to participate in civil society and thus enhance social capital (see Stolle 1998; 
Uslaner 2002). 
This brings us back to the question of the possible sources of trust, what 1 have 
isolated above as the third step in Miller's argument. To Miller, the problem of sourcing 
and sustaining trust is solved through reliance on a common national community.133 To 
recall, Miller advocates a common nationality as a pre-requisite for a successful social 
welfare state (cf. Chapter Two) for reasons that are now evident, namely because of the 
assumed interdependence between a shared national community, social solidarity and 
social trust. And it is because of this interdependence that the social trust component of 
the social solidarity caveat could challenge redistributive immigration policies. Only if 
this last assumed link between shared national identity, social trust and social solidarity 
were convincing would the social solidarity caveat against redistributive immigration 
policies be plausible. What, then, is the evidence for the daim linking a shared cultural 
identity to the kind of trust a functioning social welfare state requires? 
1 agree that several studies, such as Uslaner and Conley's on Chinese-Americans 
mentioned above (Uslaner and Conley 2003), seem to substantiate the link between 
shared ethno-cultural identity and trust. Soroka et al. also show that ethnicity plays an 
important role when determining to what extent people trust others (Soroka et al. 2004: 
40ff). When asked whether individuals believe that a lost wallet would be returned intact, 
and checking their findings against demographic specifics - i.e. investigating people's 
feelings about whether, in their neighborhood, a wallet would be returned - the authors 
133 Furthermore, relying on a shared national identity as a pre-requisite, as it were, for both social trust and 
social solidarity, this account also relieves its proponent of an analysis of (and of having to take a decision 
on) the problem of sequence as just described. If a shared national identity is given and promoted, feelings 
of interdependence are assured since this is part and parcel of the definition of sharing in a national 
identity, as 1 explained. 
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concIude that ethnic diversity does affect interpersonal trust. When it cornes to questions 
of interpersonal trust, most people seem to trust members of their ethnic group more than 
the y do others. In the absence of racist motives for su ch a stance, these findings seem 
puzzling at first, or so 1 would argue, since many members of my ethno-cultural group -
aIl members of the British National Party, for example - wou Id not instill me with a lot 
of interpersonal trust. Why would interpersonal trust be highly influenced by sharing 
ethno-cultural characteristics? 
One explanation provided by Fukuyama ho Ids that trust cornes easier among 
those sharing an ethno-cultural identity because of links between ethnic identity and 
cultural customs. Fukuyama construes trust as being an "inherited ethical habit" 
(Fukuyama 1995: 34) that is "primarily cultural in nature," an inclination towards each 
other which we have inherited from "pre-existing communities of shared moral norms 
and values" (Fukuyama 1995: 336). To phrase this differently, we trust members of our 
ethno-cultural group more easily because we know what to expect from them. We share 
the cultural tools, as it were, with which we can read and understand our interlocutors' 
actions, as weIl as predict their future behavior (or at least what would be considered 
their moral and ethical behavior). It is important to remember at this point the definition 1 
adopted earlier for the personal, psychological component of trusting, namely that to trust 
is "to bet on" another' s contingent behavior. In light of Fukuyama' s definition, we could 
say that sharing a culture gives us cIues about these contingencies and that having shared 
cultural backgrounds provides us with a sense of what we can expect to happen in the 
future. Moreover, it is perfectly plausible to say that in sharing a cultural context, it 
might be easier for us to understand our roles and the roles of others and, 
consequentiaIly, to have the appropriate kinds of expectations about people's role 
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fulfillment. To illustrate, we need only compare the different roles inhabited by eIders in 
different cultural contexts. While much of western culture worships youth rather than 
experience, eIders have roles of authority and council in many other cultures. Such 
customs might be hard for me to grasp, not having been brought up and immersed in 
such a culture. Similarly, because 1 have been brought up in a secularized version of a 
Christian culture, 1 may have certain ideas about the role of members of the clergy - that 
they mediate in disputes and work towards reconciliation, for ex ample - which 1 may not 
find represented by religious authorities in other faith groups. On a more abstract level, 
we can say that trust flourishes when we are in a situation of "familiarity," when we are 
"living in a system which is familiar [to us], and so requires no further information about 
it but tacitly pro vides an everyday basis for mu tuaI understanding" (Luhmann 1979: 37). 
To trust members of our ethno-cultural community, then, cornes easier than extending 
trust to members of other ethno-cultural communities. When it cornes to general 
questions of whom to trust, or whom we trust more, people of our ethno-cultural 
background fare better than those whose customs and codes we do not know. People's 
inclination to trust, we could say, depends on their knowledge, because this kind of 
knowledge reduces the risks inherent in any matter of trust. Note, then, that it is 
consistent for Miller to argue for a shared national identity as a source of trust since 
according to his definition, our national identity is the purveyor of both cultural norms 
and traditions on the one hand, and is part of our ethical make-up, on the other. 
There are, however, also studies that highlight that we need to make distinctions 
about the relevance of ethno-cultural identifiers. In sorne cases, whether we have a 
situation of trust cannot be determined exclusively with reference to a shared ethno-
cultural background. Another major factor in determining levels of trust is, for example, 
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level of education - with the principle ruling that the higher the level of education, the 
more trusting people will be (Uslaner 2002: Ch. 4). The level of education will also 
affect to the extent to which in-group parameters like shared race, ethnicity or religion 
play a more or less important role when determining whom to trust. Analyzing the 
dependencies between level of education and interracial trust for whites, for example, 
Oliver and Mendelberg found that whites with 9 years of schooling or Jess are more 
likely to develop a distrustful attitude towards Blacks and, more generally, suspicion of 
those outside their own group than those with higher levels of education (Oliver and 
Mendelberg 2000; see also Marshall and Stolle 2004: 142). A second important factor in 
developing a trusting attitude - arguably dependent on the previous one - is socio-
economic status. In fact, in their study of people's trust in local government, Rahn and 
Rudolf find that levels of socio-economic heterogeneity are far more significant in 
influencing personallevels of trust than other parameters like race (Rahn and Rudolf 
2002, see also Inglehardt 1999). As Uslaner puts it, it is easier to trust when one has 
more to fall back on (Uslaner 2002: 112ff). 
It seems, then, that we can draw three les sons from these recent studies into the 
variety of conditions of trust. The first is that we need to be careful when analyzing 
findings about trust and pay particular attention to the very specific questions and 
research objectives these studies pursue. This call for caution is well articulated and 
illustrated by Marshall and Stolle in their analysis of inter-racial trust in racially mixed 
neighborhoods: 
One problem has to be kept in mind, however, when using questions about 
generalized trust that inquire about trust in most people. Specifically, it cou Id 
certainly be the case that the expression "most people" has a different radius for 
blacks or whites or for people in various settings. Whereas whites might perceive 
most people to mean other whites, blacks might infer that most people stands for 
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other whites, so that true inclusion for out-groups are not fully captured for aU 
groups of people alike. No systematic research has been undertaken to examine 
this potentially confounding problem of the radius of trust, but we have to take 
this into account in our analyses. (Marshall and Stolle 2004: 141) 
Put differently, while researchers may have one intention and one potential contextual 
answer in mind when phrasing and designing research questions, it is ultimately 
impossible to anticipate people's take on certain questions. Individuals will interpret 
research questions according to their own horizons and expectations and it would be next 
to impossible to capture aIl the eventualities influencing individu al answers. This is not 
to say that attempts to measure attitudinal incentives are moot exercises; instead, it is 
meant to emphasize the need for contextualization of questions and answers. Political 
theorists, in other words, need to take the cautionary remarks about potential uses made 
by empiricist colleagues seriously wh en analyzing sets of data. 
The second les son we should draw, to recall Rothstein's tax-payer example, is 
that we need to consider the underlying expectations people have in determining whether 
or not to trust. For someone with a jaundiced view about the political process, for 
exampIe, it may be easy to "trust" her representative to perform his roIe, if that role 
description has already very minimal standards. In fact, 1 cou Id find myself pleasantly 
surprised. In contrast, if 1 subscribe to the high principles of the political process, 1 may 
find it very difficult to trust in the representative process and my representative because 
human fallibility may make it hard for my representative to fulfill my very high 
expectations. As 1 have argued above, the difference between having my expectations 
fulfilled or disappointed may determine whether 1 adopt an attitude of confidence 
towards others and towards the state or whether 1 consider social co-operation a risk and, 
instead, turn towards potential alternatives. For example, 1 could try to secure my welfare 
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independently, by putting my money in the bank rather than by paying taxes. While this 
may not be what Russia' s tax delinquents do, 1 assume it to be a rational consequence of 
not trusting that the state could raise enough tax funds to support a functioning state 
pension scheme. 
Taking into account individu al expectations is also how we can make sense of the 
findings in Marshall's and Stolle's study about trust in racially mixed neighborhoods in 
Detroit. Marshall and Stolle found that, in general, living in a racially mixed 
neighborhood increased interpersonal trust for black residents while it did less or nothing 
to increase that of whites (Marshall and Stolle 2004: 146). Taking into account aIl the 
contributing variables the authors provide134 would it be fair to assume that black 
residents were not only more willing to take the leap of faith to actuaIly trust but, 
furthermore, that their expectations of their white neighbor's trustworthiness were so low 
that they were indeed pleasantly surprised? Considering the fraught race relations in the 
US, the attitudinal point of departure for Black Americans might have been so sceptical 
or so unhopeful that a positive interpretation of their interactions with the white residents 
of their neighborhoods might have been an easy result. Melissa Williams has made a 
convincing theoretical argument detailing how memory influences our propensity to trust 
(Williams 1998) - an argument she employs to make a case for measures of political 
group representation for hitherto excluded members of society. If we agree that memory 
influences trust, then it seems to me that we should also consider to what extent 
134 Among these factors is Marshall and Stolle's observation that if white Americans live in mixed racial 
neighborhoods, they are more likely to also have a low socio-economic status and low levels of education. 
White residents in mixed racial neighborhoods, in other words, have liule access to the resources that 
increase the propensity to trust. This is not the same for Black Americans, who often live in mixed racial 
neighborhoods, irrespective of their socio-economic background or their level of education. 
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expectations and their fulfillment influences trust. 135 1 will retum to the role perceptions 
play in assessing the performance of state institutions and, in tum, the consequences 
these perceptions have on our levels of trust in these institutions below. 
The third lesson we can draw from these findings is of immediate importance for 
this project. If we read the se studies carefully, 1 would argue, we can see that they 
determine and evaluate not only different background conditions under which people will 
be more or less likely to trust. They also show the different kinds of trust people may or 
may not have - a factor that is important to consider when talking about social trust and 
its sources, as Cohen and Levi have pointed out in response to Putnam (Cohen 1999; 
Levi 1996). Building on their arguments as they pertain to my project, 1 would further 
argue that we also need to distinguish between different kinds of social trust. Not aU 
kinds of social trust are necessarily relevant for the support of a social welfare state. The 
studies of Banting et al. (forthcoming) and of Soroka et al. (2004), to illustrate, show that 
while ethnicity indeed affects social trust, ethnie diversity does not affect support of the 
social welfare state in Canada. In this vein, 1 will make the case for an independent 
analysis of institutional trust as supporting measures of the social welfare state in the 
following section. 1 will side and argue for "a cornrnon loyalty to a set of political 
institutions" (Miller 2004a: 29) as the necessary ingredient for the kind of social trust we 
need to support the social welfare state and hence goals of social justice. 
135 Memory may also be what is at work in the case of Russian taxpayers who may remember ail too weil 
the workings of the tax authorities during seven decades of communism, and the strong ties of elitist 
cliques that siphoned off money for their own purposes. 
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4 Social Welfare, Collective Action, and Institutional Trust 
To be in a position to assess possible sources of the kind of social trust that will 
help stimulate and buttress the social welfare state, we need to be clear about what we 
hope to gain from social trust. 1 want to investigate how social trust is to enable 
collective action, which is something that 1 believe, with Miller, we need to enable if we 
want to implement and sustain measures of social welfare. Miller, as 1 explained above, 
anticipates that the kind of state action required to implement policies of social welfare 
necessarily relies on cooperation from its citizens. For Miller, this cooperation will only 
come about if aIl can be as certain as possible that others will also cooperate. Otherwise, 
we would feel as though we shoulder the burden of cooperation, like the costs of 
taxation, for example, on our own (Miller 1995: 90t). Collective action thus requires a 
sense of reciprocity. Problems of collective action would be overcome if 1 trust the 
people around me to chip in equally, if 1 can trust that nobody will take what 1 would 
consider an unfair share and that no group of people will be given an unfair advantage 
(Miller 1989: 230ft). To put this otherwise, social trust depends on a sense of "ethical 
reciprocity", i.e. it depends on our belief that all subscribe to and act according to the 
"norm requiring that individuals in a given population cooperate with govemment 
demands but only as long as others are also contributing" (Levi 1997: 24). 
This seems like a plausible assumption. We need only think of the reasons the 
Russian tax clerk provided to explain why Russians did not pay their taxes, at least one 
of which referred to the suspicion that other Russians would not pay theirs. Similarly, we 
can read the study referred to earlier about immigrant tax contribution in the UK as 
measuring a sense of reciprocity. The underlying rationale for the study by the IPPR was 
to show that immigrants to the UK contribute as much, if not more, to the British welfare 
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state as they profit from it, implying that they fulfill "their share" of the burden that it is 
to support the welfare state. We could say that its authors' aim was to find out to what 
extent a sense of reciprocity reigns in the UK between British citizens contributing to the 
welfare state budget and their immigrant peers, with tax contributions acting as a 
measure of reciprocity. 
The assumption, however, that social trust depends on a sense of reciprocity does 
not seem to be the whole story, at least according to this example. If the logic of 
reciprocity as a foundation for social trust were correct, the findings would go hand in 
hand with a growing or increased level of social trust between members of the host 
community and newcomers. According to this logic, members of the host community 
should trust newcomers as long as the latter contribute to the social welfare state. If we 
were satisfied that reciprocity can sustain a functioning social welfare state, we could say 
that as long as the maths add up, i.e. as long as people contribute more or equally to 
others, and as much as they bene fit, then levels of social trust should be sufficient for 
effective collective action to be possible. The wanting levels of social trust between 
members of the host-community and immigrants in the British scenario do not reflect this 
paradigm, though.136 
To be sure, trust, as a concept built, at least in part, on norms of reciprocity is 
widespread in the social capitalliterature. As mentioned above, Putnam argues that we 
will establish ties of reciprocity in the course of interactions with others in civic 
136 At least this is how 1 would interpret the fact that the findings of this study were heralded as finally 
correcting sorne misguided assumptions about immigrants draining the British welfare system (see The 
Guardian 13th August, 2005). 
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associations, ties that will bridge over into generalized trust (Putnam 1993: 171-174).137 
And of course, Putnam could reply to my critical take on reciprocity as both a measure 
and as a foundation of social trust that this particular example does not satisfy aH of the 
conditions for social trust he establishes. He could say that his concept of social trust 
indudes two sources, but that in my example from the UK, only the norm of reciprocity 
would be fulfilled by compliance with tax law. The feature of civic life meant to 
stimulate trust - namely, that people from aIl spheres of society share in a network of 
civic associations - is not fulfilled in the British example, and indeed in many others. 
This may be, as 1 accepted earlier, due to individual or collective choices about with 
whom we choose to share in voluntary associations. Missing the second variable of 
Putnam's normative catalogue, sorne could convince themselves that Putnam would be 
right to question my choice of example. What 1 want to underline in response to such 
criticism, though, is that the fact that the second variable is missing undermines the 
argument that voluntary associations stimulate and foster social trust. If we choose with 
whom we associate, and if those authors are correct who argue that we will most likely 
associate with those to whom we feel akin already, then voluntary associations may be 
the icing on the cake, but it is implausible to make the daim that they are the basis of 
general, widespread social trust. To summarize, if norms of reciprocity in themselves are 
not sufficient to sustain social trust because reciprocity is hard to gauge, and if voluntary 
associations only foster particularized trust in those with whom we already share 
137 Putnam distinguishes between the "bonding" effect of voluntary associations that assumes the creation 
and fostering of interpersonal trust among members of voluntary associations, and the "bridging" effect of 
membership in voluntary associations that assumes a spill-over of the trusting relationship experienced in 
one association to the bigger society, hence generating generalized trust. 
197 
affinities, then the two norms supposedly sustaining social trust rest on shaky grounds. 
Arguments in this vein thus fail to con vince. 
Nevertheless, to approach my own definition of the kind of trust we need to 
buttress the workings of the social welfare state, Putnam' s and Miller' s arguments are 
worth exploring. Both arguments, to my mind, rely on a conception of the community 
and its virtues similar to the moral ideal of social solidarity discussed in Chapter Three. 
The concept of community underlying both Miller's and Putnam's arguments is premised 
on an ideal of social trust that aims to promote a certain idea of community. Since the se 
conceptions reveal what we hope social trust to achieve - namely, how social trust is 
supposed to enable collective action - they warrant theoretical contextualizing at this 
point. 
The historical genesis of Putnam' s argument (1995a; 2000) and that of 
Fukuyama, for example, is tied to a decline in social capital in the US and other Western 
industrialized nations (see Cohen 1999). Putnam and others attribute this decline of 
social capital to an increasing individualization of the public sphere in the decades after 
World War II; to the fact that women entered the workforce; and to the fact that we 
congregate less and less in voluntary associations outside of the family (Putnam 2000). 
Based on these facts of modem life, sorne authors deduct that our sense of social trust is 
diminishing: if social trust is built on interaction in voluntary associations, as in 
Putnam's argument, or if it is built on the fact that we share communal values, as in 
Fukuyama's, a decline of social trust seems aIl but inevitable. Such communitarian 
arguments seeking to establish a community and its values as worth protecting and 
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nurturing138, were soon countered by liberal authors who rejected the communitarian 
charge of liberalism as interested only in atomized individuals rather than in functioning 
communities. Sorne, like Kymlicka and Raz, have made arguments for the necessity of 
contexts of choice represented by viable cultural communities (Kymlicka 1989; Raz 
1986); others, like Macedo, have argued for 'liberal virtues' aimed at supporting the kind 
of collective context we need to be able to have, say, liberal democratic institutions in 
our communities (Macedo 1990). Indeed, many have contributed to the debate between 
communitarians and liberals and it now seems a battle mostly fought. 139 
Regardless of how we conceptualize the foundations of a viable community, what 
unites those writing about social cooperation, most importantly for the purposes of this 
project, seems to be that aIl postulate society to require a set of mIes according to which 
individuals interact with each other. While Fukuyama and, as 1 have argued, Miller 
suppose that this set of mIes emerges from a shared ethno-cultural background, dominant 
customs and traditions, others have supported the idea that these mIes can be sustained 
by the principles ofliberal citizenship (Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Macedo 1990; 
Patten 1999; Rawls 1999c). The authors of the first set imply that 1 will be motivated to 
comply with these mIes because of my ties to the community and its ethics, while the 
second set of authors stipulates that my compliance will be based on general principles of 
the political community. In Chapter Three, 1 have argued that this latter interpretation is 
more helpful when examining the solidaristic behavior of immigrants. To reiterate, 1 
138 See Cohen (1999) who argues for an understanding of Putnam' s work as framed and supported by 
communitarian poli tic al ideas. See also Levi (1996) for a critique of sorne of Putnam' s normative c1aims 
derived from communitarian values. This communitarian idea of the value of the community for 
community's sake stands in contrast to a liberal theory that defends the welfare of communities because of 
their value for their individual members (see Kymlicka 1989). 
139 In fact, sorne have understood "liberal nationalism" as the bridge between the two seemingly 
conflicting visions (see Kymlicka 1998) and we can read Miller's accounts of the ethics of nationality as an 
instance of the newly found consensus (see Miller 1995: Ch. 5). 
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construe the necessary public ethics supporting measures of the social welfare state as a 
prevailing civic morality that "entails obedience to the rules, and honest and responsible 
behavior" (Letki 2005: 2). What is important for the purposes of this project is therefore 
not how the need for civic morality is conceptualized, but the fact that it is. 1 have argued 
that employing the postulate of civic morality rests on two assumptions about the 
conditions of collective action. First, it stipulates a sense of our moral obligations and 
second, it accounts for Miller' s daim that we need sorne sense that makes it plausible to 
believe in the trustworthiness of others with whom we are to act collectively. Only if 
both conditions are met will effective collective action come about. 
With these background conditions in mind, 1 will now turn to the question of the 
basis of civic morality. To recall, 1 held that Putnam's idea of the virtuous cirde of civic 
association, participation, and social trust is not convincing as a foundation of civic 
morality. Putnam's work has, however, been the starting point for another way of 
conceptualizing social trust in the bigger context of social capital: while Putnam argues 
that social trust can be stimulated and fostered "from below," as it were, sorne have 
started to debate the potential to foster and sustain social trust from "above", i.e. through 
institutions of the state. Can "just" institutions with which individuals have to deal in 
every day circumstances bring about the kind of civic morality necessary to buttress 
support for policies of social welfare? ln the remainder of this chapter, 1 will explore and 
support arguments for the institutional stimulus of social trust. 1 will relate and 
contextualize arguments that tie a sense of civic morality to one of trust in institutions, 
hence supporting those who argue that a specific set of institutions can instill the social 
trust necessary for a prevailing sense of civic morality. 1 then dispute the counter-claim 
that trust in government and its institutions is implausible, a stance that 1 ground on my 
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original conceptualizations of what it means to trust. Using the logic of what 1 have 
called the psychological component of trust, 1 argue that trust in just institutions is in fact 
plausible. 
If sustainable, this argument is important for the purpose of this project, and for 
two reasons: as l discussed above, one argument sorne could make against redistributive 
immigration is that increased ethno-cultural diversity will jeopardize our sense of social 
trust and that hence the social welfare state as we know it may be challenged. l have 
related the findings of studies that seem to lend credence to su ch fears, based on the fact 
that most of us will find it easier to trust those we know and those who are like us. In 
ethno-cultural terms, l will more easily trust another person if she shares sorne of my 
ethnic characteristics. If interpersonal trust was a necessary ingredient for a sense of 
civic morality - for a sense of honesty and rule compliance, in other words - we could 
con vince ourselves that, based on what we know about interpersonal trust, a sense of 
civic morality would be jeopardized in a society with a high level of ethnic diversity. If, 
on the other hand, civic morality as the foundational element for collective action were 
based on or could be stimulated through something else, the ethno-cultural composition 
of our society rnight not play that big a role, if any at all, for the level of social 
cooperation needed in support of the social welfare state. If the argument for institutional 
trust as the central building block for civic morality is a convincing one, a constitutive 
part of the social solidarity caveat would have lost much of its normative clout against 
arguments for redistributive immigration policies. 
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4.1. Civic Morality and Institutional Trust 
Up until now, 1 have discussed work by authors for whom civic morality is what 
we could caU a dependent variable, i.e. something that is dependent on and 
conceptualized along the lines of interpersonal trust. Civic morality will then come about 
if we trust in individu ais - if others are trustworthy, trust can do aIl the things we hope it 
to achieve. Most notably for Illy project, it will support the collective action that we need 
to sustain the social welfare state. New research indicates, however, that civic morality 
should be conceptualized as independent of levels of interpersonal trust and, instead, as 
tied to levels of institutional trust. So what is the evidence we have to make the second 
daim rather than follow the first? 
Natalia Letki has proposed the hypothesis that civic morality depends on 
institutional, not on interpersonal trust. She sets out to test four core hypotheses that she 
gleans from a careful study of the prevailing arguments in social capitalliterature and 
which reiterate the issues 1 have addressed in the course of this chapter. She states these 
hypotheses as follows: 
1. Civic morality is positively related to perceptions of others' trustworthiness; 
2. Individual's level of confidence in political institutions positively influences their 
civic morality; 
3. Civic communities (i.e. communities rich in social capital) produce high levels of 
civic morality among citizens; 
4. Institutional configuration matters: democracy and econornic growth stimulate 
civic morality, while corruption hampers it. (Letki 2005: Il) 
ln order to verify these hypotheses, Letki analyses the findings of the World 
Value Survey (WVS), 1995-1997~ for 25 different countries,140 which she clusters into 
three groups (Latin America, established Western democracies, and post-Communist 
140 This is the same set of data that is at the basis of many if not most country and comparative studies 1 
refer to (cf. Inglehardt 1999; Uslaner 2002; Uslaner and Stolle 2003 and my own description of Canadian 
levels of trust, below). 
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countries). These clusters are characterized by shared geo-political features, and aIl 
clusters represent the full range of quality of national institutions. Quality, in this 
instance, depends on the transparency and stability of institutions. The assumption is that, 
within each duster, reigns a comparable level of institutional quality, socio-economic 
standard, and challenges to social trust, such as corruption, tax evasion and organized 
crime. In order to assess levels of civic morality, Letki examines individu al answers to 
questions aimed to gauge the acceptability of certain kinds of individu al behavior in 
public life. Respondents are asked whether or not it is acceptable to daim government 
benefits even when one is not entitled to, to use public transport without paying the fare, 
to cheat on tax payments, to buy stolen goods or to accept a bribe (Letki 2005: Table 1). 
Accepting a bribe is considered the least acceptable behavior, while taking public 
transport without paying is considered the least unacceptable or most acceptable. The 
answers to these questions, Letki posits, will obviously not provide an exact measure of 
actual behavior since, for example, 1 may find something not acceptable but nevertheless 
engage in such activities myself. Instead, Letki employs them as "measures of 
respondent's nonns of ci vic morality and responsible behavior" (Letki 2005: 13, my 
emphasis) and this usage seems justified. We have to find a way to evaluate people's 
beliefs about civic morality, and while any answer to morally charged survey questions 
ought to be taken with caution, the self-evaluation of respondents is one tool we should 
refer to, accompanied by more detached measures such as levels of tax compliance. 
Examining the clusters together, Letki finds a hierarchy among them, with post-
communist countries belonging to the dus ter that has the lowest average score on the 
civic morality scale, while Western democracies have the highest, with Latin American 
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countries somewhere in between. 141 Letki then sets out to test these findings about levels 
of civic morality against levels of trust in institutions defined, here, as trust in the legal 
system, the police, national government, political parties, parliament and civil services 
(Letki 2005: 15). Letki finds a correlation between levels of civic morality and levels of 
institutional trust in that Latin-American countries have the lowest level of institutional 
trust while Western democracies have the highest, with post-communist countries 
somewhere in between. Of course, as 1 pointed out above, levels of trust are generally 
influenced by different parameters of one's life, and levels of institutional trust are no 
exception. Letki hence expects levels of civic morality that are dependent on institutional 
trust to also be deterrnined by the same variables that trust in general is influenced by. 
And, indeed, parts of her findings reiterate earlier findings about the usual factors that 
influence individuallevels of trust. So for example can she establish dependencies 
between levels of civic morality and age: the older individual respondents are, the higher 
the likelihood for them to have a strong sense of civic morality. "Age" can, of course, 
hardly be dealt with through institutional adjustment or public policy. However, her 
second dependency, that of socio-economic status, should make policy-makers attentive: 
according to Letki, socio-economic security is next to age and religiosity the most 
powerful predictor of civic morality (Letki 2005: 22). The higher one's socio-economic 
status, she posits, the stronger one's sense of civic morality.142 
141 However, it should be noted here that there is a considerable range of diversion in between the 
countries of the individual clusters: Venezuela, Argentina and Uruguay, for example, score higher on the 
civic morality index than Brazil and Mexico (cf. Letki 2005: Figure 1). 
142 This part of her analysis poses yet another problem of sequence. According to Letki' s approach to 
social trust, governments will have to rely on a strong sense of civic morality to implement measures of the 
social welfare state. The latter's purpose is it to provide citizens with socio-economic security. The 
strongest sense of civic mindedness, however, prevails among those who are already socio-economically 
secure. This interdependence paints a grim picture for the prospects of social welfare in socio-
economically fledgling countries, or for those with stark socio-economic inequalities, like Russia. 
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The most surprising results in light of previous research and for the purposes of 
this project are tied to Letki's findings about the relationship between civic morality and 
interpersonal trust, compared to those about the ties between civic morality and 
institutional trust. First, Letki found no evidence for the hypothesis that civic morality is 
positively tied "to perceptions of others' trustworthiness" or interpersonal trust: "People 
who believe others to be trustworthy are not themselves more honest" (Letki 2005: 25). 
Instead, and secondly, Letki finds a strong correlation between transparent institutions 
and civic morality - a correlation summarized in hypothesis four. In order to have a sense 
of civic morality, then, it is not most important to trust others or to find them trustworthy. 
Rather, "civic morality strongly depends on [our] perceptions of institutions' 
trustworthiness" (ibid). It is trust in institutions that motivates and sustains a sense of 
civic morality. 
How should we interpret these results? To my mind, they suggest that if 1 believe 
the institutions of the state to be trustworthy, 1 will be most likely to abide by the law and 
do my share, as it were, for the upkeep of these institutions. If 1 believe in the 
trustworthiness of the Department of Revenue, say, 1 will be more likely to pay my taxes 
rather than put the money somewhere else. In this scenario, then, it is not the fact that 1 
trust other individuals specifically and personally that will make me co-operate in the 
collective project. Put differently, 1 do not need to know if the people in my 
neighborhood would behave in a trustworthy way towards me personally, if they would 
return my lost wallet. Rather, 1 need a sense that the Department of Revenue is able and 
effective in getting my neighbors and compatriots to pay their taxes. 1 need to be able to 
trust that my sense of civic morality is sanctioned and enforced by the institutions of the 
state in which 1 live, and with whose members 1 should cooperate towards a common 
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good. And, if 1 interpret Letki correctly, 1 will only have such a sense of living in "a 
culture of honesty and civic morality," if 1 live in astate with "stable and transparent 
institutions" (Letki 2005: 26). 
Letki's findings thus clearly support arguments that link institutions with a sense 
of civic morality, arguments that were suggested earlier by the conclusions Bo Rothstein 
drew from his study of the Swedish welfare state (Rothstein 1998). If institutions 
influence and deterrnine our sense of civic morality and, furthermore, if civic morality is 
needed in order to motivate successful collective action that can sustain a social welfare 
state - a connection 1 have accepted aIl along - then we can hail Letki's analysis as 
substantiating the hypothesis that social trust can be engineered from above, by designing 
. and implementing trustworthy institutions (see Rothstein 2003; see aiso Freitag 2006). 
Indeed, Letki's analysis goes further than the se latter studies, by making a convincing 
case for the universal relevance of just institutions, hence helping to generalize 
individual case studies, Iike Rothstein's arguments about the importance of just 
institutions in the administration of the Swedish welfare state and Freitag' s arguments 
about the role the Swiss consensual model of federal government institutions plays in 
generating social trust in Switzerland. We are then in a position, 1 believe, to maintain 
that, contrary to Putnam's beliefs, we can disentangle the "well-tossed spaghetti," as he 
describes the "causal arrows among civic involvement, reciprocity, honesty and social 
trust" (Putnam 2000: 137).1 posit that one causal arrow, and the one that 1 am most 
interested in here, has a very clear direction: it flows from a set of trustworthy 
institutions to a sense of civic morality, honesty and social trust. 
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4.2. Institutional Trust? 
While we may want to convince ourselves of the plausibility of Letki' s argument, 
sorne first order questions about her principles and approach have yet to be addressed. In 
the next step, therefore, 1 propose to discuss sorne of the arguments against an 
institutional approach to social trust and civic morality. To begin with, sorne authors find 
it hard to believe that we could trust institutions of the state. 1 will answer their 
reservations by taking a doser look at what kinds of institutions could achieve the goal of 
instilling civic morality. Letki summarizes the characteristics of such institutions as 
"stable and transparent," while Rothstein has described them as "just" (Roth stein 1998) 
and as "non-discriminatory, non-corrupt and impartial" (Roth stein 2003: 61). Both these 
conceptions of institutions and their effect on ci vic morality entail, of course, that we can 
in fact conceive of institutional trust. This is to say that if 1 live in a country with stable 
and transparent institutions, or non-corrupt, non-discriminatory, and impartial ones -
both sets of adjectives 1 employ interchangeably - 1 can convince myself to trust that 1 
will not have to shoulder an undue share of tax burdens and contributions, for example. 
Instead, 1 will trust that the individuals working in the institutions of the state see to it 
that aIl will carry their share and that nobody is unduly burdened. 143 This is how a sense 
of civic morality would come about, or so 1 understand Letki's argument. The causal 
relationship with social trust, however, is the point at which the institutional 
143 1 have intimated earlier that our conception of trustworthy institutions is intimately tied to our 
understanding of social justice (see Fn 128, above). We will only find those institutions trustworthy that 
promote and further the principles of social justice we subscribe to. In the context of this project, in the 
course of which 1 have advocated principles of social justice aiming to promote conditions of individual 
autonomy, 1 believe it convincing to say that we would only find those institutions trustworthy that most 
minimally comply with the principles Rothstein proposes. Just institutions, put differently, will be those 
which support individual autonomy by not discriminating towards individuals arbitrarily, but which 
administer access to social goods in a fair and transparent way. In this sense, 1 posit that my sense of what 
just institutions are relies on the principles of the liberal democratic state, and on Rawls' concept of social 
justice. 
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understanding of civic morality is questioned. Hardin, for example, argues that the causal 
link between institutions and a sense of civic morality is flawed because it is simply 
implausible to trust governmental institutions (see Hardin 1998). Of course, if it were 
implausible to trust institutions, 1 could not argue that institutions can be at the basis of 
civic morality and thus serve as the foundation of successful collective action in the 
realm of the welfare state. It is therefore important to address those critics who believe it 
unconvincing to speak of institutional trust. 1 will tackle the challenge by developing 
what exactly it would mean to trust institutions and to have trustworthy institutions. This 
section builds on my earlier analysis of writings about trust in general, what 1 determined 
to be implied when we speak about engaging in a trusting relationship. 
What would it mean for institutions to be trustworthy? Hardin argues that we trust 
another - or representatives of institutions, such as judges or police personnel - if we 
have good reasons to assume that he or she will act in our interest, that the other will 
"encapsulate" our interests (Hardin 1998; 2001). Hardin's concept of encapsulated trust 
thus suggests that 1 would trust the representatives of these institutions if they were to 
represent and foster my interests. We need to know ifwe can trust them to act in our 
interest. To compare this to my earlier example of the plumber, 1 could say that 1 trust her 
because of the professional expertise she seems to have and because there is no plausible 
reason to suspect that she would gain much from willfully betraying her trustworthiness. 
However, since it is "impossible to have enough knowledge about the incentive structure 
that would make individuals working for the government trustworthy" (Hardin 2001: 
30), trust in government is implausible. We simply do not know if it wou Id pay for a 
representative of an institution to live up to our trust. In making such criticisms, Hardin is 
relying on certain assumptions about how trust works. As 1 developed earlier, trust cornes 
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much easier if we have knowledge about the socio-cultural norms and role-defined 
behavior prevalent in society. In fact, Seligman argues that trust is synonymous with 
"reliance on role performance" (Seligman 1997: 25). So, to paraphrase Hardin, 1 could 
say that 1 need to know what kind of role my interlocutor plays and what his role should 
be in order to be able to assess the extent to which it is likely that he will comply with 
such expectations. To be in a position to know that, in turn, 1 would need to know about 
the motivational culture and structure needed to bring about raIe compliance. Since 1 do 
not have such knowledge about the institutions of government, Hardin argues, 1 cannot 
be expected to trust a representative of such an institution. 
Is this how we conceptualize trust in government, though? Any attempt to gauge 
trust in government institutions are often of a rather generic nature. So, for example, do 
Soroka et al. (2004) report to have evaluated Canadians' trust in government based on 
responses to the question: "How much do you trust the government in Ottawa to do what 
is right?" (Soroka et al. 2004: 40). If we follow Hardin's argument, this question would 
have to suggest that "to get it right," the government must understand my interests and 
act accordingly. But is this a plausible way of determining, first, what trust in 
government is, and second, what governments or their institutions need to do in order to 
be trustworthy? Rothstein, for example, points out that trust in government can not be 
understood as "encapsulated" trust (Rothstein 2003). Assume that 1 am in need of 
Employment Insurance because 1 cannot find work. Should 1 expect a social worker 
assessing my case to cater to my needs more immediately than she might cater to 
somebody else's? Who tells me that 1 wou Id always be on the lucky side and that 1 would 
be able to convince her or any other social worker in the future of the prevalence .of my 
needs over those of somebody else? If 1 can be favored this time, so can another next 
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time around. Similarly, it would not really inspire me with trust if 1 were to find out that 
judges in my town are susceptible to the bribes 1 propose to make them act in my 
interests. If 1 can have my interests taken care of through such means, surely somebody 
else can if he is willing to paya higher price. Or imagine that 1 have a set of interests that 
may collide with those of others. Would 1 trust an institution more or less simply because 
it catered to my interests immediateIy? What if such catering was to the detriment of the 
overall good? Accordingly, Rothstein can plausibly argue that trust in govemment need 
not be construed as the govemment encapsulating my particularized, individual interests. 
To be fair, Hardin could retort that Rothstein has misinterpreted his definition of 
interest. Instead, he could argue that my interests as a member of a community might 
differ from my interests as a private person or as a member of a walking club, for 
exampie. So if Rothstein argues that trust in government should be conceptualized as 
trust in transparent institutions, an argument 1 will explore further along, Hardin could 
reply that my personal interest as a citizen might be to have such institutions. Or that 1 
might, in fact, have a vested personal interest in having a non-corruptjudiciary. Non-
corrupt, non-discriminatory and impartial is how we conceive of the role description of 
the judiciary and it would be essentiai to my interest to have these role expectations 
fuifilled. Having the public or common good in mind, and accepting that 1 wouid partake 
in and benefit from the common good, 1 couid adopt such institutions as within the 
purview of my personal interest. Hence, those civil servants who comply with the rules 
of such institutions would in fact encapsulate my interests. We could draw from this that 
one's personal and communal interests can converge. 144 This might be a more 
144 This is of course an interpretation of personal interests in a very Rousseauian vein (cf. Rousseau 1997). 
While at times seemingly very convinced that such convergence would be the natural path of developments 
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sympathetic interpretation of Hardin and one with which he could easily agree. However, 
Hardin is adamant that trust in government is implausible because we do not know 
enough about why a governmental official should be impartial and not corrupt or 
discriminatory. In other words, even if we accept that my interests can be encapsulated 
by just institutions, we still do not know why representatives of these institutions should 
act to further the cornmon good which forms part of my interests. Following this line of 
argument, Hardin seems to believe that government institutions cannot do anything to 
make us trust them. 
Rothstein argues instead, that governments can do a great deal. First, he invites us 
to draw certain distinctions. Of course, not ail institutions of the state will necessarily be 
helpful to foster social trust and feelings of civic morality (Rothstein 2000; see also 
Rothstein and Stolle 2003). Uslaner, for example, has shown that institutions in the US 
which, dominated as they are by poli tic al parties, will not foster a generalized sense of 
trust (Uslaner 2002: 136ff). Political parties have ideological programs and agendas that 
they offer for approval or rejection. They do not in general set out to mediate and 
converge common interests into public policy. Rather, they cater to their ideological 
constituency. Imagine, for instance, 1 was a Christian who believes abortion to be 
murder. It is hard to see how 1 could trust in the representatives of a political party that 
promotes legalized abortion as a woman's right. 1 may, of course, have a sense of 
interpersonal trust in individu al politicians in that system - a district attorney, say - who 
belongs to that party but whom 1 know to share my views on abortion. 1 would, however, 
be hard pressed to accept the daim that the institutions of a political system dominated 
in the social contract, Rousseau on the other hand wanted to prohibit voluntary (private) associations - a 
precaution one can read as expressing healthy skepticisrn as to individuals' ability to adopt the public good 
as their own interest. 
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by party politics represent and foster my interests. Institutions dominated by party 
politics, in other words, do not foster the kind of trust necessary to buttress feelings of 
civic morality but, instead, rely on particularized trust (see Rothstein 2003; 1998: 116ff; 
Uslaner 2000: 115ft). But partisan institutions are also not necessarily what we need to 
trust if we are concerned with support for the social welfare state. It is fundamental, 
rather, to trust in the institutions that implement public policy, and which administer the 
workings of the social welfare state (Rothstein 2003). We need to trust in the police, the 
social services, the health services and the courts - in those institutions of the social 
welfare state with whom we are most likely to be in contact in every day interaction (see 
also Rothstein and Stolle 2003).145 
Secondly, Rothstein wonders under what circumstances we wou Id trust in these 
institutions and, to return to Hardin's concerns, what representatives ofthese institutions 
would have to do in order for us to trust them. To reiterate, Rothstein argues that we will 
trust in the institutions of the welfare state if they are non-corrupt, non-discriminatory, 
and impartial (Rothstein 2003: 61). As 1 underlined in my discussion of Hardin's concept 
of encapsulated trust, it is quite reasonable to expect that if faced with the prospect of 
corrupt and discriminatory institutions, and being aware of the dangers such institutions 
could bear for the realization of my personal interest in the long run - that 1 could benefit 
now, but suffer later -institutions organized along the principles Rothstein describes 
would be much more desirable and thus trustworthy. If we accept this proposaI of what 
makes institutions trustworthy, 1 wou Id argue that certain secondary expectations would 
follow. For example, 1 would expect that institutions organized along these principles 
145 These are incidentally also the institutions Letki believes to influence civic morality, aIthough her list 
does inc1ude political parties (see Letki 2005). 1 side with Rothstein and Stolle's position on political 
parties. 
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~ .. encompass rules and procedures that prohibit and discourage its representatives from 
engaging in corruption, discrimination and partiality. Concomitantly, it would be 
reasonable to say that we have a set of expectations about appropriate behavior of public 
servants - that judges, for example, must be impartial. And if they were to fulfill our 
expectations, we could slowly build a sense of trust in those institutions. Again, 
Rothstein' s example of the Russian taxpayers may serve as the inverse of this positive 
and rosy picture. The Russian tax authorities were clearly not organized according to the 
kinds of principles that would instill trust, and the secondary suspicions regarding tax 
administrators - that they were probably going to pocket the money themselves - were 
consistent with a lack of institutional principles barring corrupt behavior. The subsequent 
refusaI of Russian taxpayers to pay their taxes followed suit. Even though they were 
prevented from the fruits of a functioning tax-system as a consequence, individu al 
behavior was, 1 would hold, entirely reasonable in the face of the institutional set-up they 
had to con tend with. 
To be sure, Hardin's charge that 1 could never be sure that individu al 
representatives of such institutions are not in violation of the rules governing their 
institutions is compelling. However, 1 would side with Rothstein on this issue for two 
important reasons. On a practicallevel, we would not expect a corrupt individu al 
representative to gain much from being corrupt in institutions organized along the 
principles Rothstein proposes - certainly not enough, we could speculate, to outweigh 
the risk of being caught and reprimanded or even dismissed and made unemployable. 
This, 1 would say, is a question of institutional culture (cf. Rothstein 2000). A 
fundamental part of this culture, moreover, is to ensure that such institutions have 
procedures in place that provide their employees with enough reasons to comply with the 
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rules. Transparent institutions have a transparent and thus knowable incentive structure 
for ernployees not to betray their trustworthiness. Second, if such were the principles of 
the institution, it is likely that in a case where 1 consider rnyself unfairly treated - a 
reason to lose trust in said institution - 1 would have recourse to an appeals process that 
will help c1arify and adjudicate institutional actions. Even if 1 felt unfairly treated by an 
individual, then, 1 might nevertheless trust in the procedures of redress open to me. 1 
might think that one individu al does not rnake the institution and continue to believe in 
the trustworthiness of the institution as a whole. 
These c1aims correlate with Letki's findings that it is citizens' perceptions of the 
trustworthiness of an institution that deterrnines the extent to which rules and laws 
imposed by such institutions are observed and obeyed (Letki 2005, see also Listhaug and 
Miller 1985; Steinmo 1993; and see Uslaner and Stolle 2003 for the perceptions about 
the courts in Canada). In other words, it is irrelevant to my level of trust in the workings 
of an institution whether said institution actually lives up to my trust or whether my 
perceptions of the trustworthiness of the institution are in fact accurate (Letki 2005:7). 
What matters is rny belief in the trustworthiness of the institution (Levi 1998), a belief 
that can be built on the principles the institution proc1aims to espouse, or on the process 
through which these principles are established and implemented such as channeis of 
redress. 
Arguments about the relevance of individual perceptions tie in with the original 
definition of trust 1 adopted earlier and to which 1 will only briefly refer here. It is worth 
remembering that, in Luhmann's words, to trust is to behave "as though we knew;" we 
need to acknowledge, however, that we do not actually know. Trusting, as 1 explained, 
bears a certain level of risk-taking (Seligman), a betting on "contingent actions by 
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others" (Szompka) - and this, it seems to me, is as valid on the individuallevel as it is on 
the institutional one. For Hardin to believe governmental trust to be impossible simply 
because we do not know enough about the incentive structure for individu al 
representatives of institutions puts the bar for institutional trust very high - much higher, 
it seems, than for individu al trust. 
Finally, Hardin has a complaint charging sorne studies with mixing up trust in 
government with confidence in government: 
there is a widely held view that government needs the trust of citizens if it is to 
work weIl ... but the more recent view of the role of trust can make sense only if 
by trust is meant essentially confidence and, perhaps, sorne element of 
cooperativeness. Government might need this much if it is to gain citizen 
compliance with sometimes hard laws, such as those concerning taxes and 
conscription. (Hardin 2002: 35) 
If 1 understand this correctly, then, we should not speak of questions of trust in 
government and of institutional trustworthiness, but rather of situations of confidence or 
lack thereof. Yet to my mind, to speak of confidence in institutions of government -
which is in fact how the question aiming to evaluate social or poli tic al trust in the WVS 
is phrased - depends on solving the question of trust. 1 accept that we may need 
confidence in government in order to cooperate, i.e. in a scenario in which we do not 
have to re-evaluate the performance of institutions continuously before taking decisions 
about trust. However, if we revert to Luhmann's definition of confidence - which Hardin 
himself does - confidence is based on repeatedly fulfilled trust or a history of trustworthy 
behavior of, in this case, governmental institutions and their representatives. It is not of a 
different nature, as Hardin seems to believe, but results from trust in government. 
So far, then, 1 have supported arguments claiming that, if built on a proper set of 
principles, governmental institutions can instill institutional trust and, subsequently, a 
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sense of civic morality that will facilitate collective action. 1 will now tum to the 
Canadian case, which 1 read as supporting these theoretical arguments. 
5 "Oh Canada, ... true patriot love in ail thy sons command" 
If patriot love has anything to do with trust, Canadians seem to comply with the 
calI of their anthem since they - not only Canada' s sons, 1 presume - "are among the 
most trusting people in the world" (Uslaner and Stolle 2003: 1). Several studies have 
tried to investigate the extent to which social trust reigns in Canada 146 and 1 will refer to 
sorne of their findings. Before entering into an analysis of the Canadian case, however, 
my interest in it warrants specification. 
1 want to explore if the social solidarity caveat against redistributive immigration 
schemes can be verified for the Canadian context in so far as it relates to concems about 
social trust and the provisions of the social welfare state in ethnically diverse societies. 1 
have summarized arguments against redistributive immigration schemes to hold that 
social trust will be undermined because ethno-culturally diverse immigration leads to 
ethno-cultural pluralism in host communities. Support for policies of redistribution to 
further social justice will be undermined because collective action will be rendered 
difficult, if not impossible, those arguing in this vein continue, if social trust is lacking. 
How would this assumption materialize in the Canadian context? To my mind, it would 
imply that members of the host-community would stop supporting the institutions of the 
social welfare state because, for example, they come to believe that these institutions are 
no longer impartial and non-discriminatory and that they will cater to particularized 
146 For a good overview see Banting and Kymlicka (forthcoming); Eisenberg (forthcoming); Soroka et al. 
(2004); Uslaner and Stol\e (2003). 
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interests rather than to those of the community. Indeed, the compartmentalization of 
Canada' s population in different ethno-cultural ghettos has long been decried as the 
inevitable outcome of Canada's multicultural policies (MCPs) (see Bissoondath 2002). In 
line with the fear of ghettoization, ethnic pluralism in Canada could lead traditional 
members of the host community, i.e. those Canadians of British or French background, to 
suspect unfairness and injustice in Canadian institutions. For example, Canadians could 
come to believe that refugees or family-category immigrants - those immigrants who 
come to Canada under family-sponsorship programs - are treated better than, say, 
Canada' s pensioners. 147 On the other hand, the level of trust in the institutions of the 
social welfare state in Canada's setting of ethno-cultural pluralism should tell us 
something about the veracity of the social solidarity caveat as it pertains to ethnic 
diversity. Put pithily, if Canadians continue to support the social welfare state even 
though they live in a highly ethnically diverse state, then we could plausibly conclude 
that something other than a historic, ethno-cultural community membership instills them 
with enough civic morality to do so. My quest to evaluate social trust in Canada is thus in 
line with the argument supported earlier and which is to be verified for the Canadian case 
study, that it is institutional trust we need in order to foster a sense of civic morality 
aimed at preparing the ground for collective action to support the social welfare state. 1 
accept that this cannot be proven to be the case beyond doubt. For the purposes of my 
project, however, what is needed is no such proof, but only the fact that there is at least 
147 1 am thinking here of a recent slip in an editorial of the Toronto Sun, which proclaimed that refugees 
could collect up to $2100 in monthly support which would be more than Canada's federal old age pension 
for aIl Canadians over 65. These figures turned out to be wrong, but were based on fears of institutions of 
the welfare state favoring sorne to the detriment of the welfare of others (see The Taxpayer 2005) 
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one country - maybe even more (see Banting et al, forthcoming) - in which ethnie 
diversity does not seem to affect levels of social trust and social solidarity. 
My interest in Canada, therefore, is different from many other studies which 
investigate the level of trust among immigrants and national minorities (see for example 
Eisenberg, forthcoming), even though my investigation and those studying levels of trust 
among immigrants might come to the same conclusions about the importance of 
institutional trust (see Rothstein 2003 for a similar argument for the case of immigrants 
to Sweden). My exploration of the Canadian case is also different from those surveys that 
hope to shed sorne light on people's attitudes towards the aims of society in general; that 
is, whether the ideal society should be more egalitarian or more competitive, whether it 
should aim for extensive welfare or for levying lower taxes (see WVS questions E066 
and E067 respectively). To my mind, these questions are general in nature and their 
answers will depend on how individual respondents frame the qualifying criteria of 
"extensive" welfare or "lower" taxes, for example. To be sure, they are coupled with 
questions trying to assess respondents' takes on the actual make-up of their society and 
the values they think society is modeled on and espouses at the time of questioning (see 
questions E 063 and E064) - i.e. questions which are geared towards assessing people's 
support for social justice. These questions, however, do not provide us with clear-cut 
tools to evaluate people' s trust in the institutions of the welfare state which is precisely 
what 1 have established to be the most important variable if what we are interested in is 
to evaluate the chances for success of the social welfare state. Moreover, in answering 
the se questions, respondents rely on their subjective take on what constitutes the "right" 
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level of equality or of taxation. And 1 would argue that the answers to these questions 
will simply reflect the very different stances individual respondents could take. 148 
Finally, sorne studies are interested in the extent to which trust in govemment 
may spill over, as it were, into interpersonal trust (Uslaner and Stolle 2003). We could 
summarize these studies as investigating a reverse form of the "bridging effect" of trust, 
namely that of institutional trust leading into interpersonal trust rather than Putnam' s 
version in which interpersonal trust is rneant to build bridges into social trust. But, as 1 
explained at the outset of the previous section, 1 am interested instead in the generation 
and support of a sense of civic rnorality that will help support the social welfare state. 
Following Letki's argument that civic rnorality rnost importantly relies on institutional 
trust, what 1 am solely interested in here is the level of institutional trust Canadians 
exhibit. Or, to put this in the context of Miller' s two rnodels of generating trust - the 
national community in the cornmon sense, or the political community - 1 am interested in 
the political community, which, to my rnind, is not tied to interpersonal trust. 149 Because 
1 subscribe to arguments tying a sense of civic morality to one of trust in institutions, 1 
am interested in exploring to what extent Canadians trust the institutions of the welfare 
148 If, say, 1 answered that society should be more competitive, it may be because 1 do not believe in the 
value of more egalitarianism generally or not any more - maybe due to the fact that 1 have lost trust in the 
institutions that were set up to bring egalitarianism about. However, 1 might give the exact same answer 
because, very differently, 1 may think that the level of egalitarianism achieved is highly sufficient and that 
a little competitive boost would help society to value egalitarianism anew. The same answer, that is, may 
be motivated entirely differently. Of course, sorne would charge that these are the kind of contextual 
comments political theorists are prone to make to tailor empirical findings to their own purposes -
however, as Marshall and Stolle (2004) have argued convincingly, they are vital in order to make sense of 
and draw the appropriate conclusions from the answers respondents in value surveys provide us with. 
149 Andrew Mason has made an argument for the idea that "belonging" should be conceptualized as a part 
of a political community, employing the same distinction between national and political community 
(Mason 2000: Ch. 5). If 1 read his account correctly, he could go either way on the question of 
interpersonal trust: he might suggest that we need interpersonal trust for the support of a political 
community, or that the political community can function independently of interpersonal trust, but rather in 
a setting of institutional trust. In the first case, and based on the evidence 1 have collected from studies 
about ethnicity and interpersonal trust, his argument might run into problems if the political community is 
characterized by ethnie diversity. 
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state which 1 will use as an indicator of their likelihood to have a sense of civic morality 
and thence to be willing to co-operate in collective action schemes. If, in other words, 
Canadians trust their institutions, 1 posit, they will be most likely to pay their taxes and 
contribute their fair share in schemes of redistribution. 
To treat institutional and interpersonal trust separately is justified (cf. Uslaner 
2002). There is a good case to analyze institutional trust independently. We should then 
ask whether these levels of institutional confidence have been influenced or affected by 
levels of ethnic diversity in Canada. Or, to tie the working question of this section into 
the larger context of my project, does this case show that Canadians' support for the 
social welfare state is in dec1ine because of ethnic pluralism and diversity? While there 
has indeed been a slight dec1ine in Canadians' institutional trust over the years, can this 
be plausibly attributed to increased ethnie diversity? Canada changed its immigration 
policy in the 1960s to one based on points - i.e. to criteria that aimed to combine 
domestic need for skilled labor with non-discriminatory practices about who to let in 
(Carens 2003). Since 1965, the number of immigrants living in Canada has continuously 
been above 3 million, with annual immigration intake peaking in the early 1990s at over 
250,000 immigrants. According to Canadian Heritage projections by the end of 2006 
numbers for "Canadians with Central and South American, Indo-Chinese, Arab, 
Caribbean, Filipino and Chinese backgrounds will have doubled in numbers since 1991," 
while the numbers for Canadians of British and French origin will only have increased 
by 5.9% and 7.5% respectively (Canadian Heritage 2004). Members of visible 
minorities, i.e. those who "are non-white in color and non-Aboriginal and non-Caucasian 
by 'race'" (Canadian Heritage 1998: n.18) represented more than Il % of the overall 
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population in 1996, with figures constantly rising, 150 and Canadians of Chinese descent 
are expected to be the fourth largest ethnie group by 2006 (Canadian Heritage 2004). In 
fact, China was the top country of origin for both 2004 and 2005 immigration, followed 
by India, the Philippines, and Pakistan (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2005: The 
Monitor, Fall2005 edition). These figures do not inc1ude aIl those Canadians who have 
an ethnie origin other than a mix of or with British, French, Aboriginal or Canadian 
origin, but who are not considered visible minorities (another 14% of the overall 
population in 1996). Suffice it to say, then, that ethnie diversity - inc1uding its visible 
signs - is and has steadily been on the rise in Canada. Has this affected Canadians' 
support for the welfare state? 
According to my reading, the level of trust in institutions does not seem to 
indicate this. The level of confidence in the police and the justice system in 1981 - that 
is, in the decade immediately after changes in Canada's immigration selection process 
and the implementation of Canada's Multiculturalism Act in 1971 - are in fact quite high 
and remain so in the following decades, even though the percentage of the population 
represented by immigrants has steadily increased over the 20 year period under review. 
1 have supported arguments conceptualizing institutional trust as the main 
motivation for individuals to adopt a sense of civic morality and argued that a sense of 
civic morality, in turn, will enable collective action. 1 have looked at the levels of 
institutional support that Canadians show for sorne of the institutions that matter for the 
administration of the social welfare state. In general, Canadians seem to be very trusting, 
as Uslaner and Stolle (2003) have claimed, and consistently trust their civil service (a lot 
150 Numerically, this rise translates to 3 197480 people as visible minorities in 1996, up from about 2 500 
000 in the 1991 census (Canadian Heritage 1998: 18). 
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or more). 1 have shown that the se levels of trust were not influenced by the ethnically 
diverse immigration which occurred after Canada changed its immigration policy to one 
based on points for language and work skiIls, job experience and the like, rather than the 
previous one which was largely based on country of origin. Based on my previous 
argument about the relevance of institutional trust for a sense of civic morality, this 
would suggest that support for the welfare state - as it is expressed by compliance with 
tax laws, for instance, and which enables the state to implement welfare legislation - is 
still high. While it seems next to impossible to obtain figures about tax evasion in the 
Canadian context,151 my adrnittedly cursory analysis of the Canadian set of the WVS 
data is supported by appropriately in-depth analysis by other authors. According to 
Soroka et al. (2004), there is little evidence for a consistent relationship between 
"ethnicity and ethnie context [and] support for the welfare state." (Soroka et al 2004: 51). 
Or, more explicitly for the question of this project, "there appears to be no direct impact 
of ethnie diversity on support of social welfare state programmes" (ibid, 52). These 
findings are further supported by the fact that between 1990 and 2000, the percent age of 
respondents to the WVS who agreed or tended to agree with the idea that "governments 
should take more responsibility to pro vide for individuals" has risen from 28.8% to 
38.8% of the population. 152 Support for the measures of the welfare state is still high in 
the Canadian context in which respondents would have to assume that government 
monies would flow to members of aIl ethno-cultural groups, not only to their own. This 
151 Unfortunately, neither Statistics Canada nor the Department of Revenue could provide me with actual 
sets of data on percentage of tax evasion, figures that seemed easily obtained by Rothstein for the case of 
Sweden and Russia. The Canadian taxpayer's association could also not be of assistance, maybe for 
obvious reasons. 
152 The usual disclaimer applies, of course, that we do not actually know what "more" means, except of 
course, more than what government already does. In this sense, again, this statistic can serve as an 
indicator of a supportive attitude, which is aIl 1 want it to do. 
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obviously confounds the liberal nationalist daim that ethnie diversity will spell the end 
of the social welfare state as we know it. 
Soroka et al. have since, and based on their original results, expanded their 
research in an attempt to find out what the effect of MCPs might be on support for the 
welfare state (see Banting, Johnston, Kymlicka and Soroka (henceforth Banting et al), 
forthcoming). Taking up the fears by sorne, like Barry and Miller, that multiculturalism 
policies are a threat to social redistribution because MCPs will hamper the grounds on 
whieh collective action can be built l53 - what 1 have referred to as the 
heterogeneity/redistribution trade-off - Banting et al. set out to investigate a potential 
correlation between strong MCPs and dedining social spending and redistribution. 154 
Contrary to mainstream opinion that seems in rare agreement about the detrimental 
effects ethnie diversity will have for western social welfare states,155 the authors argue 
that one of the important reasons for the continuous support of the welfare state in 
Canada is, in fact, the presence of strong MCPs. While they accept that rapid changes in 
the level of ethnie diversity matter for the overall acceptance of ethno-cultural pluralism 
- the faster ethnie diversity cornes about, the harder it is for people to accept it - they 
find that MCPs aetually help to buffer the effect ethnie diversity may have on the level of 
social welfare. In fact, "for countries faeing medium to high changes in migrant stock, 
high levels of MCPs appear to enhance social spending" (Banting et al, forthcoming: 24). 
153 See Miller (1995: Ch. 5; idem 2000: 105-106). Barry actually singles out Canada as having gone 
"farther down the path" of multicuIturalism (or muIticuIturalist doom, one feels inclined to say) than any of 
the other three misguided sheep, although Australia is doser to Canada than the US or the UK (see Barry 
2001: 294). To be fair, the fear of consequences for social welfare states brought about by multiculturalism 
has also been articulated from other quarters. For a comparative perspective see Alesina and Glaeser 
(2004). 
154 Their criteria of changes in social welfare are the following: "social spending as a proportion of GDP; 
the effect of redistribution in reducing poverty; the effect of redistribution in reducing inequality; the level 
of child poverty; the level of inequality" (Banting et al. forthcoming: 13). 
155 See Kymlicka (forthcoming) for a review of the literature. 
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Rather than assaulting the social welfare state as sorne, based on the 
heterogeneity/redistribution trade-off, fear, Banting et al. argue that MCPs actually help 
overcome such a trade-off when they suggest that it is through the successful 
implementation of strong MCPs that Canada has been able to strike a balance between 
increased ethnic diversity and pluralism on the one hand, and continuous support for the 
social welfare state on the other. 
As 1 intimated above, this positive verdict on Canada's ethno-cultural integration 
record has been, and continues to be, heavily disputed from aIl fronts (see e.g. 
Bissoondath 2002; Gregg 2006). And to be sure, Canada's success in balancing different 
sorts of interests through MCPs may be due to a set of specifically Canadian factors that 
might be difficult to reproduce in other countries. Kymlicka, for example, identifies two 
significant components of the acceptance of MCPs: namely, the time-frame when 
Canada's MCPs were originally drafted - and when these policies were aimed at white 
European immigrants rather than others - and Canada's geography which makes much 
illegal immigration unlikely (Kymlicka 2004).156 Whether or not we travel down the road 
of ethno-cultural ghettaization and fail ta integrate Canada's ethno-cultural diversity into 
an encompassing national identity "in the traditional sense," as Miller phrases it, does 
not, however, affect the findings of the study by Banting et al.; indeed, this particular 
study shows that Canada does exhibit a combination of high levels of ethnic diversity 
and a strong social welfare state. This is the reason for my interest in them. 
156 However, it is worth recalling that MCPs are implemented in Europe, as 1 illustrated in my example 
from the UK in Chapter Three. To sorne extent, then, we may acknowledge that the Canadian success story 
might not be easily replicated - but that implementation of MCPs has nevertheless become a necessity in 
most western countries in the face of ethno-culturally diverse immigration. 
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Neither the authors around Banting nor those collaborating on the earlier study 
led by Soroka verify to what extent Canadian's strong performance as a social welfare 
state has anything to do with the fact that Canadians trust in the institutions of the 
welfare state. While an in-depth study of the possible links between trust in institutions, 
support of the welfare state and MCPs is beyond the scope of this project and will have 
to be the subject for future research, the studies by Banting and Soroka should still make 
us pause. Could it be that considering the levels of trust in institutions 1 have gleaned 
from the WVS set of data for Canada - trust in institutions that are at the forefront of 
implementing laws and regulations based on MCPs, such as the police and the judiciary -
that there is in fact a link between the level of ethno-cultural pluralism brought about 
through immigration, MCPs and institutional trust in Canada? Returning to Miller's 
argument, that levels of immigration have to be kept to the point for the host community 
to be able to absorb newcomers and integrate them successfully into the fabric of an 
encompassing national identity because of concerns for social solidarity and social trust, 
Banting et al. acknowledge that 
on a theoreticallevel, [Miller's] argument rightly insists that in trying to 
understand the impact of MCPs on the welfare state, it is a mistake to view MCPs 
in isolation to the larger context of public policies that shape people' s identity, 
beliefs and aspirations. Whether or not MCPs encourage trust and solidarity, for 
example, will heavily depend on whether the MCPs are part of a larger policy 
package that simultaneously nurtures identification with the larger political 
community. (Banting et al., forthcoming: 27) 
ln other words, MCPs must be understood within the socio-political context in which 
they operate. If MCPs help to stimulate support towards continuing high levels of social 
welfare, cou Id we not speculate that it is because they fit in with values and principles of 
the political community that implements them? As 1 explained in section 4,1 subscribe to 
the argument that it is just institutions that will foster identification with a poli tic al 
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community, if we understand identification to imply that we share a sense of 
responsibility for the welfare and the functioning of our community - what 1 have called 
a sense of civic morality. Put differently, if we show a sense of civic morality- which we 
will have if we live in a setting dominated by just institutions - then we will be able to 
accept MCPs for what they are intended to be, namely tools of integration and 
. accommodation of aIl members of society. We will then continue to support the social 
welfare state because we do not take MCPs to undermine social justice, but rather, we 
will understand MCPs as a tool towards the proliferation of social justice. MCPs are thus 
one way of integrating society. They will only work, however, in a setting with an 
already established civic morality. If this is the case, then what mitigates the effects of 
increased ethnic diversity - namely, Meps - relies on a setting of institutional trust that 
can indeed be engineered "from above," through the establishment of just institutions. To 
counter the challenge of ethno-cultural diversity through immigration, societies must, 
then, establish a setting of just institutions. Such institutions would instill a sense of civic 
morality, as it is necessary to enable successful collective action. Once these parameters 
in place, 1 would argue, a society can start designing policies like MCPs to accommodate 
the ethno-cultural diversity in its midst. 1 would therefore argue, to retum to my original 
question, that a blanket objection to ethno-culturally diverse immigration in the wake of 
redistributive immigration schemes because of its potentially negative effects on 
domestic social justice and social welfare is not a defensible position. Rather, what the 
Canadian case study suggests is that it is a question of fostering institutional trust and 
sets of social policies, which strike a balance between the interests of the members of the 
host community and potential newcomers. 
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6 Conclusion 
This chapter has tackled one potential fear about the effects of redistributive 
immigration policies: namely, the erosion of social trust in ethnically diverse societies. 1 
have examined what it means to trust in a general sense and why we need to have social 
trust in particular. One kind of social trust, 1 accepted, is fundamental in bringing about 
collective action, as it is needed to support the social welfare state. 1 then continued to 
investigate exactly what kind of social trust we would need, and have sided with those 
who argue for a link between trust in just institutions and a sense of civic morality that 
such institutional trust breeds and on which collective action relies. 1 have supported this 
argument with a look at the Canadian case study, arguing that institutional trust in 
Canada is high and that ethnic diversity has not hampered support for the Canadian 
welfare state. More countries have been examined with regards to the link between their 
demographic make-up and the well-being of their welfare state (see Banting and 
Kymlicka, forthcoming). For the purposes of my project, however, what is important is 
that ethno-cultural diversity does not necessarily stand in the way of social solidarity, 
social trust, and the social welfare state. Such fears about ethno-culturally diverse 
immigration and its potential impact on the achievement of social justice in host 
communities are therefore neither warranted nor justifiable. More importantly, such fears 
should not be used to argue against using redistributive immigration as one way of living 
up to robust duties of redistribution. 
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Conclusion 
Here is what we need to do: Make it a little more difficult for educated, weIl-off people 
to get into Canada. And make it much, much easier for unskiIled, poor people, especially 
from Sub-Saharan Africa, to immigrate in great numbers, and soon. 
Doug Sanders in The Globe and Mail (June 17,2006: F3) 
While writing this thesis, 1 have lived and worked in three different countries, two 
of which are not my country of citizenship. 1 did not leave my country of origin because 
of a need to move abroad in order to have access to opportunities that would enable me 
to lead a valuable life - 1 could easily have led su ch a life in my country of origin. 
Rather, 1 moved to Canada and to the UK because 1 chose to, because 1 had the 
opportunity to do so and because 1 was eager for the experience. In the last stages of this 
thesis, 1 moved to Canada with the intention to apply for permanent residency status, and 
it is remarkable how little 1 had to do in order to fulfill the demands of Canada's 
immigration policy. Once in Canada, in fact, the requirements are far less demanding 
than if 1 had applied from outside Canada. It is my German citizenship that puts me in a 
position to apply from within Canada because 1 can enter Canadian territory and remain 
as a tourist for up to six months. 
AH of these conditions would be dramatically different if 1 had been born in Mali. 
Nevertheless, thousands of people try to enter Europe every day in se arch of the kind of 
opportunities that 1 and many of my compatriots take for granted. This movement of 
people towards Europe is weB documented and extensively discussed in the European 
media. For, to be sure, it is not my kind of immigrant the tabloids in Europe write against, 
or who cause concern to politicians. Rather, it is the "unskilled and poor" kind that 
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dominates public debate - those, in other words, whose immigration is not sought by rich 
western countries. They are, however, often the worst-off in the world, and their 
countries of origin do not pro vide them with the kind of opportunities that enable 
individual autonomy and a life worth living. The differences in individu al opportunities 
that make people want to move to Europe, Canada or the US, and the distinction between 
desirable and undesirable immigrants in national immigration policies, 1 have argued, 
needs to be addressed by liberal authors concerned with social justice and individual 
autonomy. If we accept that we do not live in ajust world, which 1 take to be an 
uncontroversial daim, the stark inequalities in conditions of autonomous living between 
those living in rich countries and those living in poor ones must be cause for concern. 
Moreover, any policy that compounds such differences in individu al opportunity needs to 
be scrutinized and changed to transform it into an instrument serving the goal of social 
justice. 
In Chapter One, 1 have elaborated on the daim that the world is unjust in its 
distribution of individual opportunities and that this injustice is compounded by unfair 
national immigration schemes that favor desirable immigrants who come from rich 
countries and who can immigrate with relative ease into other rich countries compared 
with undesirable immigrants who come from po or countries. Instead of accepting the 
convention al assumption that domestic needs of the host community should de termine 
immigration regimes, a principled liberal position on immigration should aim at 
providing access to opportunities of autonomous living for those who lack them. One 
way towards this goal would be to adopt immigration policies that specifically target 
those living in countries that cannot provide individu al opportunities and bring them into 
the countries that can provide such opportunities, or redistributive immigration policies. 
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Such policies, 1 have explained, should be based on a global principle of fair equality of 
opportunity that is modeled on Rawls' blueprint for a theory of justice regulating access 
to social goods that enable individual autonomy. My defense of this proposaI has in the 
first instance focused on those who den y that Rawls' theory can be applied on a 
cosmopolitan scale, and 1 have referred to the work of liberal egalitarians who have 
shown what form cosmopolitan principles of redistribution could take. In response to 
Rawls' rejoinder and critique of cosmopolitan interpretations of his theory, 1 have 
accepted his principles of a Society of Peoples as a blueprint of international justice -
indeed, to c1arify, the ideal is to have ajust world made up of decent societies. We are far 
from such a world, however, and in the non-ideal world we live in, and while working 
towards more just international conditions, redistributive immigration policies can serve 
as a means of remedial justice for the global pOOf. To propose redistributive immigration 
policies as a tool of remedial justice situates my proposaI squarely within Rawls' 
framework. Although 1 refer to those writing in the cosmopolitan vein sympathetically, 1 
am not advocating a global egalitarian principle that aims to equalize conditions of living 
for aIl human beings. Neither do 1 believe, however, that obligations of justice on an 
international scale can be restricted to humanitarian aid and assistance. Instead, 1 am 
concerned with providing aIl human beings with adequate conditions of individu al 
autonomy and access to fair equality of opportunity when choosing what life to lead. 
Such conditions are most obviously lacking for those 2.6 billion people who live on US $ 
2 per day, and it is towards them that redistributive immigration policies ought to be 
directed and to whom they should be applied. 
Redistributive immigration policies rely on the premise that international 
principles of redistribution are plausible and defensible. The most acute challenge to this 
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pre mise cornes from liberal nationalism as a particular strand of liberal egalitarian 
thinking. Liberal nationalists - and David Miller in particular, on whose work 1 have 
focused in much of this discussion - endorse the goals of social justice and redistribution 
my proposaI espouses. In fact, sorne liberal nationalist principles are explicitly modeled 
along liberal egalitarian arguments for the redistribution of access to social goods. For 
example, the liberal nationalist postulate of access to a viable cultural background has 
been justified with the daim that such a cultural context is a social good and hence 
should be considered as part of the goods that principles of redistribution regulate (see 
KymIicka 1989). Miller insists, however, on the important role a shared national identity 
and community life plays in designing and implementing principles of social justice. 
Norms of social justice, he daims, are socially contingent. 1 have argued against this 
assumption in Chapter Two, making the case instead that access to social goods that 
provide individual opportunities and enable an individu al to lead an autonomous life 
must be framed in universal terms. 
1 have then examined Miller' s second point daiming that while citizens of rich 
countries shouid accept universal duties of humanitarian assistance to help alleviate 
absolute deprivation, they do not incur global duties that arise from a situation of relative 
deprivation - from a perspective that compares the set of opportunities and conditions of 
individual autonomy of those living in rich countries to those available to the global 
po or. Duties of redistribution that address relative deprivation, Miller holds, are situated 
in the do main of domestic politics since we have a different set of duties towards 
compatriots than towards non-compatriots. If duties of redistribution cannot 'be 
universalized a policy of redistributive immigration is rendered implausible. 
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1 have made several points in response to this challenge to redistributive 
immigration policies. First, 1 refuted the model underlying Miller' s conception of the 
nature of our duties - what 1 referred to as the concentric circle model of our duties - and 
have instead shown that outside an intimate core of people, strangers are strangers, 
whether they live in the same state or on the next continent. In this vein, the dut y to 
redistribute access to opportunities on the cosmopolitan scale is based on the same 
premise as the duties of redistribution we have in the domestic sphere. Second, 1 have 
addressed Miller' s claim that we share a special relationship with fellow nationals, which 
warrants domestic redistribution. Here 1 have relied on Scheffler' s work, which pro vides 
different models of relationships that may bear special moral obligations. Analyzing 
Miller's account of the relationship we have with compatriots, 1 have deducted that he 
could not plausibly refer to two of these models to explain special moral obligations. 
Instead, 1 have taken Miller to argue for a contractual relationship with compatriots, 
which 1 identified to be fundamentally instrumental and hence not warranting special 
moral obligations, according to Scheffler. Shedding my doubts for the purposes of the 
argument, moreover, and accepting Miller' s claims about the ethical relevance of the 
relationship among compatriots, and his premise for the special relationship between 
compatriots, 1 have nevertheless maintained that sharing special relationships does not 
absolve us from moral obligations towards the global poor. It is unconvincing to 
articulate ethical principles that would simply result in support for a club of the wealthy 
against the legitimate moral claims of those outside the club. In other words, even if we 
were to convince ourselves of a special relationship with compatriots and were to derive 
special duties from su ch a relationship, we cannot neglect moral duties that arise from the 
principle that aIl humans are morally equal and should be able to lead autonomous lives. 
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ln this vein, 1 have interpreted Scheffler's idea of a distributive objection to entail that 
moral equality represents a constraint on the effect special relationships may have on 
conceptualizing moral duties. 
After having defended the hypothesis on which my proposal is based, 1 imagined 
sorne more possible objections to redistributive immigration schemes. The objections 1 
had in mind for the remainder of the thesis related to the effects such policies might have. 
To reiterate, the relevance of liberal nationalist arguments against redistributive 
immigration policies stems from the fact that Miller in particular subscribes to egalitarian 
principles of social justice. But what if redistributive immigration were to counteract the 
implementation of principles of social justice in the host community? My proposaI wou Id 
be indefensible if a change in the ethics of immigration were to result in a deterioration 
of conditions of social justice in host communities. If the driving motivation for 
redistributive immigration is to exp and access to individual opportunities, it would be 
implausible to accept that those who might have enjoyed access to opportunities so far 
were to lose such access. 
1 have argued that redistributive immigration schemes have to be incorporated 
into the context of redistributive domestic social justice - the y are not simply an addition 
to existing unjust social conditions. Providing the example of employers who may lose 
sorne profits as a consequence of stricter wage laws that cut them off from access to 
inexpensive immigrant labor, 1 would maintain that such a change in condition of 
employers' balance-sheets is not my concern since the previous relationship was 
exploitative and unjust. Similarly, 1 would argue that it does not pose a challenge to my 
proposaI if the high-earning percent age of the population in a ho st community has to pay 
higher taxes in order to finance redistributive immigration schemes. Rather, their higher 
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tax contribution would be part of the redistribution that principles of social justice would 
call for. These, then, are not the kind of fears 1 have discussed. 
Instead, and in order to address legitimate concems about the conditions of social 
justice in the host community, 1 have first asked what form a dec1ine of social justice 
might take and have construed it as the dec1ine of the social welfare state in host 
communities. 1 have then, in Chapters Three and Four, confronted fears that 
redistributive immigration policies might generate, which 1 have summarized as the 
social solidarity caveat and concems for social trust. These fears take a very particular 
shape in their liberal nationalist Interpretation. The worry is that a change in immigration 
regimes geared towards the global poor would result in increased ethno-culturally diverse 
immigration, and that such levels of ethno-cultural heterogeneity would challenge 
feelings of social solidarity and social trust in the host community. 1 have summarized 
this as the heterogeneity/redistribution trade-off, to which Miller explicitly draws 
attention. 
ln Chapter Three, 1 scrutinized the social solidarity caveat and argued that Miller 
makes several different arguments that are worth analyzing separately. One is that 
feelings of solidarity are tied to a national identity and community. The challenge from 
ethno-cultural heterogeneity would then derive from my perception that the national 
community and its identity features have changed to the point that 1 no longer have these 
feelings of solidarity. 1 have challenged this c1aim by first defining social solidarity as 
relying on a moral Ideal that acknowledges interdependence and ties between people. 
This moral Ideal is not tied to any specifie community, however, and Miller does not 
make a convincing argument for why we should think of solidarity as framed by national 
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identity, or only in the context of a national community rather than in a cosmopolitan 
one. 
The second argument Miller proposes to substantiate the social solidarity caveat 
is buiIt on an instrumental account of the ties between social solidarity and social 
cooperation. The idea here is that only if we have feelings of sharing in a national 
identity and community will we cooperate in the realm of the social welfare state. More 
explicitly, only if 1 identify with my fellow compatriots will 1 be willing to pay my taxes, 
rather than move my money elsewhere. With increased ethno-cultural heterogeneity, this 
underlying assumption for social cooperation would be challenged in so far as the make-
up of the national community wou Id change and its members would no longer be able to 
refer to a shared national identity in Miller' s sense, that is one that relies on a shared 
history and culture. 1 have challenged this instrumental assumption by analyzing findings 
from the UK indicating that recent immigrants - i.e. those who do not share in the 
national identity of their ho st community yet - contribute overwhelmingly more in 
income taxes than their hosts. If tax contribution is at the basis of the social welfare state, 
then it is not clear why ethno-cultural heterogeneity that results from redistributive 
immigration should pose a threat to the implementation of social justice in ho st 
communities. 1 concluded Chapter Three by proposing an alternative account of what 
motivated such contributions, what 1 calI a sense of civic mindedness that is generated by 
rule compliance in the ho st community. 
Finally, Chapter Four addressed another social condition of a functioning social 
welfare state, namely that of social trust. The assumption Miller makes is that social trust 
is important for social cooperation, which in turn supports the social welfare state. And 
again, Miller ascribes properties to a shared national identity - to induce trust - which 
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will be challenged by ethno-cultural heterogeneity. In the course of this chapter, 1 
ventured into previously unknown territory, as it were, in so far as 1 analyze writings in 
social theory and empirical analysis. This is fascinating literature and extremely 
enjoyable to read for a political theorist, or so it seemed to me: to read how individuals 
respond to questions regarding their levels of trust should bring those often accused of 
residing in the ivory tower back to life. In this vein, 1 share sorne of Miller' s convictions, 
namely that it is important to make a methodological choice, between an abstract 
normative position or one that takes into account how individual actually think about 
social justice - or, as 1 de scribe, that they have intuitions and ideas about whom to trust 
and whom not to trust. 
Chapter Four relates the most important lesson 1 draw from the empirical 
literature conceming questions of trust, which is that, when analyzing trust, important 
distinctions need to be made. Individuals will make distinctions of individual trust based 
on ethno-cultural parameters and will be more likely to trust those with whom they share 
an ethno-cultural background. However, this individual bias towards one's own ethno-
cultural background does not affect social cooperation and support for the social welfare 
state. Such support, rather, depends on a sense of civic mindedness, which in tums 
depends on levels of institutional trust. 1 explain that non-corrupt and just institutions 
will induce trust. Making this argument, 1 join those like Rothstein and Stolle who argue 
that the important kind of trust for social cooperation can be brought about through 
institutional design, and need not rely on an existent sense of community, which is how 1 
interpret Miller' s conception of social trust. 
With this conceptual clarification in mind, 1 then returned to Miller' s argument 
that ties national community, solidarity and trust together and which anticipates that with 
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an increase in ethno-cultural pluralism a society will witness a deterioration of the social 
conditions of social welfare. Miller argues strongly against multicultural policies (MCPs) 
as detrimental to the bases of the social welfare state and to the implementation of 
policies of social justice. His stance against the instruments countries like Canada, 
Australia and, to sorne extent, Britain have chosen to deal with ethno-cultural 
heterogeneity is simply misguided; instead, what studies from Canada show is that MCPs 
play a vital role in producing the kind of institutional trust that instills feelings of civic 
mindedness. MCPs actually help integrate ethno-culturally plural polities and help 
stimulate institutional trust. 
Chapters Three and Four have shown that the concerns for social justice in the 
ho st community based on conditions of a functioning welfare state are not warranted. 
Redistributive immigration policies, in other words, cannot be refuted based on the fear 
of the heterogeneity/redistribution trade off. The results of these chapters thus support 
my proposaI for change in the ethics of immigration. However, 1 accept that my summary 
of the social welfare caveat and concerns for social trust as arguments against 
redistributive immigration policies does not include other problems that may arise in the 
context of the welfare state and newcomers. To conclu de, then, 1 will sketch sorne of the 
work that should be done in order to address the important concerns that reflect yet again 
the need to balance the justice concerns of the host community with those arising from 
the international differences in conditions of autonomy. 
It could be argued that redistributive immigration schemes challenge a sense of 
social justice if immigrants were to receive welfare state benefits. 1 have explained that 
an important part of national immigration policies to date focus on speedy and successful 
integration of immigrants into the social fabric of the ho st community. And 1 have 
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supported considerations for integration since the motivation for redistributive 
immigration policies is to provide individuals with opportunities in their host 
community, which they will only be able to seize and use if they have a basic knowledge 
of the language of their host community, for example. Since my proposaI is aimed at the 
global poor, it is fair to assume that those immigrating under redistributive schemes 
would not be in a position to pay for language training - in fact, 1 have criticized the new 
Dutch immigration regulations to impose high language training costs onto hopeful 
immigrants arguing that this mIe may make it next to impossible for the global poor to 
fulfill the requirements. In the context of redistributive immigration scheme, it would 
then be plausible to expect national governments to pay for language training as part of 
their commitment to redistribute access to opportunities. 
Traditionally, of course, the funds national governments spend on welfare state 
schemes are financed through contributions citizens have made over time. Because of the 
accumulative character of welfare state provisions - for example, into pension schemes, 
national health or unemployment in surance schemes - sorne could argue that it wou Id be 
unfair to provide newcomers with benefits others have paid for even though they 
themselves have not or have not yet contributed to these schemes. One way national 
governments have chosen to decide who should enjoy welfare benefits is by making 
access to welfare benefits contingent on years of residency and contribution to a welfare 
scheme. And to be sure, this is a reasonable stipulation for people like myself who move 
from one country to another because of interest rather than need. To have to pay for 
private healthcare, say, is then simply one of the costs one has to face when making the 
decision of exchanging residency in one wealthy country against another one, and 
residency requirements are a legitimate tool to use when ensuring that the welfare state is 
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not exploited by somebody moving from the UK to Sweden beeause she realizes that she 
will receive better and free healthcare there. However, this stipulation would obviously 
defy the premise of redistributive immigration schemes. In a more general sense, 
therefore, the adoption and implementation of redistributive immigration schemes would 
necessarily entail a reconceptualization of national welfare state schemes. 
While relatively little has been written on this specifie topie - beyond caUs to 
aetually think about it (cf. Kukathas 2003), that is - there are three sets of literature one 
eould employ when thinking about principled solutions to these problems. First, there is 
the vast and ever growing normative and theoreticalliterature produeed by politieal 
theorists and philosophers theorizing what eosmopolitan polieies should look like and 
indeed taking into aceount what members of one nation should do for those of another 
(e.g. Pogge 2005). This literature, however, does not address the very specifie question of 
the normative and eeonomie basis of the welfare state and how it would have to be 
reconceptualized to, say, justify systematic distribution of tax monies to people who have 
not (yet) contributed to the benefits scheme. Second, there is the literature on the effeets 
of ethnie diversity and the welfare state in multipluralist countries that 1 have referred to 
in Chapter Four. And while this set of literature helps to shed light on people's attitude 
towards others, specifically members of other ethno-cultural groups, to participate and 
contribute in the workings of the social welfare state, it rests squarely in the traditional 
mindset of the welfare state as relying on nation-state principles of reciprocity. This 
literature should be analyzed in order to evaluate the attitudes of members of the host 
community towards extending welfare benefit provisions to non-compatriots. Finally, 1 
believe that studies examining the deepening integration of the European Union should 
be explored. The EU has been the subject of studies investigating issues of national 
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sovereignty and common policies of social welfare, health care and the like (e.g. Pagano 
2004). This literature can help to evaluate arguments for transnational considerations of 
welfare and to see how these arguments conceptualize ideas of national sovereignty and 
autonomy when it cornes to welfare state provision. 
Immigration is an issue of everyday life for many individuals around the world. 1 
have aimed to highlight sorne of the problems and inequities that arise from CUITent 
immigration schemes which compound international injustices and the stark differences 
in opportunities and conditions of individual autonomy that characterize the world today. 
Immigration schemes ought not to and, indeed, do not need to work only to the 
advantage of the rich, or of rich countries. If they are remodeled along the lines of my 
proposaI, they can actually be a means to further international social justice. 
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